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In this dissertation, I put forward an interpretation of  Spinoza’s seemingly 
intractable notion of  the ‘eternity of  the mind’, an enduring puzzle in the history of  
early modern philosophy. The originality of  my contribution will lie in the use that I 
make of  Spinoza’s philosophy of  freedom as a key to unlock what he meant by this 
notion. By presenting Spinoza as a philosopher who was genuinely concerned with 
human salvation and the need to provide an adequate response to the existential 
predicament posed by human mortality, I begin by motivating a serious engagement 
with this aspect of  his thought. After presenting a critical history of  prior 
engagements with the question, from Spinoza’s own time up until the recent efforts 
that make up the status quæstionis, I proceed to examine the various philosophical 
elements out of  which his eschatology is composed, tracing their development 
through his intellectual career, and subjecting them to critical scrutiny. I argue for 
what I call a ‘qualitative’ reading of  Spinoza’s conception of  eternity, and therefore 
also that the eternity of  the mind described in Ethics V should be understood as a 
form of  ‘realised eschatology’, in virtue of  its implicit subversion of  the classic 
theological distinction between ‘this’ and the ‘next’ life. I argue that what qualifies a 
state of  human existence as eternal, and so as ‘deathless’, for Spinoza, is the 
autonomous expression of  one’s true nature, or freedom. Caught between the 
expression of  our true nature and the unpredictable course of  ‘fortune’, we struggle 
to align ourselves with the former and live ‘authentically’. To the extent that we 
succeed, we ‘feel and know ourselves to be eternal’, but these transient episodes of  
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  1 
He who binds to himself  a joy 
Does the wingèd life destroy 
But he who kisses the joy as it flies 
Lives in eternity’s sunrise 
 
William Blake 
   
Introduction  
 
The thesis of  this dissertation 
 
In the following dissertation, I defend the claim that Spinoza’s seemingly intractable 
notion of  the ‘eternity of  the mind’, as developed in the last pages of  the Ethics, is 
greatly illuminated by considering it in the light of  his views on human freedom.1 
Both freedom (libertas) and eternity (æternitas), as defined by Spinoza, concern the 
necessity (necessitas) with which the existence of  an entity is determined by its own 
nature. While ‘[t]hat thing is called free which exists from the necessity of  its nature 
alone’, ‘eternity is existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily from 
the definition alone of  the eternal thing’.2 If  this is correct, then the extent to which 
we human beings can partake in eternity, ‘the very essence of  God insofar as this 
involves necessary existence’, depends on the extent to which we can achieve 
genuine freedom.3 But human freedom, for Spinoza, is attainable only in ‘this life’, 
not in the ‘hereafter’. So, although the title of  this dissertation, ‘Free for Eternity’, 
may seem to imply an indefinite stretch of  time, extending beyond a single lifetime, it 
is not intended to do so. It points instead to the conceptual relationship whereby 
freedom is for, or stands for, a kind of  existence that Spinoza regards as eternal. 
The passage in question draws a work of  staggering philosophical scope and 
ambition to its climactic close, but continues to frustrate and enchant critics in equal 
measure, three and a half  centuries after first appearing in print. The difficulty owes 
                                                          
1 Benedictus de Spinoza, Ethica, ed. Carl Gebhardt, vol. II, Opera (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925),   
p. 294, 5p20s and passim. Translations of  this text, unless otherwise stated, are from Ethics, in Edwin 
Curley ed. and trans., The Collected Works of  Spinoza, vol. I (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1985), pp. 408-617. Citations are given in the standard form of  ‘5’ (part), ‘p20’ (proposition), ‘s’ 
(scholium), etc. 
2 Spinoza, Ethics, 1def7, 1def8. 
3 Ibid. 5p30dem. 
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as much to the strict geometrical necessity with which it implicates the entire 
preceding work, as it does to the puzzle posed by the doctrine that it appears to 
convey. With the interpretation that I put forward in this dissertation, I hope to cast 
some light on the subject. Although previous attempts to decipher the passage are 
numerous - and many ingenious in execution - I am hopeful that the as-yet 
unexplored (or, at least, underexplored) angle from which I approach the question 
will serve to further our general understanding and appreciation of  this aspect of  
Spinoza’s thought. 
The originality of  my contribution will lie in the use that I make of  Spinoza’s 
philosophy of  freedom as an interpretative key to his thought on the eternity of  the 
mind. It is true that John Caird, in his study of  1888, suggested that ‘Spinoza’s 
doctrine of  immortality is, in one point of  view, only another form of  his doctrine 
of  freedom’.4 However, except for a somewhat elliptical gesture towards a 
connection between these ideas, he did not develop this suggestion much further. 
More recently, Matthew Kisner has argued that ‘[a]mong Spinoza’s many 
philosophical aims and ambitions, none was closer to his heart than helping people 
to achieve freedom’, a claim I hope to support in my own way in the following 
dissertation.5 He also suggests, albeit in passing, that Spinoza’s attempt to show the 
way to human freedom includes a ‘soteriological’ aspect. ‘Even Spinoza’s notion of  
salvation’, he thinks, ‘is arguably directed at our freedom, for it arises from union 
with the eternal, divine nature and, thus, offers a kind of  liberation from the power 
of  external forces’.6 Entwined with this philosophical account of  human salvation 
through union with the eternal is Spinoza’s ‘eschatology’, defined, in the Oxford 
English Dictionary, as ‘that part of  theology concerned with death, judgement, and the 
final destiny of  the soul and of  humankind (from the Greek eschatos, meaning 
“last”)’. It is this aspect of  Spinoza’s thought that I hope to elucidate, picking up 
where Caird and Kisner have left off. 
It might ring alarm bells for some that Spinoza should be linked with any 
theological enterprise or view whatsoever. After all, is this not a thinker whose most 
profound legacy may lie precisely in having courageously decoupled the concept of  
‘philosophy’, or rational, disinterested inquiry, from that of  ‘theology’, an essentially 
partisan exercise in thought control, carried out in the interests of  a dominant 
                                                          
4 John Caird, Spinoza (London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1888) p. 287. 
5 Matthew Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 1. 
6 Ibid. 
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religious institution?7 Referred to at one point as the ‘primary intention [præcipuum 
intentum]’ of  his Theological-Political Treatise, this separation has indeed proven to be 
one of  the more fertile seeds of  modern secularism.8 He explains the fundamental 
difference between the two pursuits as follows: ‘theology defines its religious dogmas 
only so far as suffices to secure obedience, and it leaves it to reason [the organ of  
philosophy] to decide exactly how these dogmas are to be understood in respect of  
truth’.9 So, whereas theology serves certain practical needs and interest groups, 
driven essentially by questions of  expediency, philosophy, in contrast, attends 
exclusively to the truth of  things, regardless of  any particular agenda. 
But Spinoza’s stance with respect to theology is in fact more nuanced than this. 
For one thing, although in the Treatise he seems to regard the purpose of  theology as 
exclusively practical, he also grants that its essential principles - justice and charity - 
are as amenable to the ‘natural light of  reason’ as they are to the prescriptions of  the 
‘true religion’. For another thing, in light of  the overtly philosophical project carried 
out in the Ethics, it cannot be correct that Spinoza ever set out to legislate a sharp 
opposition between the purely theoretical and the purely practical. After all, what is 
the philosophical project of  the Ethics if  not a deeply practical, indeed ethical, one? 
The sense of  paradox is relieved by keeping the distinct purposes of  these two texts 
in view.10 The philosophical journey on which a reader of  the Ethics embarks, moving 
through its successive proofs and theorems, is one that is by its nature an individual 
pursuit, followed to the extent to which each person’s own philosophical inclination, 
or indeed patience, allows.11 The theological project described in the Theological-
                                                          
7 Benedictus de Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, ed. Carl Gebhardt, vol. III, Opera (Heidelberg: 
Carl Winter, 1925), ch. 15, p. 180, and passim. Translations of  this text, unless otherwise stated, are 
from Theological-Political Treatise, trans. Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1998). 
8 Ibid. ch. 14, p. 174, translation my own. Of  course, the more expressly declared purpose of  the 
text, announced on the title page, is to show ‘that freedom to philosophise can not only be granted 
without injury to Piety and the Peace of  the Commonwealth, but that the Peace of  the 
Commonwealth and Piety are endangered by the suppression of  this freedom’. See, also, Jonathan 
Israel’s history of  the influence of  Spinoza’s critique of  seventeenth-century intolerance on the 
subsequent liberalisation and secularisation of  Enlightenment Europe. Jonathan Israel, Radical 
Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of  Modernity 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002). 
9 Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 15, p. 169. 
10 For more on the divergent goals of  these two texts, as brought out with reference to a certain 
group of  ‘Dutch Cartesians’, see Alexander Douglas, ‘Spinoza and the Dutch Cartesians on 
Philosophy and Theology’, Journal of  the History of  Philosophy, 51, no. 4 (2013), p. 567 and passim. 
11 Antonio Negri describes the Ethics as a ‘philosophical Bildungsroman’. Antonio Negri, The Savage 
Anomaly: The Power of  Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of  
Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 48. It might be added that the protagonist of  this Bildungsroman is not a 
character within it - or even Spinoza himself  - but anyone who actively engages with the text and who, 
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Political Treatise, on the other hand, is concerned with society as a whole, and, in 
particular, with the aim of  maximising the fundamental virtues of  justice and charity 
among the wider public. The ‘universal faith [fides catholica]’ described in the Treatise 
therefore reflects the historical circumstances in which it was conceived.12 For that 
which Spinoza then envisaged to achieve these practical ends may well differ from 
what he would suggest today. But while the means may vary from context to context, 
the ends remain universal, and, indeed, true: 
Theology thus understood [Theologiam... sic acceptam], if  you consider its 
precepts and moral teaching, will be found to agree with reason; and if  you 
look to its purpose and end, it will be found to be in no respect opposed to 
reason, and is therefore valid for all men.13 
That Spinoza allowed for a kind of  theology - ‘theology thus understood’ - that 
harmonises with philosophy is a claim that I hope will be further vindicated by the 
interpretation of  Spinoza’s distinctively philosophical theology of  human mortality 
that I advocate in this dissertation.14 But, if  Spinoza distinguishes between a narrow 
and a broad conception of  theology, and if  his aim is to quarantine the former from 
the domain of  philosophy, then, in order to do so, he at times seems to depend on a 
corresponding distinction between a narrow and a broad conception of  philosophy 
itself. In its narrow, more specialised, sense, philosophy may seem aloof  from the 
practical demands of  theology, but in its broader sense, it encompasses a far richer 
epistemological approach, including a worldly and practical aspect, as well as a 
general sensibility conferred by the ‘natural light of  reason’. Susan James draws 
                                                                                                                                                              
having followed the sequence of  its demonstrations, has climbed to a vantage point some distance 
from which he or she began (whether this new vista shares much in common with Spinoza’s or not). 
12 Spinoza sets out seven tenets of  what he calls a ‘universal faith [fides catholica]’, general adherence 
to which would serve to maximise justice and charity in society. Among them are at least two that we 
know Spinoza ‘the philosopher’ did not strictly believe to be true (for example, that ‘God forgives 
repentant sinners’), again highlighting an apparent tension between the aims of  theology and those of  
philosophy. Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 14, p. 162. 
13 Ibid. ch. 15, p. 185. See also ch. 11, pp. 201-2 (and note 27): ‘although religion as preached by the 
Apostles - who simply related the story of  Christ - does not come within the scope of  reason, yet its 
substance, which consists essentially in moral teachings as does the whole of  Christ’s doctrine, can be 
readily grasped by everyone by the natural light of  reason’. 
14 Having arrived at this analysis, I was subsequently encouraged to find that Jonathan Israel shares a 
similar view: ‘Spinoza subverted theology, merging it with philosophy... When, therefore, Spinoza 
concludes his chapter on the separation of  theology and philosophy by deploring the “absurdities, 
disruption and harm that have resulted from the fact that men have thoroughly confused these two 
branches…”, he is not in fact upholding the separation of  spheres introduced by De Witt... Rather he 
totally subverts theology’s autonomy... In other words, true theology is philosophy...’ Israel, Radical 
Enlightenment, ch. 11, pp. 208-9. I disagree, however, with Israel’s further claim that Spinoza was 
‘eliminating [theology’s] role in teaching men truth and the path to salvation’, because, as he also 
acknowledges, ‘true theology’ merges with philosophy in pursuit of  ‘truth’ and ‘salvation’, except that 
the former does so in view of  a ‘social function’. 
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attention to the way in which Spinoza oscillates between these two senses of  
‘philosophy’, depending on his immediate purpose: 
Philosophical understanding, it seems [cf. Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 13, p. 
170], must either result from demonstration or be non-existent… This 
argument serves Spinoza’s immediate purpose by conveniently establishing 
that, when theologians expect people who lack philosophical training to grasp 
speculative truths, they are asking the impossible… Here, then, philosophy 
seems to be defined as a highly specialised form of  knowledge, with its own 
rarefied and distinctive method… Spinoza’s project of  separating philosophy 
from theology sometimes pushes him towards the narrower conception, even 
where doing so obscures the richness of  his own overall argument.15 
By advocating a reading of  Spinoza’s treatment of  the question of  human 
mortality that draws on his philosophy of  freedom, I will seek to uncover any 
possible affinity in his thought between theology, ‘broadly construed’, and 
philosophy, ‘broadly construed’. In doing so, I do not claim to supersede the best 
interpretations in the literature, nor do I claim to have identified the sole and 
exclusive strand in this rich nexus of  ideas. My hope is only to bring a neglected 
aspect back into the picture. So, although the work presented here may show 
disagreement with certain readings, it will be more neutral or complimentary with 
respect to others. Foundational to my approach has been the path-finding research 
into Spinoza’s ethics of  freedom, much of  which has been carried out by scholars in 
recent years.16 Equally influential for my reading, and bearing again on the possibility 
of  a philosophical theology, has been the work done by those who have sought to 
restore the term ‘Deus’ to Spinoza’s much-maligned expression ‘Deus sive Natura’.17 
The tradition of  begrudging this term any force dates back to Spinoza’s own time, 
beginning with the earliest accusations of  ‘atheism’ and allegations that he could not 
have used the word in any more than a hollow or deceptive way. 
                                                          
15 Susan James, Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion and Politics: The Theologico-Political Treatise (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 192-3. 
16 See, for example, Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza and the Idea of  Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1961); Stuart Hampshire, ‘Spinoza’s Theory of  Human Freedom’, The Monist, 55 (1971),        
pp. 554-66; Jon Wetleson, The Sage and the Way: Studies in Spinoza’s Ethics of  Freedom (Assen: Van 
Gorcum, 1979); Susan James, ‘Freedom, Slavery, and the Passions’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Spinoza’s Ethics, ed. Olli Koistinen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 223-41; 
Michael LeBuffe, From Bondage to Freedom: Spinoza on Human Excellence (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010);  Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom. 
17 See, for example, Sylvain Zac, L’idée de vie dans la philosophie de Spinoza (Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1963); Errol E. Harris, Salvation From Despair: A Reappraisal of  Spinoza’s Philosophy (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973); Alan Donagan, Spinoza (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1989); 
Herman de Dijn, ‘Spinoza on Knowledge and Religion’, in Religio Academici: Essays on Scepticism, Religion 
and the Pursuit of  Knowledge, ed. Péter Losonczi (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2009), pp. 126-36. 
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By way of  framing the dissertation to come, I will devote the remainder of  this 
introduction to three aims. Firstly, by presenting Spinoza as a thinker who was 
genuinely concerned with the problems of  human salvation and eschatology, I will 
attempt to motivate a serious engagement with his discussion of  the eternity of  the 
mind. Secondly, I will briefly outline the interpretative challenge facing a reader of  
the Ethics upon encountering the passage that begins at (5p20s). Finally, I will look to 




Spinoza’s many masks 
 
Like many of  the great figures from the philosophical canon, Spinoza has had his 
fair share of  caricature; at times venerated to the point of  legend, at others deflated 
to little more than an industrious integrator of  prior thought, an echo chamber for 
existing ideas and traditions. For some, he stands out almost as a kind of  anomaly, a 
philosopher of  such standing among the greats that he warrants a unique status.18 So 
profound can reverence for this ‘philosopher’s philosopher’ be, that it is a sentiment 
capable of  uniting historians of  philosophy as diverse as Bertrand Russell, who did 
not blush to hail Spinoza as ‘the noblest and most lovable of  the great philosophers’, 
and Gilles Deleuze, whose boundless admiration found expression in the sobriquet, 
‘the Christ of  philosophers’, adding that ‘the greatest philosophers are hardly more 
than apostles who distance themselves or draw near to this mystery’.19 Offsetting this 
hagiographic fervour is the suggestion that each of  Spinoza’s ideas may be little 
more than an heirloom handed down from prior traditions, to the extent that ‘if  we 
could cut up all the philosophic literature available to him into little slips of  paper, 
toss them up into the air, and let them fall back to the ground, then out of  these 
scattered slips of  paper we could reconstruct his Ethics’.20 The combined truth, of  
course, is that Spinoza was deeply engaged in the intellectual, social, and political 
                                                          
18 See, for example, Negri, Savage Anomaly. 
19 Bertrand Russell, History of  Western Philosophy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1946), p. 552; 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), p. 60. 
20 Harry A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of  Spinoza: Unfolding the Latent Processes of  his Reasoning, vol. I 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934), p. 3. 
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currents of  his time, and that even though in reacting to this milieu he was informed 
by a plethora of  existing traditions and literatures, he nevertheless gave these ideas 
his own radical spin and reinterpretation, bequeathing to future generations a 
philosophical impulse, or ‘Spinozism’, itself  ever-capable of  renewed relevance and 
reinterpretation.21 
Perhaps this inherent dynamism of  old and new, of  rebirth and renewal, is 
responsible for Spinoza’s philosophy being so peculiarly susceptible to a diversity of  
readings and interpretations, even though it may be ironic that a philosopher who 
modelled his methodology on the precision and exactitude of  geometry should in 
the end be open to such a diverse legacy. For in the history of  Spinoza’s reception 
one is confronted not with a single, straightforward ‘Spinoza’, but with a number of  
different ‘Spinozas’. However, with these appropriations of  the famous Dutch 
philosopher - often seeking to recruit him as figurehead for some intellectual 
movement or trend - one tends to find an exaggeration of  some aspect of  his 
thought at the expense of  others. A recent fashion among certain historians of  
philosophy to portray Spinoza as a kind of  grandfather of  twentieth-century 
‘physicalism’ or ‘naturalism’, for example, promotes a reading that un-Spinozistically 
elevates extension above its fellow attributes as much as it tries to brush his 
religiosity under the carpet, a dimension of  his thought that would otherwise jar so 
flagrantly with his alleged bequest of  an austere mechanistic materialism. His famous 
equivocation, ‘Deus sive Natura’, for these historians of  philosophy, is a needless and 
perhaps even deceptive lengthening of  Natura. For others, it ‘esoterically’ masks the 
intentions of  a writer who cautiously disguised a message aimed at an elite who 
would be able to extract it: 
The traditional distinction between exoteric (or “disclosed”) and esoteric (or 
“enigmatical”) presentation was accessible to Spinoza… He was cautious 
insofar as he did not state the whole truth clearly and unequivocally but kept 
his utterances, to the best of  his knowledge, within the limits imposed by what 
he considered the legitimate claims of  society. He speaks then in all his 
writings, and especially in the Treatise, “ad captum vulgi”.22 
                                                          
21 Lorenzo Vinciguerra suggests, playfully, that if  ‘we were to parody Bergson’s way of  putting it, we 
could say that Spinoza gave rise to at least two histories of  philosophy - one in which he belongs to 
the past and is ranked among Cartesians with his attention turned toward the ancient theologies, and 
one in which he is a member of  the avant-garde, rebellious and subversive, polemicising against the 
instituted order, resolutely turned towards a thought yet to be constructed’. Lorenzo Vinciguerra, 
‘Spinoza in French Philosophy Today’, Philosophy Today, 53, no. 4 (2009), p. 422. 
22 Leo Strauss, ‘How to Study Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise’, Proceedings of  the American Academy 
for Jewish Research, 17 (1947), pp. 111-2. 
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This suspicion situates critics in an interpretative tradition dating back to Spinoza’s 
own time. For there has always been the perception that he did not invest any literal 
significance in the religious language with which he chose to frame his philosophy, 
dressing what was an essentially atheistic and anti-religious position in such terms 
solely in order to escape the fate of  Bruno or Galileo. 
But these more reductive assessments of  Spinoza’s philosophy have always 
seemed to fall short of  capturing the full scope of  his thought. The suggestion that, 
in the Ethics, Spinoza veiled his iconoclastic stance in religious garb simply as lip 
service to the ecclesiastical authorities is implausible, if  only because he had already 
defied orthodoxy anonymously with the Theological-Political Treatise. But, more than 
anything, it is the glaring failure of  these assessments to do justice to the tenor of  his 
life’s intellectual work that belies their inadequacy. From the beginning, Spinoza 
announced his philosophical project to be a fundamentally ethical one:  
After experience had taught me that all the things which regularly occur in 
ordinary life are empty and futile… I resolved at last to try to find out whether 
there was anything which would be the true good… whether there was 
something which, once found and acquired, would continuously give me the 
greatest joy, to eternity.23 
This autobiographical intimation of  Spinoza’s principal intellectual motivations, 
reminiscent of  a comparable passage with which Descartes opens his Discours de la 
Méthode, reveals the rich inclusivity of  his conception of  the ethical.24 Not only does 
this search for improvement (emendatio) aim at ‘the true good’, but it also involves a 
soteriological concern with the salvation, or redemption, of  a troubled human 
existence, as well as an eschatological concern with the kind of  existence awaiting the 
consummation of  this ethical journey. Thus ‘the true good’ stands to deliver - or 
save - Spinoza from the worldly bondage of  ‘empty and futile’ things, and in doing 
so afford him a share in a higher, ‘eternal’ form of  existence. That his lifelong 
conception of  the ethical includes this much is finally borne out in the last pages of  
                                                          
23 Benedictus de Spinoza, Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, ed. Carl Gebhardt, vol. II, Opera 
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925), p. 5, §1. Translations of  this text, unless otherwise stated, are from 
Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, in Curley ed., The Collected Works of  Spinoza, vol. I, pp. 7-45. 
Citations give the section number, following the now standard sequence introduced by Bruder. 
Benedictus de Spinoza, Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, ed. Carl H. Bruder, vol. II, Opera quae 
supersunt Omnia (Lipsiae: Typis et sumtibus Bernh. Tauchnitz jun., 1844). 
24 René Descartes, Discours de la Mèthode, ed. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, vol. VI, Oeuvres de 
Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 1964-76), pp. 1-78. References to this edition of  Descartes’ works will 
henceforth be abbreviated as ‘AT’. 
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his masterpiece, the tellingly titled Ethics, in which he marks out the way to ‘salvation, 
or blessedness, or freedom [salus seu beatitudo seu libertas]’.25 
The notion of  the eternity of  the mind was therefore of  undeniable importance 
to Spinoza, and although the passage which follows (5p20s) is, as Edwin Curley has 
said, ‘more than usually obscure’ (even by Spinoza’s standards), and indeed more 
than usually difficult, it deserves to be taken seriously and its meaning must be 
sought if  justice is to be done to Spinoza’s philosophy.26 It would leave something to 
be desired from an engagement with his thought were one to follow Jonathan 
Bennett’s advice: ‘[t]hose of  us who love and admire Spinoza’s philosophical work 
should in sad silence avert our eyes from the second half  of  Part 5’, an ‘unmitigated 
and seemingly unmotivated disaster’.27 Although Bennett’s frustration is 
understandable, for this passage is, as Curley says, even more inscrutable than one 
normally expects from Spinoza, the challenge of  trying to uncover the meaning of  
his notion of  the eternity of  the mind is nevertheless one that deserves to be 
confronted, even if  in the end that meaning should be found to consist more in a 
kind of  philosophical fantasy than anything more substantive, or to be deficient in 
some other way. 
 
A puzzling twist in the Ethics 
 
At (5p20s), the reader is invited to set aside ‘this present life’ because it is ‘time now 
to pass to those things which pertain to the Mind’s duration without relation to the 
body’.28 Even by itself  there is something provocative in this overture, but it is all the 
more striking because of  its incongruity within the context of  the Ethics. In 
particular, the reader is surprised by Spinoza’s suggestion that he is going to 
elaborate a sense in which the mind might outlive the body - beyond ‘this present 
life’ - because this would appear to contradict what he has already said about the 
relationship between mind and body in Part II, itself  a consequence of  the substance 
monism that he has developed in Part I. That is, because ‘in Nature there is only one 
                                                          
25 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p36s. 
26 Curley, The Collected Works of  Spinoza, vol. I, p. 606, note 13. 
27 Jonathan Bennett, A Study of  Spinoza’s Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984),       
pp. 375, 357. To be fair to Bennett, he does acknowledge that his ‘adverse judgement on it should be 
defended’, even if  he ‘would like to excuse [himself] from discussing it’. 
28 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p20s. 
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substance’, a thesis proven in the first fourteen propositions of  the work, it follows 
eventually that ‘the thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the 
same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, now under that’, 
and so also, in particular, that any individual mind (which Spinoza calls an ‘idea’) and 
its corresponding body (the mind’s ‘ideatum’) are in fact ‘one and the same thing, but 
expressed in two ways’.29 But if  the mind and body are indeed in a sense ‘one and the 
same thing’, as Spinoza has demonstrated in Part II, then should it not just follow as 
a matter of  course that the mind and body are exactly contemporaneous with each 
other, from beginning to end? And if  so, then in what possible sense could the mind 
outlive ‘this present life’? 
That Spinoza is suggesting that the mind might survive the death of  the body 
therefore throws up what appears to be a sudden twist in the narrative of  the Ethics, 
and it is perhaps at first tempting to brush it aside. Perhaps this is just a misleading 
way of  introducing a consideration of  the mind in abstraction from its necessarily 
bodily circumstances of  existence, a suggestion that would in fact be in keeping with 
Spinoza’s principle of  the strict heterogeneity of  the different attributes.30 But alas 
the twist is not so easily untwined, as becomes evident over the course of  the 
ensuing propositions. In particular, Spinoza appears to explicitly confirm the 
parallelism-contradicting claim that was only suggested at (5p20s), declaring outright, 
‘The human Mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the Body, but something of  it 
remains which is eternal.’31 Here there really does seem to be a stronger claim to the 
effect that there is a real existence of  the mind (or at least ‘something’ thereof) that 
outstrips that of  the body, a claim in clear violation of  the identity of  mind and body 
established at (2p7s). For many, this is the most obviously problematic and urgent 
form in which the puzzle of  Spinoza’s discussion of  the eternity of  the mind 
presents itself, a puzzle so mystifying that it has sparked an even wider array of  
opinion than one normally finds among the commentators. Indeed, if  Spinoza is 
peculiarly susceptible to a rich and varied legacy at the best of  times, then in the case 




                                                          
29 Ibid. 1p14c1, 2p7s. 
30 Ibid. 1p10: ‘Each attribute of  a substance must be conceived through itself.’ 
31 Ibid. 5p23. 




The structure of  this dissertation 
 
In Chapter 1, I will consult the rich tapestry of  prior engagements with Spinoza’s 
eschatology. Starting with the earliest attempts to come to terms with this aspect of  
his thought and concluding with an appraisal of  the more prominent readings that 
make up the contemporary status quæstionis, a valuable moral to be gleaned from this 
survey will be that, for many of  the readings currently on offer, there are certain 
precedents already in the literature well worth rereading for their insights, and in 
some cases, old wine in new bottles. Steven Nadler’s ‘suggestion... that for Spinoza, 
after a person’s death, what remains of  the mind eternally - the adequate ideas, along 
with the idea of  the essence of  the body - all disperses and reverts back to the 
infinite intellect of  God’ in fact joins an established tradition of  ‘Averroist’ 
readings.32 Again, Nadler’s portrayal of  Spinoza as a ‘naturalist’ or ‘atheist’, such that 
any ‘religiously charged doctrine goes against every grain of  his philosophical 
persuasions’, is to echo a view that for a long time was almost a platitude among 
European thinkers (though the term ‘atheism’ certainly meant something different 
then to what it does nowadays).33 Conversely, an acknowledgement of  Spinoza’s 
(highly idiosyncratic) religiosity, recently gaining momentum again, echoes the great 
turning point in Spinoza’s reception that rippled outwards from Germany towards 
the end of  the eighteenth century. Keeping this chequered history of  Spinoza’s 
reception in view helps, if  anything, to highlight the incredible malleability - or 
conceptual fluidity - of  the broad terms often used to characterise positions in 
philosophy. This is as true of  the familiar grands mots, ‘naturalism’, ‘rationalism’, and 
‘religiosity’, as it is of  the more specific terms that describe the workings of  a 
particular doctrine, in this case, ‘eternity’, ‘mind’, and ‘immortality’. Allowing a shift 
of  meaning in some of  these terms, while holding others fixed, is an interpretative 
decision that requires justification. Conversely, if  it is granted that Spinoza reshaped 
many of  the traditional terms at his disposal, then it might be expected that this be 
                                                          
32 Steven Nadler, ‘Eternity and Immortality in Spinoza’s Ethics’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 26, no. 1 
(2002), pp. 242-3. 
33 Ibid. pp. 243-4. 
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applied to his conceptual topography more generally. I will therefore bring Chapter 1 
to a close with Clare Carlisle’s sage advice regarding the way we approach this 
innovative use of  traditional philosophical and theological language. 
The task of  reconsidering Spinoza’s eschatology in the light of  his philosophy of  
freedom will begin, in Chapter 2, by clarifying the relationship in his thought 
between the ‘immortality of  the soul’ and the ‘eternity of  the mind’. This 
clarification will proceed by tracing the progression in Spinoza’s thought from his 
earlier work, the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being, in which he makes 
liberal use of  the language of  the ‘immortality of  the soul [onsterfelykheid van de ziel]’, 
to his later masterpiece, the Ethics, in which he dispenses with this phraseology, 
opting instead to frame his discussion in terms of  the ‘eternity of  (part of) the mind 
[æternitas (partis) mentis]’.34 A common strand will be found in the ethical ambitions of  
both texts, each setting out a path towards a state of  human fulfilment that is at once 
cognitive, psychological, agapic, moral, and spiritual. On the holistic conception 
advanced in both texts, no single one of  these aspects is to be realised in isolation, 
but rather all are to issue as parallel expressions of  one and the same ethical 
condition. The cognitive improvement which consists in the acquisition of  more and 
more adequate ideas is reflected, in practical terms, in the manifestation of  more and 
more virtuous forms of  behaviour and interactions with others, while, ‘spiritually’, 
both of  these aspects consist in a gradually improving ‘salus’, which connotes as 
much a sense of  spiritual salvation, as it does a sense of  health or wellbeing. 
Similarly, in both texts, the eschatological aspect of  this ethical condition is one that 
is realised in ‘this’, as opposed to the ‘next’, life. However, whereas the later work 
arrives at a more definitive expression of  this kind of  ‘realised eschatology’, the 
earlier work contains only glimmers of  it that remain ultimately obscured by a more 
temporally construed ‘afterlife’.35 But because Spinoza’s eschewal of  these more 
traditional vestiges in the Ethics is not accompanied by a renunciation of  the 
eschatological concerns of  the earlier work tout court, it remains to be seen whether 
the position presented in the later work warrants the language of  ‘immortality’ or 
‘deathlessness’. 
                                                          
34 Benedictus de Spinoza, Korte Verhandeling van God, den Mensch, en des zelfs Welstand, ed. Carl 
Gebhardt, vol. I, Opera (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925), pp. 3-121. Translations of  this text, unless 
otherwise stated, are from Short Treatise on God, Man and his Well-Being, in Curley ed., The Collected Works 
of  Spinoza, vol. I, pp. 53-156; Spinoza, Ethics, 5p20s and passim. 
35 Charles H. Dodd is credited with coining the term ‘realised eschatology’. Charles H. Dodd, The 
Parables of  the Kingdom (London: William Clowes and Sons, 1935), p. 23. 
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Seeking to explicate the sense in which the eternity of  the mind pertains to a 
condition - or quality - of  existence in this life, I will in Chapter 3 probe the meaning 
of  ‘eternity’ and its opposite, ‘duration’, within Spinoza’s metaphysical framework. In 
order to unpack what Spinoza means by referring to these two notions as ‘species 
[species]’, I will suggest an interpretation whereby the metaphysical category to which 
they belong is to be understood by close analogy with that of  the ‘attributes 
[attributi]’. For both ‘attributes’ and ‘species’ express the being of  substance in such a 
way that it is cognisable by a suitably attuned intellect, though in neither case does 
this render the category ‘merely’ subjective. Following Descartes, for whom an 
attribute is the ‘principal property’ constituting the ‘nature and essence’ of  a 
substance by which it ‘affects us’ in its being, Spinoza likewise understands the 
attributes as (jointly) constituting the essence of  God (or substance) ‘through which 
we come to know him in himself ’.36 But, whereas the attributes in this way serve to 
express the nature or essence - the ‘whatness’ - of  substance, the species in contrast 
serve to express its ‘thatness’, yet still essentially with reference to how this is 
cognisable by a suitably attuned intellect. The two categories, attributes and species, 
are thus mutually dovetailing, each supplying a necessary dimension of  being, which 
is thus essentially cognisable. 
Paving the way for an examination of  Spinoza’s account of  cognition, and, in 
particular, the form of  cognition he describes as being framed ‘under a species of  
eternity [sub specie æternitatis]’, which features prominently in the demonstration of  the 
mind’s eternity in Ethics V, Chapter 4 will set out the philosophy of  mind (and body) 
on which this account depends. The exposition will proceed at first genetically, 
tracing a gradually evolving conception of  mind (and body) through the successive 
stages of  Spinoza’s intellectual development. This approach will yield the interesting 
observation that there would appear to be a correlation between the development of  
this side of  Spinoza’s thought and that of  his eschatology. For the earlier Short 
Treatise, which founders under a tension between its occasional hints of  a realised, 
this-life, eschatology and its blurring of  temporality with eternity, is also a work in 
which one finds a distinctly pre-Ethics conception of  mind (and body). In fact, given 
the palimpsestic nature of  the text, it is possible to discern the distinct stages of  a 
                                                          
36 René Descartes, Principia Philosophiæ, §53, AT VIII.25. Translations of  this text, unless otherwise 
stated, are from Principles of  Philosophy, in John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch 
ed. and trans., The Philosophical Writings of  Descartes, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 
1985), p. 210. This translation of  Descartes’ works will henceforth be abbreviated as ‘CSM’. Spinoza, 
Short Treatise, I, p. 73. 
  14 
gradually maturing conception. This will invite a hypothetical ‘geology’, as it were, 
from which a timeline for the evolution of  Spinoza’s views on the mind (and body) 
will be conjectured. As a result, it will be suggested that the ambiguity evident in the 
eschatology of  the Short Treatise is at least partly a consequence of  this earlier 
vacillation on the question of  the mind and its relationship to the body, for these 
pre-Ethics conceptions still effectively allow for a Cartesian basis on which to defend 
an orthodox and temporally construed immortality of  the soul. 
With this groundwork in place, I will in Chapter 5 expound Spinoza’s theory of  
cognition, with particular attention given to the relationship between this 
epistemological capacity of  the mind and the metaphysical category of  ‘species’. A 
correlation will be mapped out between Spinoza’s hierarchy of  the varieties of  
cognition and the alternative expressions of  existence meant by the species of  
duration and eternity, with the ‘imagination [imaginatio]’ corresponding to existence 
qua temporal, changing, and fortuitous, and ‘reason [ratio]’ and ‘intuitive knowledge 
[scientia intuitiva]’ corresponding to existence qua eternal, fixed and necessary.37 This 
will be followed by a closer examination of  each rank in the cognitive hierarchy and 
the essential differences between them, which will be shown to consist not, as a 
popular rendering of  Spinoza’s ‘rationalism’ often implies, in the denigration of  the 
senses or the imagination, but rather in a more fundamental distinction between 
autonomy and heteronomy. In this respect, Spinoza’s account of  cognition 
anticipates the core Enlightenment value of  wresting oneself  free from the coercion 
of  dogmatic authority in order to direct one’s thoughts according to the demands of  
rational thought itself. It is at this point, in the move from dependence on the 
external and arbitrary towards the immanent and essential, that freedom announces 
itself  as the core principle in Spinoza’s ethical project. After noting Spinoza’s revival 
of  the notion of  a noetic union between knower and known, in the tradition of  
Aristotle and Aquinas, the chapter concludes with a suggestion for how this might 
bear on the question of  the eternity of  the mind. 
Having identified freedom as marking the essential difference between higher and 
lower varieties of  cognition, I will in Chapter 6 turn to investigate this fundamental 
quality further. As might be expected, the very same aspects of  the ethically 
accomplished condition described in both the Short Treatise and the Ethics - the 
cognitive, psychological, agapic, moral and spiritual – come to be seen as, each in 
                                                          
37 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p40s2. 
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their own way, a form of  freedom. But, before a case can be made for attributing to 
Spinoza a conception that encompasses all these parallel expressions of  human 
freedom, an urgent justificatory challenge must be met. For if  freedom really is to be 
allocated so central a role in his system, then Spinoza must first be exonerated of  the 
longstanding charge of  having denied that there is any such thing as human freedom 
at all. The challenge presents itself  on two fronts, the first occasioned by the 
apparent conflict between Spinoza’s strict (necessitarian) determinism and the 
compossibility of  human freedom, and the second occasioned by the apparent 
conflict among Spinoza’s own various notions of  freedom. Whereas the freedom to 
‘think as one pleases and say what one thinks [sentire, quæ velit, et quæ sentiat, dicere 
licere]’, defended in the Theological-Political Treatise and the Political Treatise, is to be 
granted universally to all citizens in a state, the freedom enjoyed by the ethically 
accomplished ‘free man [homo liber]’ of  the Ethics is a hard-won prize, ‘as difficult as it 
is rare’.38 So what, if  anything, could these various kinds of  freedom have in 
common? Drawing on the work of  Susan James and others, I present Spinoza’s 
multifaceted conception of  freedom as stemming from a deeper commitment to a 
classical, republican, notion of  self-determination and self-legislation, reinforced by 
his own experiences of  the political landscape in the young Dutch Republic. In this 
deeper commitment lies the unity binding together his various notions of  freedom, 
which is in fact expressed, rather than problematised, by the metaphysical definition 
at (1def7). 
But why a condition of  human freedom should carry eschatological, as well as 
cognitive, psychological, agapic and moral, consequences remains to be shown. In 
order to prepare the way for an elucidation of  this specifically spiritual dimension of  
ethical fulfilment, I will in Chapter 7 return to Spinoza’s metaphysics. For it will turn 
out that freedom enjoys an important ontological status within the system, and 
especially with respect to the distinction between eternity and duration. This will be 
spelled out via a somewhat indirect route, beginning with an evaluation of  the 
fundamental character of  Spinoza’s conception of  reality (and its opposite, ‘mere’ 
appearance). After considering several popular ways of  marking the distinction in his 
thought between that which is real and that which is only apparent, each attempt will 
                                                          
38 Spinoza, Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, ch. 20, p. 239. The slogan that Spinoza chooses for the title of  
the final chapter in the Treatise is from Tacitus: ‘ubi sentire quæ velis et quæ sentias dicere licet’. Tacitus, 
Histories, trans. C. H. Moore, in Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931). See 
also Benedictus de Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, in Carl Gebhardt ed., Opera (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 
1925); Spinoza, Ethics, 4p66s and passim; 5p42s. 
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be shown to be incapable of  accommodating the truly revolutionary form of  
Spinoza’s metaphysics, which is shaped, above all, by a framework of  immanence. In 
place of  these deficient demarcations, it will be suggested that Spinoza re-construed 
the classical philosophical opposition between reality and appearance, translating it 
instead into an opposition between the ‘inmost essence of  things’ and a ‘superficial’ 
view of  them. But existing according to one’s ‘inmost essence’ just is, for Spinoza, 
what it is to be free, while those aspects of  ourselves that are ‘superficial’ are those 
that issue at least partly from outside our true nature, rendering us, to that extent, 
unfree. When viewed sub specie æternitatis, as opposed to sub specie durationis, things are 
understood according to their ‘inmost essence’, excluding those aspects of  ourselves 
which manifest themselves only superficially. What ‘remains’ from such a standpoint 
includes only those aspects of  ourselves that are truly free, which equate, of  course, 
to those expressions of  our nature that are cognitively enlightened, psychologically 
temperate, loving, morally virtuous, and spiritually fulfilled. 
Having set out these metaphysical foundations in the preceding chapter, I will in 
Chapter 8 take stock of  the key results that have emerged over the course of  the 
dissertation, as well as confront the notorious passage beginning at (5p20s). I will 
begin by expanding on the importance of  freedom in Spinoza’s philosophical 
eschatology, both in his earlier and his later work. In addition to supplying the 
content required by a ‘qualitative’ rendering of  ‘eternity’, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
the idea of  freedom will be shown to help determine what Spinoza means by a kind 
of  existence that is ‘deathless’ or ‘free from death’. Without attempting to 
‘psychologise’ any of  the objective workings of  Spinoza’s doctrine, I will point to an 
illuminating connection between the centrality of  freedom in his philosophy 
generally, and its profound importance to him in the context of  his life and times. 
The bulk of  the chapter will contain an attempt to reconcile the interpretation of  
Spinoza’s doctrine of  the  ‘eternity of  the mind’ as a form of  ‘realised eschatology’ 
that has emerged over previous chapters with the claim that he is not simply 
reducing this doctrine to therapy aimed at alleviating the fear of  death. While this 
does figure as a corollary of  Spinoza’s mature eschatology, it does not exhaust its 
significance. Seeking to uncover the additional metaphysical sense that he bestows on 
his treatment of  this issue will lead to a confrontation with the most recalcitrant 
proposition in the passage under consideration: ‘The human Mind cannot be 
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absolutely destroyed with the Body, but something of  it remains which is eternal.’39 
Various possibilities for understanding this apparent violation of  Spinoza’s definition 
of  eternity as timelessness will be considered, drawing on the distinction between the 
‘superficial’ and the ‘authentic’ developed in the previous chapter. However, the final 
answer to this particular question will have to remain somewhat guarded, and even 
uncertain. This will suggest that there may even be something intractable about this 
particular aspect of  the doctrine, owing possibly to the nature of  its ‘content’, if  that 
is even an appropriate term for it. For if  the eternity of  the mind turns, in a crucial 
way, on the acquisition of  scientia intuitiva, and an immediate episodic grasp of  the all-
animating source of  existence in which this special kind of  cognition consists is, by 
definition, distinct from the sequential structure of  ratio, then perhaps it should be 
unsurprising that the elaborate sequence of  arguments conveyed in the Ethics may in 
the end be incapable of  capturing this deeply experiential, yet metaphysically 
concrete, orientation towards life (and freedom from death). Struggling to deploy his 
words and inferences in aid of  a task to which they may be essentially inadequate, 
and acknowledging the peculiarity of  his allusions to a more temporal eternity of  the 
mind, since ‘eternity can neither be defined by time nor have any relation to time’, 
Spinoza points to the crux of  the difficulty, if  not the denouement for all our 
confusion: ‘still, we feel and know by experience that we are eternal’.40 
                                                          
39 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p23. 
40 Ibid. 5p23s, emphasis added. 







In the Footsteps of  Others 
 
 
Before venturing my own account of  Spinoza’s mature eschatology, and especially as 
it culminates in the passage beginning at (5p20s), I will consider some of  the more 
prominent readings that have come before. In the introduction to the dissertation, I 
gave reasons for taking this aspect of  Spinoza’s thought seriously, and so have 
already discounted the approach (or non-approach) of  complete dismissal that, for 
example, Bennett at one point appeared to recommend (but, curiously, did not 
himself  follow). This ‘approach’ would be leaving out a dimension of  Spinoza’s 
thought about which he cared a great deal. I have also discounted the hypothesis that 
Spinoza was writing disingenuously, or ‘esoterically’. While this hypothesis goes 
further than outright dismissal in at least postulating some intelligible intentions in 
writing the passage, it too ultimately fails to take seriously the explicitly soteriological 
and eschatological dimensions of  Spinoza’s philosophy, in light of  which it would 
seem that the passage does express some kind of  meaningful doctrine. In any case, 
the suggestion that Spinoza wrote duplicitously in order to ‘cover his tracks’, or for 
the benefit of  a few in the know, does not stand up to scrutiny. As Frederick Pollock 
remarked concerning any alleged posturing in the passage, ‘it would be a curious 
thing that he began to think of  saving appearances after he had written nine-tenths 
of  the Ethics without the slightest regard to any such prudential economy’.1 What, 
then, have others taken the meaning of  the doctrine to be? 
                                                          
1 Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy (London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1880), p. 276. 
What may this mean 
That thou, dead corpse, again in complete steel, 
Revisits thus the glimpses of  the moon, 
Making night hideous, and we fools of  nature 
So horridly to shake our disposition 
With thoughts beyond the reaches of  our souls? 
Say why is this? Wherefore? What should we do? 
 
Shakespeare, Hamlet 
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Early reckonings 
 
The earliest engagement with Spinoza’s eschatology of  which we have a record is to 
be found in his correspondence with Willem Van Blyenbergh, a grain merchant with 
a lively interest in theological matters.2 After initiating the exchange with Spinoza, 
raising some qualms that he had with the philosopher’s deviation from orthodoxy on 
the nature of  God, and eventually meeting with him in Leiden, Blyenbergh 
challenged the consistency of  his views on the fate of  the mind, or soul, after the 
death of  the body. In order to appreciate Blyenbergh’s challenge, it is necessary to 
supply some of  the intellectual context, and as with much of  Spinoza’s thought, this 
must be done with reference to his illustrious predecessor, René Descartes. For 
Descartes had claimed to have answered the call of  the Lateran Council to uphold 
the truth of  orthodox Christian doctrine in the face of  heretical and ‘Averroist’ 
denials of  personal immortality:3 
[T]hese arguments are enough to show that the decay of  the body does not 
imply the destruction of  the mind… [T]he human body, in so far as it differs 
from other bodies, is simply made up of  a certain configuration of  limbs and 
other accidents of  this sort; whereas the human mind is not made up of  any 
accidents in this way, but is a pure substance… And it follows from this that 
while the body can very easily perish, the mind is immortal by its very nature.4 
Spinoza, on the other hand, developed a view of  the mind that was apparently in 
deliberate contradistinction to that advocated by Descartes. As Lodewijk Meyer 
explained in the preface to his friend’s geometrical exposition of  Descartes’ “Principles 
of  Philosophy”, whereas ‘Descartes only assumes... that the human mind is a substance 
                                                          
2 Letters 18-24, 27; Benedictus de Spinoza, Epistolæ, ed. Carl Gebhardt, vol. IV, Opera (Heidelberg: 
Carl Winter, 1925), pp. 79-161. Translations of  this text, unless otherwise stated, are from Spinoza: The 
Letters, trans. Samuel Shirley, with introduction and notes by Steven Barbone, Lee Rice and Jacob 
Adler (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1995). For a study of  Spinoza’s correspondents and 
associates, see Koenraad O. Meinsma, Spinoza et son cercle: Étude critique historique sur les heterodoxies 
hollandaise, trans. S. Roosenberg and J.-P. Osier (Paris: Vrin, 1983). On Blyenbergh, see p. 208 and 
passim. 
3 The Fifth Lateran Council (1512-1517) issued as one of  its decrees that ‘each and every 
philosopher who teaches publicly in the universities or elsewhere... when they explain or address to 
their audience the principles or conclusions of  philosophers, where these are known to deviate from 
the true faith - as in the assertion of  the soul’s mortality or of  there being only one soul [‘Averroism’] 
or of  the eternity of  the world and other topics of  this kind - they are obliged to devote their every 
effort to clarify for their listeners the truth of  the Christian religion...’ Decrees of  the Ecumenical Councils, 
ed. Norman P. Tanner (Washington, D.C: Sheed & Ward, 1990), p. 606. 
4 Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, ‘Synopsis of  the following six Meditations’, AT VII.14. 
Translated in CSM, vol. II, p. 10. These arguments clearly were not ‘enough’ for Mersenne, however, 
who complained: ‘[Y]ou say not one word about the immortality of  the human mind. Yet this is 
something you should have taken special care to prove and demonstrate.’ Ibid. ‘Second Set of  
Objections’, p. 91, AT VII.127-8. 
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thinking absolutely’, Spinoza shows that ‘just as the human Body is not extension 
absolutely, but only an extension determined in a certain way... so also the human 
Mind, or Soul, is not thought absolutely, but only a thought determined in a certain 
way’.5 On these grounds, Blyenbergh challenged Spinoza: 
You hold that... just as the human body is not Extension absolutely but only 
Extension determined in a definite way... so too the human mind is not 
Thought absolutely but only Thought determined in a definite way... From this 
I think it seems to follow that... just as the human body on its disintegration is 
resolved into the thousands of  bodies of  which it was composed, so too our 
mind, when it leaves the body, is resolved again into the multitude of  thoughts 
of  which it was composed... so too after death our thinking substance is 
dissolved in such a way that our thoughts or thinking substances remain, but 
their essence is not what it was when it was called a human mind.6 
As in the presentation of  the puzzle in the previous chapter, Blyenbergh presents 
the problem with Spinoza’s eschatology as one of  consistency. How can Spinoza 
insist that the mind is, like the body, a certain modification of  substance, yet at the 
same time hold that the mind (or, at least, ‘something’ thereof) retains enough of  a 
claim to its erstwhile essence and identity to continue in existence when the very 
locus of  identity itself, the body, loses its specific configuration at death? 
Unfortunately we do not know what Spinoza’s considered response to this challenge 
was, since he chose somewhat brusquely to discontinue his correspondence with 
Blyenbergh.7 But out of  the resources of  Spinoza’s philosophical system and things 
that he does say elsewhere, it is possible to reconstruct a riposte that rises to the 
challenge. In effect this is what will emerge by way of  the interpretation advocated in 
the following chapters. But this being a result awaiting consummation of  the 
dissertation as a whole, it will have to suffice here simply to gesture in the direction 
of  Spinoza’s best available response. Essentially, he would want to reply that, 
although the mind and body are alike in both being limited modifications of  
substance (and in fact are in a certain sense ‘one and the same thing’), nevertheless 
the nature of  the mind (which is as distinct from the nature of  the body as the 
nature of  thought is from that of  extension) is such that its share in eternity is at 
                                                          
5 Benedictus de Spinoza, Renati Des Cartes Principiorum Phiosophiæ, in Opera, ed. Carl Gebhardt, vol. I 
(Heidelberg, Carl Winter, 1925), pp. 127-281. Translations of  this text, unless otherwise stated, are 
from Descartes’ “Principles of  Philosophy”, in Curley ed., The Collected Works of  Spinoza, vol. I, pp. 224-346. 
6 Letter 24; Spinoza, The Letters, p. 171. 
7 It may be that Spinoza is at least partly to blame for the confusion and eventual breakdown of  this 
exchange. See Spinoza, The Letters, Introduction, p. 24. For a more charitable portrait of  Blyenbergh, 
see Gabriel Albiac, La synagogue vide: les sources marranes du spinozisme (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1994), 428-34. 
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once something to be experienced, something to be actively enriched, and something 
that involves a certain transcendence of  the particular vantage point in space and 
time from which one cognitively grasps the whole. 
However, not all early engagements with Spinoza’s eschatology returned this same 
verdict of  inconsistency. Pierre Bayle, for example, in his Dictionnaire Historique et 
Critique of  1695, far from finding any notion of  a post-mortem destiny for the soul 
to contradict the fundamental principles of  the Ethics, claimed that Spinoza was in 
fact ‘obliged by his theory to admit the immortality of  the soul since he considers 
himself  as a modification of  an essentially thinking being’.8 Without expanding 
further on why this should follow, nor unfortunately referring directly to the critical 
passage in Ethics V, Bayle adds a characteristically colourful conjecture concerning 
Spinoza’s commitments on the question of  eternal punishment. ‘Tiberius, Caligula, 
and a hundred others’, he suggests, are precisely ‘the kinds of  modifications’ who, 
when they ‘get angry at other ones’ and ‘torture them... would make this punishment 
eternal if  death did not prevent it’.9 So it is conceivable that, in the darkest corners 
of  the universe, there are more powerful, even infinitely more powerful, 
modifications of  the same malicious persuasion, whose role it is to administer 
eternal punishment to the sinner: ‘He does not at all escape justice then by death or 
avoid the caprice of  his invisible persecutors. They can follow him wherever he goes 
and mistreat him in all the visible forms that he may assume’.10 
But the eccentricities of  this conjecture seem extravagant, even by Bayle’s 
standards, in view of  something he himself  had taken care to note in that same 
article on Spinoza. For the theology of  eternal reward or punishment, he points out, 
is either, for les esprits forts, that ingenious ‘stratagem’ by which ‘the first authors of  
religion’ captured the hopes and fears of  the masses, or, for the pious, the essential 
and authentic purpose of  ‘the true religion’.11 Either way, this provides the sole 
purpose of  religious devotion: 
                                                          
8 Pierre Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary, trans. Richard Popkin (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 
1965), p. 322. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. p. 323. 
11 Ibid. p. 294, note ‘e’. 
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All the religions of  the world, the true one as well as the false ones, turn on this 
great pivot, that there is an invisible judge who, after this life, punishes and 
rewards the actions of  mankind, both exterior and interior.12 
Whatever ‘the true religion’ may be, Bayle contrasts this theology of  eternal reward 
and punishment with the teachings of  those ‘who deny the immortality of  the soul’: 
Observe that those who deny the immortality of  the soul and Providence, as 
the Epicureans did, are those who maintain that men should apply themselves 
to virtue on account of  its excellence and because one finds enough advantage 
in the practice of  morality in this life not to have anything to complain about. 
This is undoubtedly the doctrine Spinoza would have put forth if  he had dared to dogmatise 
publicly.13 
In fact, Spinoza did dare to publicise this doctrine, in both his earlier and his later 
writings. ‘Sadness, despair, envy, fright, and other evil passions... are the real hell 
itself ’, he explained in the Short Treatise, whereas the ‘knowledge’ whereby ‘we 
attribute everything to God, love him alone... and offer ourselves entirely to him’, 
which turns out, in practice, to living a life of  virtue, for Spinoza, ‘is what true religion 
and our eternal salvation and happiness really consist in’.14 Similarly, in the Ethics, Spinoza 
concludes the work as a whole with the proposition, ‘Blessedness is not the reward 
of  virtue, but virtue itself; nor do we enjoy it because we restrain our lusts; on the 
contrary, because we enjoy it, we are able to restrain them’.15 But does this mean that 
Spinoza denied the immortality of  the soul, ‘as the Epicureans did’? He does not do 
so in the Short Treatise  (from the principles of  which, he claims, ‘we can see clearly 
the origin of  clear knowledge, and the immortality of  the soul’).16 Does he deny this 
dogma in the Ethics?17 
For Leibniz, the meaning of  Spinoza’s doctrine was more worrying than its logic. 
He finds a certain banality in the claim that something of  the mind is eternal simply 
because the essence of  the body is mirrored in the attribute of  thought by an eternal 
essence of  the mind. This eternal essence pertaining to the human mind has no 
more claim to existence than the abstract idea of, say, a sphere, itself  a mere 
possibility until materially instantiated. After quoting (5p23dem), in which Spinoza 
                                                          
12 Ibid. pp. 293-4, note ‘e’, emphasis added. 
13 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
14 Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, pp. 128-9, emphasis added.  
15 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p42. 
16 Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, p. 156. 
17 In Chapter 2, I will address the relationship between the ‘immortality of  the soul’, as it is 
presented in the Short Treatise, and the ‘eternity of  the mind’, as it is presented in the Ethics. 
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reasons that ‘[t]his idea, which expresses the essence of  the body under a species of  
eternity, is a mode of  thought which pertains to the essence of  the mind and is 
necessarily eternal’, Leibniz complains: ‘All this is illusory. This idea is like the figure 
of  the sphere whose eternity does not favour existence, since it is only the possibility 
of  an ideal sphere.’18 He accuses Spinoza of  talking about ‘blessedness and the 
reform of  our mind, as if  these figures or abstract ideas could be made better’.19 But, 
as Mogens Lærke has pointed out, Leibniz’s criticism fails to take into account the 
two distinct ‘levels’ involved in Spinoza’s account of  the eternity of  the mind.20 
While it is true that Spinoza opens his account at (5p23) by crediting the human 
mind with, as Lærke puts it, a certain ‘aspect absolu’, owing to its essence being 
somehow timelessly ‘encoded’ in God’s attributes, he goes on to elaborate a 
specifically human form of  eternity in the subsequent passage. What Moreau calls 
the ‘perspective différentielle’ of  eternity is indeed ethical, since it depends on the extent 
to which an individual enjoys ‘cognition of  the third kind [cognitio tertii generis]’ and the 
extent to which he or she has achieved some degree of  ‘improvement [emendatio]’. 
Therefore, as Lærke points out, ‘[i]f  Leibniz does not see how the Spinozist 
conception of  the mind’s eternity can induce improvement, it is because he reduces 
it to the absolute aspect [aspect absolu] alone’.21 
Elsewhere, Leibniz chastised Spinoza’s eschatology for veering too closely 
towards a general heresy that had come to be associated with the twelfth-century 
Andalusian polymath Averroës, whose teachings were officially condemned by the 
Bishop of  Paris in 1277.22 Leibniz explains this tendency in a letter to Michael 
Hansch: 
                                                          
18 Gottfried W. von Leibniz, Remarques critiques de Leibniz, d’apres le manuscrit original, de la bibliothèque 
royale de hanovre, in Réfutation inédite de Spinoza par Leibniz, ed. Louis A. Foucher de Careil (Paris: 
Ladrange, 1854), p. 57, translation my own. Quoted in Mogens Lærke, Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza: la genèse 
d’une opposition complexe (Paris: Honoré Champion, 2008), p. 908. 
19 Gottfried W. von Leibniz, Opuscules et fragments inédits, ed. Louis Couturat (Hildesheim: Georg 
Olms Verlag, 1961), p. 344, translation my own. Quoted in Lærke, Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza, p. 909. 
20 Lærke, Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza, p. 912. Pierre-François Moreau has highlighted the importance of  
keeping these distinct ‘levels’ in view when reading the passage beginning at (5p20s). From ‘the first 
perspective [première perspective]’, the ‘reasons we are eternal are not applicable to human beings alone’, 
but ‘Spinoza says “we” or “human beings” when speaking of  the feeling of  eternity’, which suggests a 
‘second perspective’, or more precisely a ‘differential perspective [perpective différentielle]’. Pierre-
François Moreau, Spinoza: L’expérience et l’éternité (Paris: Presses Universitaires de Frane, 1994), p. 540. 
21 Lærke, Leibniz lecteur de Spinoza, p. 912. 
22 On March 7, 1277, the Bishop of  Paris, Étienne Tempier, consolidated his earlier attempt of  1270 
to stifle a growing popularity among University of  Paris magistri of  unorthodox philosophical and 
theological ideas perceived to be of  Aristotelian and other Greco-Arabic origins, with a further 
condemnation of  219 ‘errores’, among which was ‘(117) quod intellectus est unus numero omnium, licet enim 
separetur a corpore hoc, non tamen ab omni [the intellect of  all men is numerically one, for even if  it is 
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Spinoza tends toward the same view. For him there is one substance, God. 
Creatures are his modifications, like figures in wax, continually arising and 
perishing through motion. So for him, just as for Almeric, the soul does not 
survive except through its ideal being in God, where it was from all eternity.23 
Continued existence in such an impersonal form, with any trace of  individuation 
melting away in the single undifferentiated mind of  God, struck Leibniz as no less 
pernicious than the crude materialist or Epicurean denial of  continued existence tout 
court. The idea that an Averroist fate for the soul could amount to anything more 
than this, he dismissed as intellectually and spiritually dishonest: 
They are false mystics, who deny individuality and action to the mind of  the 
blessed, as if  our highest perfection consisted in a kind of  passive state. 
Blessedness of  the soul does indeed consist in union with God, but we must 
not think that the soul is absorbed in God, having lost its individuality and 
activity, which alone constitute its distinct substance, for this would be an evil 
enthusiasm, an undesirable deification.24 
This kind of  Averroist reading would continue to appeal to critics, and indeed still 
thrives in the secondary literature today.25 I will return to some recent examples 
below, but first I must turn to the intervening perception of  Spinoza, which long 






                                                                                                                                                              
separated from a given body, it is not however separated from all]’. La condamnation parisienne de 1277, 
ed. David Piché (Paris: Librairie Philosophique, 1999), p. 88, translation my own. Predating the 
broader connotations that it subsequently acquired, the term ‘Averroism’ in the thirteenth century 
referred principally to this doctrine of  mono-psychism, owing mainly to Aquinas’ intervention of  
1270, De unitate intellectus contra averroistas. Ibid. p. 166, note 1. 
23 Leibniz to Michael Gottlieb Hansch, 25 July 1707, in G.W. Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, 
ed. Leroy E. Loemker (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1956), p. 967. Quoted in Marc Bobro, 
‘Prudence and the Concern to Survive in Leibniz’s Doctrine of  Immortality’, History of  Philosophy 
Quarterly, 15, no. 3 (1998), p. 308. 
24 Ibid. p. 966. 
25 Rousseau, for example, would write in a note on a manuscript of  Julie that ‘those who in following 
Spinoza hold that at the death of  a person his soul is resolved in the great soul of  the world are saying 
nothing that makes sense’. Jean-Jacque Rousseau, Émile, ou de l’Éducation, ed. Maurice Masson 
(Fribourg: Librairie de l’Université, 1914), p. 209, note 2. Quoted in Walter Eckstein, ‘Rousseau and 
Spinoza: Their Political Theories and Their Conception of  Ethical Freedom’, Journal of  the History of  
Ideas, 5, no. 3 (1944), p. 267. 
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The ‘most impious atheist’ becomes ‘drunk with God’ 
 
Through much of  the eighteenth century, Spinoza’s reputation among European 
thinkers was that of  an audacious atheist who had launched a bitter and scathing 
attack on religion. For many, this made him an enemy of  the existing moral and 
social order that religion was thought to uphold, while in more radical circles, the 
biographical accounts of  Spinoza’s own virtuous character only served to 
demonstrate that the cultivation of  virtue and moral decency need not depend on 
any subscription to orthodox religious principles.26 However, both sections of  the 
Enlightenment intelligentsia, the radical wing no less than their more conservative 
counterparts, shared the common assumption that Spinoza did indeed represent a 
hostile attempt to dismantle religion’s credibility and doctrinal tenets, including the 
immortality of  the soul and the theology of  divine reward and punishment. This was 
not surprising, in view of  the initial wave of  fierce condemnation and controversy 
which Spinoza left in his wake in the last decades of  the seventeenth century. 
It was therefore only natural for commentators, both sympathetic and critical, to 
ascribe to Spinoza a rejection of  religion’s eschatological pretensions. Hence the 
conclusion reached by the Lutheran Minister John Colerus who, while staying in the 
house in which Spinoza had lived in The Hague, developed something of  a curiosity 
for the notorious former resident and set out to compose one of  the earliest 
biographies: 
Thus [Spinoza] owns indeed, that God is the General Cause of  all things... In 
like manner, everything that happens in the World, Good or Evil, Virtue or 
Vice, Sin or Good Works, does necessarily proceed from him; and 
consequently there ought to be no Judgement, no Punishment, no 
Resurrection, no Salvation, no Damnation. For if  it were so, that imaginary 
God wou’d Punish and Reward his own work... And therefore Mr. Burmanus, 
                                                          
26 See, for example, Pierre Bayle, Various Thoughts on the Occasion of  a Comet, trans. Robert Bartlett 
(Albany: State University of  New York Press, 2000) p. 181: ‘[A]theists are very much capable of  
performing all the moral actions we admire in paganism. This is what I say in response to all the 
examples of  the pagans’ virtue that one can adduce for me… As a result… they were no more likely 
to be virtuous than are atheists.’ Later in the same text, Bayle recounts the noble calm with wh ich 
Spinoza met his final rest: ‘But what more could one do than what Spinoza did shortly before dying? 
…He was the greatest atheist there ever was and who was so infatuated with certain principles of  
philosophy that… he went into retirement, renouncing all that may be called the pleasures and 
vanities of  the world… Sensing that he was near his end, he had his landlady come and begged her to 
prevent any minister from coming to see him in that condition. His reason was, as is known from one 
of  his friends, that he wished to die without a dispute and that he feared falling into some weakness 
of  the understanding which would make him say something that could be used against his principles.’ 
Ibid. pp. 226-7. 
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a Reformed Minister, at Enkhuysen calls Spinosa, with great Reason, the most 
impious Atheist that ever liv’d upon the Face of  the Earth.27 
This widely held opinion of  Spinoza’s overall stance would not be reconsidered 
on any particularly grand scale until the public controversies that erupted in 
Germany towards the fin de siècle. The ‘Pantheism Controversy [Pantheismusstreit]’ of  
the 1780’s, which centred on Friedrich Jacobi’s allegations that the celebrated poet 
and playwright Ephraim Lessing had been a follower of  Spinoza, grossly slanderous 
in view of  the erstwhile reputation just recounted, captured the attention and interest 
of  the learned world with all the intrigue of  a good scandal.28 When Moses 
Mendelssohn rose to the defence of  his dear departed friend, the ensuing debate 
over Lessing’s alleged Spinozism, the very nature of  ‘Spinozism’, and the wider 
implications for the Aufkläring more generally shook the intellectual scene ‘like a 
thunderbolt out of  the blue [wie ein Donnerschlag vom blauer Himmel]’, as Hegel put it.29 
But as a consequence of  all this renewed interest in Spinoza’s thought, there 
emerged in the public realm some radical new assessments of  its philosophical - and 
theological - import. The religiosity that Lessing had found, and Mendelssohn had 
defended (albeit by first ‘purifying’ it), in Spinoza’s thought now seemed a credible 
assessment, helped still further by the revelation that Goethe and (indeed from an 
earlier date and with more philosophical rigour) Herder too had arrived at a more 
religious estimation of  the notorious philosopher.30 Having reached this view already, 
Herder protested to Jacobi: 
                                                          
27 John Colerus, The Life of  Benedict de Spinosa (London: D.L., 1706), p. 70. Frans Burman 
(‘Burmanus’), perhaps better known for his transcription of  a conversation he had had with Descartes 
in 1648, when he was still twenty, later became Professor of  Theology at Utrecht in 1664, and 
subsequently joined the fierce outcry against Spinoza and his philosophy. 
28 Upon learning of  Mendelssohn’s intentions to publish a tribute to Lessing’s life and character, 
Jacobi felt compelled to inform him of  conversations he had had with the celebrated poet in which 
the latter had revealed his assent to Spinoza’s philosophy. Offended by the impertinence of  this 
insinuation, Mendelssohn brushed the allegations aside, but this only served to provoke Jacobi into 
eventually publishing all of  the incriminating letters and transcripts. Friedrich Jacobi, Ueber die Lehre 
von Spinoza in Briefen an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn (Breslau: Gottlieb Löwe, 1785). Preparing for this 
danger all along, Mendelssohn’s exoneration of  Lessing in Morning Hours appeared almost 
simultaneously. Morning Hours: Lectures on God’s Existence, trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom and Corey Dyck 
(Dordrecht: Springer Verlag, 2011). For an account of  this fascinating episode of  intellectual history, 
see Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of  Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1987), p. 44 and passim. 
29 G. W. F. Hegel, Werke, vol. XX (Frankfurt: Surhkamp Verlag, 1980), pp. 316-7. Quoted in Beiser, 
Fate of  Reason, p. 46. 
30 Goethe wrote to Jacobi at the height of  the controversy, saying that if  ‘others scold Spinoza for 
being an atheist, I should like to name him as theissimum, indeed, christianissimum’. Heinrich Scholz, Die 
Hauptschriften zum Pantheismus Streit zwischen Jacobi und Mendelssohn (Berlin: Reuther and Reichard, 1916), 
cviii. Herder, similarly, reversed the old stereotype: ‘I thought I should find a brazen atheist and I find 
almost a metaphysical and moral enthusiast.’ J. G. von Herder, God: Some Conversations, ed. and trans. 
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The proton pseudos, dear Jacobi, in your and every anti-Spinozist system is that 
God, as the great ens entium, the cause that is eternally active in all phenomena, 
is a zero, an abstract concept in the way we form our idea of  Him. But 
according to Spinoza He is not this, but the most real and active One, who 
alone says to Himself: “I am that I am, and shall be in all the changes in my 
phenomenal appearance”… And so the philosopher of  true being does not 
begin from the proposition, Ex nihilo nihil fit, but from the eternal proposition 
Quidquid est, illud est.31 
The nineteenth century would therefore be open to an entirely novel depiction of  
Spinoza. A philosophy that had long been reviled for its heresy now became, as the 
poet Heinrich Heine put it, ‘the unofficial religion of  Germany [das öffentliche 
Geheimniß in Deutschland]’, referring to the growing enthusiasm for a heavily idealistic 
and theological appropriation of  Spinoza’s single-substance metaphysics in the 
philosophy of  Schelling, Hegel and others.32 Spinoza was now known as a man  
‘drunk with God [gottbetrunkener]’.33 Interestingly, the eschatology propounded by the 
ministers of  this new ‘unofficial religion of  Germany’ carried distinct echoes of  
what Spinoza had attempted to convey in Ethics V. Suggesting that Hegel’s view may 
bear ‘a significant relation to Spinoza’s reflection on the mystical state in Ethics BK 
5’, Cyril O’Regan adds that both consist in ‘(1) a dismantling of  the absoluteness of  
the distinction between this life and the next life… and (2) a revisionist and critical 
understanding of  the durational representation of  immortality’.34 The subversion of  
a traditional theological distinction between this life and the next, involved in 
something that Charles Dodd has called ‘realised eschatology’, is in fact the same 
‘doctrine’ that Bayle long ago suggested ‘Spinoza would have put forth if  he had 
dared to dogmatise publicly’.35 As pointed out above, and as will be explored in 
                                                                                                                                                              
Frederick H. Burkhardt (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1940), p. 430. Quoted in David Bell, Spinoza in 
Germany from 1670 to the Age of  Goethe (London: Institute of  Germanic Studies, University of  London, 
1984), p. 106. 
31 Herder to Jacobi, 6 February 1784, Briefe. Gesamtausgabe 1763-1803 (Weimar: Goethe- und Schiller-
Archiv, 1977), pp. 28-9. Quoted in Bell, Spinoza in Germany, p. 109. 
32 Heinrich Heine, Werke, vol. VIII (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1981), p. 175. Quoted in Beiser, Fate of  
Reason, p. 45. Hegel mused lyrically on the debt he owed to his spiritual forerunner: ‘[T]o be a follower 
of  Spinoza is the essential commencement of  all Philosophy… the soul must commence by bathing 
in this ether of  the One Substance, in which all that man has held as true has disappeared; this 
negation of  all that is particular, to which every philosopher must have come, is the liberation of  the 
mind and its absolute function.’ G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of  Philosophy, vol. III, E.S. 
Haldane and Frances H. Simson trans. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968) pp. 257-8. 
33 ‘Spinotza ist ein gottbetrunkener Mensch’. Novalis, Schriften, ed. Richard Samuel (Stuttgart: 
Kohlhammer Verlag, 1960), p. 651. 
34 Cyril O’Regan, The Heterodox Hegel (Albany: State University of  New York Press, 1994) p. 255. 
35 Dodd, Parables of  the Kingdom, p.23; Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary, p. 295. 
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subsequent chapters, this is indeed an important feature of  Spinoza’s eschatological 
position. 
This radical reappraisal of  Spinoza’s thought, though originating in Germany, was 
not of  course confined to that region but rippled outwards to the rest of  Europe. As 
Victor Delbos observed, looking back on the century, it is ‘certainly under the 
influence of  German ideas that Spinozism has been more directly studied and more 
favourably received in France’.36 But any additional enthusiasm for the individual’s 
subsumption into an all-consuming ‘absolute’ would struggle to translate in a land 
where individualist values had only recently helped to fuel a violent and traumatic 
revolution.37 Nonetheless, Victor Cousin could now correct a mistaken accusation: 
‘Far from being an atheist, as he has been accused, Spinoza has such a sentiment of  
God that he has lost a sentiment of  the human’.38 But this is to replace one mistake 
with its inverse, for Spinoza had not lost sight of  the human any more than the 
divine. Indeed, the two for him are so closely linked that ‘God, in so far as he loves 
himself, loves mankind, and, consequently... the love of  God towards men and the 
mind’s intellectual love towards God are one and the same’.39 
In England, the point in Spinoza’s thought at which the human and the divine 
converge was not lost on the minister and theologian John Hunt, who echoed the 
new appraisal emanating from the continent: ‘Spinoza’s object was… to prove that 
religion is the highest reason.’40 Favouring clerical eloquence over technical rigour, he 
offered his take on the eternity of  the mind: 
Starting with the existence of  God… [Spinoza] went on to demonstrate the 
immortality of  the soul… From eternal life [the soul] falls into the darkness of  
the terrestrial state. Detached in some way from the bosom of  God it is exiled 
into nature… it perceives things only in their temporal and changing aspect, 
and with difficulty seizes the eternal bond which binds the entire universe and 
itself  to God. It does, however, seize it, and by a lofty effort, surpassing the 
weight of  the corporeal chain, it finds again the infinite good which it had lost. 
The human soul is thus immortal… Reason, which enables us to perceive 
                                                          
36 Victor Delbos, Le problème moral dans la philosophie de Spinoza et dans l’histoire du Spinozisme (Paris: 
Ancienne Librairie Germer Baillière et Cie, 1893), p. 491, translation my own. 
37 Delbos mentions certain ‘profound tendencies of  the French mind… disposed to affirm that 
individuality constitutes a completely sufficient form of  existence, to make of  the person an end in 
itself ’. Ibid. p. 496, translation my own. 
38 Victor Cousin, Fragments philosophiques, vol. II (Paris: Ladrange, 1826), p. 164, translation my own. 
Quoted in Delbos, Le problème morale, p. 492. 
39 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p36c. 
40 John Hunt, An Essay on Pantheism (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1866), p. 235. 
Reproduced with notes in W. Boucher ed., Spinoza: Eighteenth and Nineteenth-Century Discussions, vol. III 
(Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1999), pp. 222-38. 
  29 
things under the form of  eternity, alone subsists. “The human soul cannot 
entirely perish with the body. There remains something of  it which is 
eternal.”41 
 
A very English Spinoza renaissance 
 
Towards the close of  the century, England became a veritable hotbed of  Spinoza 
scholarship, with the publication of  sophisticated and illuminating book-length 
studies by Frederick Pollock, James Martineau and John Caird.42 Referring to the 
doctrine of  the eternity of  the mind as ‘the singular and difficult part of  Spinoza’s 
exposition’, Pollock took it to concern that which ‘is known as part of  the necessary 
order of  nature’, which, being ‘the idea of  a certain state of  its own body’, must give 
the mind also ‘consciousness or knowledge of  itself  which exactly corresponds to its 
knowledge of  the body,’ which is, however, ‘not a persistence in time after the 
dissolution of  the body, for [eternity] is not commensurable with time at all’.43 This 
‘consciousness or knowledge’ invokes a ‘state or quality of  perfection called the 
intellectual love of  God’.44 Martineau took this passage in the Ethics to straddle ‘the 
boundary between the ethical and the hyper-ethical’.45 Whereas Pollock was willing to 
allow that the eternal part of  the mind is ‘part of  the infinite intellect, but is not lost 
in it’, Martineau found this unwillingness to attribute to Spinoza an impersonal 
eternity - ‘like a telescope, outside us all, yet available to all’ - to stem from a 
temptation to import too strong a ‘modern conception of  personality’ into the 
doctrine and in doing so ‘overstrain its meaning’.46 For Caird, clearly under the 
influence of  Hegel, the problem lies not in the preservation of  individuality or 
personhood, but in Spinoza’s unresolved abstraction of  the eternal viewpoint from 
the lived and ‘imagined’ world of  time and change. He recommends, by way of  
completing Spinoza’s eschatological picture, a revalorisation of  the ‘lower’ phase of  
time and imagination: 
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The relation of  imagination to reason is simply the relation, in modern 
language, of  consciousness to self-consciousness… It is not by brooding on 
itself  in some pure, supersensuous sphere of  untroubled spirituality, but by 
going forth into a world that, in the first instance, is outside of  and foreign to 
itself… that self-conscious intelligence ceases to be a lifeless abstraction, and 
becomes a concrete reality… The eternal life is not that which abstracts from 
the temporal, but that which contains while it annuls it.47 
The twentieth century saw still more attempts to decipher Spinoza’s doctrine of  
the eternity of  the mind. Harold Joachim, one of  Francis H. Bradley’s students at 
Oxford, followed in the footsteps of  the previous generation by interpreting Spinoza 
idealistically, though, unlike Martineau, he was willing to credit the eternal part of  the 
mind with ‘an individuality, which has universal, necessary and permanent being in its 
oneness with God, but is yet concrete and uniquely characterised’, and, unlike Caird, 
without taking this to mean that ‘we are lost in the abstract universality of  the 
objects of  science,’ but rather that we ‘have come to a rich and real personality’.48 In 
1934, Wolfson’s monumental study of  the intellectual ancestry informing Spinoza’s 
philosophy appeared.49 As a result of  his archaeological excavation, he concluded 
that ‘Spinoza’s conception of  the immortality of  the soul, in its main outline, does 
not go beyond that of  any rationalist theology’, such as that of  Maimonides or 
Gersonides, for whom ‘immortality is to be attributed only to the rational part of  the 
soul’, and ‘the bliss and happiness of  the immortal souls consist in the delight they 
take in the knowledge of  the essence of  God’.50 For Wolfson, then, Spinoza’s 
eschatology allows a ‘personal’ and ‘individual’ immortality: 
Still, though all souls are immortal, and all of  them are united with God, there 
exist certain differences between the individual souls which remain after death. 
They do not all merge in one universal soul. Immortality is in a certain sense 
personal and individual.51 
Stuart Hampshire deemed it incorrect to draw out so strong an implication as the 
continued existence of  a distinct individual, subscribing instead to the Averroist 
reading previously favoured by Leibniz and Martineau: 
The possible eternity of  the human mind cannot therefore be intended by 
Spinoza to mean that I literally survive, as a distinguishable individual, in so far 
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as I attain genuine knowledge; for in so far as I do attain genuine knowledge, 
my individuality as a particular thing disappears and my mind becomes so far 
united with God or Nature conceived under the attribute of  thought… In our 
intellectual life, at the more successful moments of  completely disinterested, 
logical thought, we have these glimpses of  the possibility of  living, not as finite 
and perishing modes of  Nature, but identified or “united” with God or Nature 
as a whole.52 
Hampshire takes this to be ‘playing the immortal as far as is possible for us’, as 
Aristotle put it. Nevertheless, he acknowledges the ‘genuine double-aspect’ of  
Spinoza’s thought, which has made him seem to some ‘a pantheist who interprets 
every natural phenomenon as a revelation of  an immanent but impersonal God’, but 
equally ‘to others… a harsh materialist and determinist who denies all significance to 
morality and religion’.53 But in certain subsequent engagements with Spinoza’s 
philosophy, this latter aspect would partially eclipse the former. Edwin Curley’s 
ingenious translation of  Spinoza’s key notions into the more contemporary lexicon 
of  logical and scientific analysis helped to make an antiquated and unfamiliar 
metaphysical language more accessible to contemporary readers. But in presenting 
Spinoza as having at bottom constructed ‘a unified science of  extended objects’, 
which he has called an essentially ‘materialistic program’, he invited the charge from 
others of  having offered a ‘reductive’ exposition of  Spinoza’s true position.54 In 
recent work, he has acknowledged, but not disputed, this charge.55 But whatever the 
answer to this more meta-interpretative question, Curley, it will become clear, has 
made many invaluable contributions to the task of  untangling Spinoza’s doctrine of  
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Recent perspectives 
 
Drawing on the importance of  (2p8) for the demonstration of  (5p23), in which it is 
cited, Curley consults Spinoza’s analogy of  the infinitely many, ‘durationally’ non-
existent, rectangles that are nonetheless implicit in any given circle, which is taken to 
illustrate the distinction between the two kinds of  existence - ‘durational’ and 
‘eternal’ - implicated in the doctrine of  the eternity of  the mind. 
[N]one of  [the rectangles] can be said to exist except insofar as the circle 
exists, nor also can the idea of  any of  these rectangles be said to exist except 
insofar as it is comprehended in the idea of  the circle. Now of  these infinitely 
many [rectangles] let two only, viz. [those formed from the segments of  lines] 
D and E, exist. Of  course their ideas also exist now, not only insofar as they 
are only comprehended in the idea of  the circle, but also insofar as they 
involve the existence of  those rectangles.56 
Curley interprets the significance of  the analogy as follows: 
Suppose that we understand by the “infinite idea of  God” the laws of  nature. 
Just as the circle defines a class of  possible rectangles, so the laws of  nature 
define classes of  possible entities... Whether or not a particular body satisfying 
the conditions [circumscribed by the laws of  nature] exists will, of  course, 
depend on considerations extraneous to scientific theory, just as the actual 
existence of  one of  the infinitely many rectangles contained implicitly in the 
circle will depend on considerations extraneous to geometry.57 
Curley’s suggestion, therefore, is that following (and also, strictly speaking, before) 
the actual, durational, existence of  the body, there will be (and was) a kind of  
existence enjoyed by both the essence of  the body and the essence of  the mind, 
insofar as these are both possible, given the eternally unchanging laws of  nature. He 
admits, however, that framing this kind of  existence in terms of  ‘possibility’ conflicts 
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with what Spinoza himself  says, both, we might add, about the reality of  
contingency more generally, and about this kind of  existence in particular, which he 
clearly regarded as actual: 
We conceive things as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to 
exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to 
be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of  the divine nature.58 
But more problematic for Curley’s suggestion, as he again confesses, is that 
‘Spinoza speaks only of  a part of  the mind as being eternal’, and ‘if  he were thinking 
of  the ideas of  things as being contained in the idea of  God in the manner that I 
have suggested, then there would be no reason for him to state his doctrine in this 
limited way’.59 In any case, Curley’s reading convinces him that the kind of  existence 
involved in the eternity of  the mind must exclude any temporal properties, such as 
‘existing after the body dies’.60 For Curley, this means that when Spinoza says things like 
‘it is time now to pass to those things which pertain to the mind’s duration without 
relation to the body’, he is ‘trying to accommodate popular views within his system 
in a way the system will not really allow’.61 He concludes: ‘Spinoza does not have a 
doctrine of  personal immortality... Whatever the doctrine of  the eternity of  the mind 
does mean, it does not mean that I can entertain any hope of  immortality.’62 
Seeking to restore balance to Spinoza’s ‘genuine double-aspect’, Errol Harris has 
offered what, in the subtitle to his commentary, Salvation from Despair, he calls a 
Reappraisal of  Spinoza’s Philosophy.63 Against the temptation to group Spinoza together 
with those who, during ‘the scientific revolution of  the seventeenth century, [and] in 
the service of  a strictly rational analysis, conceived the world as a lifeless machine’, 
Harris countered that Spinoza’s brand of  rationalism is in fact rich enough to invoke 
a ‘constructive and prescriptive’ phase, among the objectives of  which is that  
‘everybody… enjoy satisfaction and peace of  mind… what he called “salvation”’.64 
Turning to Spinoza’s ‘doctrine of  human immortality, which is, in many ways’, he 
admits, ‘the most puzzling and controversial of  his entire system’, he takes the 
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solution to lie in the distinctive nature of  the human mind.65 ‘Man’s immortality’ 
differs from that of  ‘a fish’ or ‘a piece of  granite’, without simply dissolving into ‘a 
set of  eternal truths identical for all minds as for God’s and with as little personal 
idiosyncrasy’, he suggests, because human thought is special in being ‘self-conscious 
and self-illuminating’.66 Explaining why this should make the crucial difference, he 
echoes the dialectical story previously recounted by Caird: 
An entity’s idea or consciousness of  itself  must and can only be its awareness 
of  itself  in distinction from something else… Consciousness, therefore, is 
always not merely self-consciousness (idea ideæ) but is also self-transcendent, 
and tends to comprehension of  some whole to which its object belongs... All 
ideas are on the one hand part of  the psychical stream which is the 
counterpart of  the body, yet, on the other hand, all consciousness is in some 
degree transcendent of  its immediate object in time and space; and to the 
extent that it is not limited, as its body (qua finite mode of  Extension) is 
limited, it participates (if  we may, like Plato, use a term which is not wholly 
appropriate) in eternity.67 
Around the same time, Martha Kneale applied the latest tools of  logical analysis 
to the concepts of  ‘eternity’, ‘eternal object’ and ‘sempiternity’, and used her findings 
to evaluate Spinoza’s position.68 Like her father, William Kneale, she concluded that 
‘timelessness as the totul simul of  time is a self-contradictory notion’, and that the 
only viable content it could have would have to amount to some kind of  notion of  
necessity.69 Since that which exists necessarily must exist at all times, Kneale infers 
that this will also be equivalent to ‘sempiternity’, or existence ‘at all moments of  
time’.70 Turning to the question of  the eternity of  the mind in the Ethics, Kneale 
acknowledges ‘those passages in which Spinoza draws a sharp line between duration 
and eternity’, but points out that this cannot accommodate her translation of  eternity 
into necessity and, inter alia, sempiternity. Accordingly, Kneale accounts for ‘those 
passages’ that draw a sharp distinction between eternity and duration by postulating 
that Spinoza ‘began with a Platonic view of  eternity as timelessness sharply 
separated from duration’, a ‘way of  thinking [that] persists into the Ethics… but by 
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the time he came to write Part V… [he] was thinking in a more Aristotelian way’ by 
equating eternity with sempiternity.71 The upshot, Kneale concludes, is that Spinoza’s 
eschatology entails ‘two doctrines of  extreme unorthodoxy’, i.e. the pre-existence (as 
well as the post-existence) of  the human soul and the doctrine of  universal salvation, 
and this must be why he had ‘shrunk from expressing it with full openness’, for ‘pace 
Pollock, Spinoza did wish to be read and to secure a hearing’.72 Kneale’s analysis, 
historical conjecture and conclusions will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter, but here it may suffice to point out that, contrary to the suggestion that 
Spinoza switched from a ‘Platonic’ to an ‘Aristotelian’ conception of  eternity in 
Ethics V, he in fact reiterates the same strict opposition between eternity and duration 
within the critical passage itself: ‘our mind, insofar as it involves the essence of  the 
body under a species of  eternity, is eternal, and… this existence it has cannot be 
defined by time or explained through duration’.73 
Siding with Kneale on the question of  which conception of  eternity is at play in 
Ethics V, Alan Donagan has argued for the strongest reconstruction of  Spinoza’s 
doctrine to date in his confidently titled article on the topic.74 Spinoza, he insists, 
must have ‘intended his remark that eternity cannot have any relation to time to be 
understood as qualified’, so that, although ‘the eternal part of  a man cannot, sub specie 
æternitatis, leave traces in his body, for leaving traces would be an event in time… it 
does not follow that the eternal part of  a man may not be related to time by forming 
part of  a human mind actually existing for a time’.75 Drawing attention to Spinoza’s 
distinction between a thing’s ‘formal essence’, which includes no implication that the 
thing in question is actual, and that thing’s ‘actual essence’, which, he suggests, is 
‘composite, and may be analysed into the idea of  a formal essence, and the idea of  
other existents being such as not to prevent its existence’, Donagan argued that the 
‘eternal part of  a mind’ is just this, i.e. ‘the idea of  the (formal) essence of  its body’.76 
Less controversially, he noted that Spinoza’s ‘theory of  the individuation of  human 
minds’ is such that human minds are ‘individuated by bodies considered as their 
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objects or ideata’.77 But, he suggests, this must apply equally to the eternal part of  the 
mind, which, after all, is the idea of  the essence of  a particular human body. This 
‘confirms Wolfson’s emphatic statement that [Spinoza] conceived immortality as 
“personal and individual”’, and implies that ‘eternal self-knowledge’ is ‘complete’ in a 
way that ‘durational self-knowledge’ cannot be.78 
No wisdom, and no virtue that a man attains in this life will be taken away 
from him; but neither will anything that he does not attain be added to him. 
For this reason, I think Martha Kneale was mistaken in attributing to [Spinoza] 
the hideous hypothesis of  universal salvation. It is true that he dismissed all 
doctrines of  retributive punishment in the afterlife… But what is beatitudo for 
the good, because it involves understanding and love of  God, and 
acquiescence in the course of  nature, will be confusion and frustration for the 
wicked.79 
In keeping with his fascinating study of  Spinoza’s ‘second-order Marrano’ 
characteristics, Yirmiyahu Yovel likens the special insight into human eschatology 
conveyed in the Ethics to that which had motivated the continued adherence of  
converso Jews in Inquisition Iberia to the Law of  Moses, which for them was the 
‘secret key to true eternity’.80 For both Spinoza and his forebears ‘knew better than 
the multitude’ where the true way to salvation lies.81 Like ‘Plato, and in a different 
way, Hegel’, Yovel suggests, ‘Spinoza can be seen also as secularising religion without 
giving up its absolute pathos, or as sacralising reason by giving it the supreme 
spiritual tasks that were wrongly attributed to religious mysticism’.82 But he warns 
against conflating the kind of  salvation offered by Spinoza with any kind of  
immortality or afterlife. The ‘cognitive basis of  salvation in Spinoza… is an 
occurrence within this life and world, as eternity penetrates my actual existence and 
transforms its quality and direction’, so it is therefore ‘not in immortality that 
metaphysical salvation consists, but in the realisation of  eternity within time’.83 
Though correct to recognise that Spinoza’s account is a form of  ‘realised 
eschatology’, as Bayle had discovered, Yovel seems to take it for granted that the only 
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valid understanding of  the term ‘immortality’ would have to amount to 
‘sempiternity’.84 But this is perhaps the very crux of  the debate. Other 
commentators, such as Harris, have not thought it inappropriate to describe that 
which Yovel (rightly) calls an ‘immanent’ form of  human salvation as a kind of  
‘immortality’. 
At the culmination of  his comprehensive exploration of  the interplay between 
eternity and experience in Spinoza’s philosophy, Moreau hoped to set the record 
straight regarding the doctrine of  the eternity of  the mind.85 Above all, he joins 
Yovel in insisting that Spinoza ‘clearly distinguished between the mind’s eternity and 
immortality’, and, consequently, it can only ‘do violence to the text to read in the 
foreground a doctrine of  the immortality of  the soul’.86 Highlighting Spinoza’s 
criticism of  ‘the common opinion of  men’, which confuses a genuine awareness of  
the eternity of  their mind with duration and attributes to it the faculties of  memory 
and imagination ‘which they believe remain after death’, Moreau argues that a 
doctrine devoid of  these popular connotations ‘cannot be assimilated to the 
traditional religious conception’, and so cannot very well be called a doctrine of  
‘immortality’.87 Having made this terminological interdiction, however, he then 
somewhat weakens his position, adding that nevertheless this ‘does not exclude a 
certain form of  immortality in the system - that which would correspond to a 
survival of  the intellect without the imagination’.88 
It is true that a ‘traditional religious conception’ of  immortality may be 
incompatible with such a stripped down form of  mental existence, but perhaps less 
traditional conceptions, acceptable even to some who might still subscribe to the 
Abrahamic faiths, might accommodate such a thing. Clearly, Donagan thought it 
justifiable to apply the language of  ‘immortality’ to Spinoza’s doctrine because, on 
his reading, the eternal part of  the mind, qua virtuous expression of  a person’s own 
individual essence, is that which most intrinsically belongs to a person. Although 
Spinoza at one point seemed to suggest - and has been said to anticipate Locke’s 
celebrated theory - that the more temporal aspects of  a person’s psychology and, in 
particular, a person’s memories, are the sine qua non of  continued personal identity, 
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the text is actually far from decisive, and in fact in tension with a clear tendency in 
Spinoza’s thought towards a stronger valorisation of  the more rational (and, in 
practice, virtuous) aspects of  a person’s identity.89 But that these questions can even 
be raised, and that their answers might depend on further reconstructive arguments, 
may suggest that Moreau’s intervention has not settled the question once and for all. 
In support of  a reading that takes Spinoza to be clearly distinguishing between 
the eternity of  the mind and the immortality of  the soul, one might argue that, 
whereas the former is proven philosophically and enjoys an independent, conceptual 
strength, the latter is just another dogma of  the ‘universal faith [fides catholica]’ 
described in the Theological-Political Treatise, that is, not necessarily true but promoted 
in the interests of  maintaining moral and social order. It may seem that Spinoza is 
bestowing such a status on this particular dogma too: 
If  men had not this hope and fear, but believed that the mind perishes with 
the body, and that no hope of  prolonged life remains for the wretches who are 
broken down with the burden of  piety, they would return to their own 
inclinations, controlling everything in accordance with their lusts, and desiring 
to obey fortune rather than themselves.90 
Moreau highlights a corresponding passage in the preface to the Theological-Political 
Treatise, concerning ‘the prejudiced beliefs that originate from the fact that the 
common people [are] prone to superstition and prizing the legacy of  time above 
eternity itself ’.91 But again, this is, strictly speaking, neutral with respect to Spinoza’s 
conception of  immortality. Indeed, as Spinoza points out in the Ethics, this is clearly 
‘immortality [immortalitas]’ as it is imagined by the ‘multitude [multitudo]’: 
If  we attend to the common opinion of  men, we shall see that they are indeed 
conscious of  the eternity of  their Mind, but that they confuse it with duration, 
and attribute it to the imagination, or memory, which they believe remains after 
death.92 
The proposition to which the first of  these passages forms part of  the scholium is 
concerned with the importance of  ‘all the things we have shown’ prior to the eternity 
of  the mind, which Spinoza introduces with a counterfactual clause, ‘[e]ven if  we did 
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not know that our Mind is eternal...’93 Clearly, then, Spinoza does take himself  to 
know that the mind is eternal. Moreover, no sooner does he mention the term 
‘eternal [æternam]’ than he follows it with the term ‘immortal [immortalem]’, as though 
the latter were an added gloss on the former. As for the ‘universal faith’ described in 
the Treatise, there is no evidence to suggest that the dogma of  immortality, in 
particular, should be included among its prescribed beliefs. In fact, neither the term 
‘immortality [immortalitas]’, nor any of  its cognates, appears in the text. 
This whirlwind survey of  engagements with Spinoza’s eschatology would surely 
be incomplete were it not to include the recent contributions from Steven Nadler. 
Expressing agreement with Curley, Yovel and Moreau, he is emphatic that ‘Spinoza 
did, without question, deny the personal immortality of  the soul’.94 However, his 
reasons for taking this view differ from those cited by these other critics. For 
Nadler’s interpretation instead resembles that which Leibniz had first originated, and 
Martineau and Hampshire had subsequently developed. In other words, Nadler 
attributes to Spinoza the ‘Averroist heresy’ of  conceiving the soul’s post-mortem 
destiny as one of  merging into a universal soul and in the process losing any 
individuating characteristics it might have had during its embodied existence: 
My suggestion is that for Spinoza, after a person’s death, what remains of  the 
mind eternally - the adequate ideas, along with the idea of  the essence of  the 
body - all disperses and reverts back to the infinite intellect of  God (the 
attribute of  Thought), since they are just God’s knowledge of  things.95 
Aside from objections to this kind of  reading already implicit in the competing 
readings above, it might also be ventured that Nadler proceeds, like Yovel and 
Moreau, from a presupposed conception of  ‘immortality’, which happens to be at 
variance with his interpretation of  Spinoza’s notion of  the eternity of  the mind. By 
way of  supplying some of  Nadler’s wider interpretative commitments, it might also 
be worth noting that he makes no secret of  his alliance with the early critics who 
charged Spinoza with heresy and irreligious mischief, arguing that his language only 
‘seems deeply religious’, but can in fact convey no more than a ‘naturalist and 
rationalist project’, since, in the final analysis, ‘Spinoza is an atheist’.96 This 
constitutes, for Nadler, ‘the strongest possible reason… for thinking that Spinoza 
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intended to deny the personal immortality of  the soul: such a religiously charged 
doctrine goes against every grain of  his philosophical persuasions’.97 
However, whether or not Spinoza’s discussion of  the mind’s eternity should be 
understood as an attempt to inoculate the idea of  ‘immortality’ of  any ethical or 
religious significance is perhaps the very Gretchenfrage with which we are confronted, 
and so should not be prejudged at the outset. To guard against this danger, I will 
conclude this survey of  literature with some advice from Clare Carlisle: 
The question is... how the concept of  immortality is transformed when it is 
thought through the Spinozistic lens. One possible response to this question, 
of  course, is that whenever Spinoza uses religious terminology he does so in 
order to naturalise and secularise established beliefs. But... we should not 
assume that the transformation of  meaning accomplished in Spinoza’s 
deployment of  traditional religious vocabulary is a reductive one. It may be 
that just as Spinoza uses - and thereby alters - existing philosophical concepts 
in order to articulate his alternative metaphysics, so his reinterpretations of  
theological ideas serve to communicate an alternative form of  religiosity in 
terms that he could expect his readers to relate to.98  
This policy may be taken further, so as not to assume from the outset any 
necessary incompatibility between ‘naturalism’, or ‘secularism’, on the one hand, and 
‘religiosity’, on the other. It is hopefully the conceptual topography of  these grands 
mots, as well as the more precise terms in play - ‘immortality’, ‘eternity’ and ‘mind’ - 
that will, with Spinozistic compass and quadrant, be charted in what follows.99
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‘Immortality of  the Soul’ vs. ‘Eternity of  the Mind’ 
 
 
A quick glance at the literature surveyed in the previous chapter shows that Spinoza’s 
account of  the eternity of  the mind in Ethics V has often been thought to be a 
response to the religious dogma of  the immortality of  the soul. There are 
commentators, like Wolfson, who think that it is ‘proper to retain the traditional 
vocabulary and speak of  the immortality of  the soul’, indeed that ‘the immortality of  
the soul, according to Spinoza, is personal and individual’ (as opposed to an 
impersonal diffusion in a ‘universal soul’).1 A recent advocate for this verdict on the 
meaning of  the passage, Donagan has argued that ‘immortality as [Spinoza] 
understood it preserves much of  the substance of  what plain men have hoped for’, 
and that Wolfson was right to understand it as ‘personal and individual’.2 But there is 
no shortage of  opposition to this view. Yovel, it was noted in the previous chapter, 
has ruled out the viability of  such a notion in Spinoza’s philosophy: ‘How then is 
immortality possible [for Spinoza]? To answer in a word: it is not possible.’3 He adds, 
the ‘transcendent-religious idea of  an afterlife, in which our existence will be 
modified in proportion to what we have done in this life, is foreign to him’.4 
Similarly, Moreau has warned of  the ‘violence [it does] to the text to read in the 
foreground a doctrine of  the immortality of  the soul’.5 More recently, Steven Nadler 
has gone to great lengths to discredit any such ‘immortality reading’. Joining Yovel 
                                                          
1 Wolfson, Philosophy of  Spinoza, vol. II, p. 295. On the ‘Averroist heresy’, see Chapter 1, p. 23 
(together with note 23). 
2 Donagan, ‘Spinoza’s Proof  of  Immortality’, pp. 256, 252. 
3 Yovel, Spinoza and Other Heretics, vol. I, p. 170. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Moreau, Spinoza, p. 535. 
Within the surface of  Time’s fleeting river 
Its wrinkled image lies, as then it lay 
Immovably unquiet, and for ever 
It trembles, but it cannot pass away. 
 
Percy Bysshe Shelley 
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and Moreau, he insists that ‘such a religiously charged doctrine goes against every 
grain of  [Spinoza’s] philosophical persuasions’, and that to try to find such a doctrine 
in his writings is ‘to deeply misunderstand Spinoza’.6 
In this chapter, I will try to make room for a compromise between these 
opposing perspectives. On the one hand, I will argue that Yovel et al are right to 
insist that Spinoza rejected the traditional, transcendent conception of  an afterlife. 
But, on the other hand, I will make a case for granting that Spinoza remained 
nonetheless deeply moved by the question of  human mortality. The philosophical 
response that he gradually came to develop reflects his more general metaphysical 
project of  replacing an opposition between ‘this world’ and ‘a world beyond’ with his 
own immanent framework, in that it too consists in replacing a theological 
opposition between ‘this life’ and ‘the next’ with his own immanently construed 
notion of  eternal life. If  Spinoza was willing to invest so many traditional 
philosophical and theological terms with new meaning, then why should the term 
‘immortality’ be any different? As early as the Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, 
he warned of  the danger of  misconstruing the nature of  immortality: ‘the Stoics 
heard, perhaps, the world soul, and also that the soul is immortal [immortalis], which they 
only imagined confusedly’.7 If  it is possible to be confused about immortality, then it is 
presumably also possible to be correct about it. Warning of  the ‘violence’ it does to 
the text of  the Ethics to find in it a doctrine of  immortality because it differs (even 
radically so) from a ‘traditional religious conception’ is to refuse Spinoza the kind of  
innovation and reinterpretation in which he was otherwise engaged.8 For in many 
ways his philosophy consists in a radical overhaul of  existing paradigms. Granting 
Spinoza this latitude, it is possible to allow Wolfson et al no less of  a concession than 
their counterparts. Admittedly, Spinoza ‘could not have denied that the character of  
the immortality he offered to demonstrate differs from that promised by the saints 
and prophets’.9 But nor, I think, did he regard his alternative as a superficial or 
                                                          
6 Nadler, ‘Eternity and Immortality’, pp. 243-4. See, also, Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method, pp. 84-
6; James C. Morrison, ‘Spinoza on the Self, Personal Identity, and Immortality’, in Spinoza: The 
Enduring Questions, ed. Graeme Hunter (Toronto: University of  Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 31-47. 
7 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §74, emphasis added. Although this was once 
thought to be one of  Spinoza’s later works, it is now generally accepted to be among the earliest. 
Filippo Mignini has made a compelling case for thinking it the earliest of  Spinoza’s known works, 
earlier even than the Short Treatise. Filippo Mignini, ‘Per la datazione e l’interpretazione del Tractatus de 
Intellectus Emendatione di B. Spinoza’, La Cultura, 17 (1979), pp. 87-160. 
8 But see Mogens Lærke, ‘The Problem of  Alloglossia. Leibniz on Spinoza’s Innovative Use of  
Philosophical Language’. 
9 Donagan, ‘Spinoza’s Proof  of  Immortality’, p. 256. 
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watered-down substitute. In tracing the evolution of  Spinoza’s eschatology from his 
earlier to his later works, I will aim to show that this problem continued to be of  
importance to him, and that the response on which he eventually settled in the Ethics, 
however unorthodox it may have been, nonetheless constituted for him an authentic 
attempt to extol a kind of  existence that could be said to be ‘without death’ - a kind 
of  ‘deathlessness [immortalitas]’. 
 
 
Life after ‘rebirth’ 
 
In the table of  contents found bound together with the Short Treatise, the title given 
for Part II is ‘The second, treating of  a Perfect Man, capable of  uniting himself  to 
God’.10 This mystical-sounding title is reminiscent of  something that Spinoza says in 
another early work, the Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect: 
[T]he highest good is to arrive - together with other individuals if  possible - at 
the enjoyment of  such a nature. What that nature is we shall show in its proper 
place: that is the knowledge of  the union that the mind has with the whole of  
Nature.11 
Acquiring such a nature is ‘the true good’ sought in the stirring opening passage of  
the work, with which Spinoza joins a long and distinguished ethical tradition. For like 
the philosophers of  antiquity to whom we owe the tradition of  ethical thought, 
Spinoza inaugurates his search for the good with a kind of  confession, and a firm 
personal resolution to forgo the shallow pursuits of  wealth, prestige and sensual 
pleasure.12 He will direct his efforts instead towards the attainment of  a certain 
human fulfilment, an ethically rich state, or ‘highest human perfection’.13 This ethical 
                                                          
10 Spinoza, Short Treatise, p. 60. In fact, the title given in the table of  contents is different from that 
which is given at the beginning of  Part II, which reads ‘On Man and What Pertains to Him’. This is 
only the tip of  an intimidating iceberg of  difficulties posed by the text. Discovered only in the 
nineteenth century, the work consists almost in a kind of  montage, with layer upon layer of  (often 
conflicting) diachronic additions. While in the past this has made some doubt the very authenticity of  
the text, it is now generally agreed that, while the translation of  the original Latin is probably not in 
his own hand, the work is indeed Spinoza’s, and there is every reason to believe that the translation is 
reasonably faithful to the original. Provided the author’s general motto, ‘caute’, is heeded, the text can 
nonetheless reward careful study. 
11 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §13. 
12 For the confessional quality of  this passage, and a comparison with classic confessional literature, 
see Moreau, Spinoza, p. 27 and passim. 
13 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §16. 
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perfection, according to Spinoza at the time of  this work, consists in ‘the knowledge 
of  the union that the mind has with the whole of  nature’. 
More is said about a ‘human nature much stronger and more enduring’ in the 
Short Treatise.14 In this work, the reader is told that acquiring the status of  ‘a Perfect 
Man’ is achieved through a transformative ‘rebirth’.15 A life of  capricious passion and 
materialistic desire, in which the whims of  the body trump the better judgement of  
the mind, is transformed into a life of  true love and rational identification with 
Nature (which, it turns out, is identical to God): 
For our first birth was when we were united with the body... But our other, or 
second, birth will occur when we become aware in ourselves of  the completely 
different effects of  love produced by knowledge... This [love of  God] is as 
different [from love of  the body] as the incorporeal is from the corporeal, the 
spirit from the flesh. 
This, therefore, may the more rightly and truly be called Rebirth, because, as 
we shall show, an eternal and immutable constancy comes only from the Love 
and Union.16 
Before rebirth, Spinoza explains, a person’s life is hindered by qualitatively inferior 
forms of  knowledge and love: knowledge limited to hearsay and random experience, 
and love limited to lust for material and sensual pleasures. One detects several 
sources for this account of  rebirth. There is the Stoic premium on equanimity 
(ataraxia), Leo Hebreo’s conception of  love as unification, Descartes’ preference for 
the intellectual over the sensual (not to mention distinct echoes of  mind-body 
dualism), as well as the idea of  rebirth itself, which featured so centrally in the 
heterodox forms of  Christianity to which many of  Spinoza’s friends and associates 
subscribed.17  
In the Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, the difference between lower and 
higher forms of  love is said to consist in ‘the quality of  the object to which we 
cling’.18 This differentiates a form of  love that clings only to ‘those things that can 
                                                          
14 Ibid. §13. 
15 Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, p. 138 and passim. 
16 Ibid. p. 140. 
17 For the Stoicism in Spinoza’s philosophy, see Susan James, ‘Spinoza the Stoic’, in The Rise of  
Modern Philosophy: The Tension between the New and Traditional Philosophies from Machiavelli to Leibniz, ed. 
Tom Sorell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 289-316. On the possible influence of  Leo 
Hebreo, see Carl Gebhardt, ‘Spinoza und der Platonismus’, Chronicon Spinozanum, 1, pp. 178-234 (cited 
in Curley, The Collected Works of  Spinoza, vol. I, p. 105, note 3). On the free-ranging religious views of  
Spinoza’s associates, see Leszek Kolakowski, Chrétiens sans église: La conscience religieuse et le lien confessionel 
au XIIe siècle, trans. Anna Posner (Paris: Gallimard, 1969). 
18 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §9. 
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perish’ from a form of  love that is directed instead ‘toward the eternal and infinite 
thing’.19 The impermanence and instability of  the first kind of  object means that the 
kind of  love that clings to it will be plagued by ‘strife’, ‘sadness’, ‘envy’, and, in a 
word, ‘disturbances of  the mind’.20 The eternal and divine quality of  the second kind 
of  object, in contrast, will allow for a love that ‘feeds the mind with a joy entirely 
exempt from sadness’.21 In the Short Treatise, Spinoza expands on the close 
relationship between knowledge, love and the quality of  that which is loved: 
Love, then, arises from the perception and knowledge which we have of  a 
thing, and as the thing shows itself  to be greater and more magnificent, so also 
is our Love greater and greater… Love… is nothing but enjoying a thing and 
being united with it. We divide it according to the qualities of  the object man 
seeks to enjoy and unite with.22 
To sum up Spinoza’s early account of  human fulfilment, a person, prior to 
rebirth, is subject to the unpredictability of  his or her natural instincts and the 
turmoil of  his or her passions, vulnerable to the vicissitudes of  a life governed only 
loosely by inferior forms of  knowledge and love. This puts one at risk of  confusion, 
sorrow, and other ‘disturbances of  the mind’. But with the realisation of  an inherent 
capacity for rational thought and intellectual insight, a ‘rebirth’ takes place, after 
which unreliable opinion is replaced with true knowledge, lust with true love, and, 
eventually, one stands to acquire that higher, special knowledge in which a thing is 
‘known through itself  alone’, and in which there is ‘an immediate manifestation of  
the object itself  to the intellect’.23 With this special knowledge comes a special love - 
‘what a union! what a love!’ - in which ‘our blessedness consists’, and through which 
‘all things are united through Nature, and united into one [being], viz. God’.24 Such is 
the path of  ethical fulfilment in these early works. But, in addition to these special 
forms of  knowledge and love, and the resulting spiritual epiphany, there is also, he 
adds, ‘an eternal and immutable constancy’, which he takes up immediately in a 
chapter titled ‘Of  the Immortality of  the Soul’.25  
                                                          
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. §10. 
22 Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, pp. 104-5. 
23 Ibid. pp. 138-9. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. p. 140. 
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This curious chapter in the Short Treatise foreshadows the puzzle posed by the 
discussion of  the mind’s eternity in the Ethics with a puzzle of  its own. The chapter 
begins, alluringly, with an invitation to ‘consider attentively what the Soul is, and 
where its change and duration arise from’, from which we would  ‘easily see whether 
it is mortal or immortal’.26 The reader is then reminded what the ‘soul’ is: 
We have said, then, that the Soul is an Idea which is in the thinking thing, 
arising from the existence of  a thing which is in Nature. From this it follows 
that as the duration and change of  the thing are, so also the duration and 
change of  the Soul must be.27 
I will examine Spinoza’s definition of  the soul (and the mind) as the ‘idea’ of  the 
body in Chapter 4. For now it is sufficient to note what seems to be a dependence (at 
least logically) of  the former on the latter, a (logical) dependence of  the soul on the 
body. So the ‘thing which is in Nature’ of  which the soul is an ‘idea’, is the body, 
which ‘comes to exist... through motion and rest’.28 This seems to imply that were 
the body to lose its essential ‘proportion of  motion and rest’ and perish, so too 
would the idea, or soul, which ‘arises from’ that body, lose its ground of  existence 
and perish.29 This consequence seems to follow with as much necessity as the demise 
of  the mind seems to follow from that of  the body in the Ethics. But in neither work 
does Spinoza draw this conclusion. 
Instead, Spinoza returns to the dualistic tone of  the previous chapter, in which it 
was said that ‘the love of  the body’ is as different from ‘the love of  God’ as ‘the 
incorporeal is from the corporeal, the spirit from the flesh’.30 He associates each of  
these kinds of  love with its own fate for the soul: 
[W]e have noted that the Soul can be united either with the body of  which it is 
the Idea or with God, without whom it can neither exist nor be understood. 
From this, then, one can easily see that: 
1. if  it is united with the body only, and the body perishes, then it must also 
perish; for if  it lacks the body, which is the foundation of  its love, it must 
perish with it; but that 
                                                          
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. Preface. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. p. 140. 
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2. if  it is united with another thing, which is, and remains, immutable, then, on 
the contrary, it will have to remain immutable also. For through what would it 
then be possible that it should be able to perish?31 
Spinoza does not go on to affirm either of  these disjuncts, but it seems clear that it is 
the second of  the two fates for the soul that he is urging the reader to strive for. The 
immortality of  the soul described in the Short Treatise appears, then, to answer to 
Spinoza’s ambition in the Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect to acquire ‘the 
greatest joy, to eternity… to arrive - together with other individuals if  possible - at 
the enjoyment of… the knowledge of  the union that the mind has with the whole of  
Nature’.32 But just as he warned in that work of  misconceiving the true nature of  the 
immortality of  the soul (as the Stoics had done), we too must be careful to inquire 
into what he meant by this traditional religious phrase.33 How must one, in Carlisle’s 
words, ‘rethink immortality through the Spinozistic lens’?34 
 
 
‘Heaven [and hell] is a place on Earth’35 
 
So far a certain picture has emerged of  the way that Spinoza thought about ethical 
fulfilment at this early stage of  his development. The essential features of  this 
preferred way of  life include knowledge, love, joy, as well as a certain orientation 
with respect to human mortality. But what is this orientation? From the standpoint 
of  the Short Treatise, Spinoza’s considered answer to this question is still amorphous 
and uncertain, yet alluring and promising. It is in fact the same answer that Bayle 
long ago attributed to Spinoza. There is no question of  reward or punishment 
awaiting us in the hereafter, so instead ‘men should apply themselves to virtue on 
account of  its excellence and because one finds enough advantage in the practice of  
morality in this life not to have anything to complain about’.36 In the Short Treatise, 
Spinoza has already rejected the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, 
and so it is unsurprising that the work at times gestures towards a naturalised 
                                                          
31 Ibid. p. 141. 
32 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §1, §13. 
33 Ibid. §74. 
34 Carlisle, ‘Spinoza on Eternal Life’, forthcoming. 
35 Title and lyric of  Belinda Carlisle’s 1987 single, produced by Rick Nowels (MCA Records: 1987). 
36 Bayle, Historical and Critical Dictionary, p. 295. 
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reinterpretation of  ‘heaven’ and ‘hell’, not as transcendent dwellings in which one 
enjoys the rewards for one’s labours or suffers in agony for a life ill-spent, but as 
conditions of  ‘this life’ as it is presently lived. ‘Sadness, despair, envy, fright, and 
other evil passions... are the real hell itself ’.37 One is reminded of  the pearl of  
wisdom attributed to Guatama Buddha: ‘You will not be punished for your anger; 
you will be punished by your anger.’ Conversely, Spinoza explains that it is 
‘knowledge’, and its manifestations in love and joy, in which ‘our eternal salvation and 
happiness really consist’.38 However, although Bayle was right to find this message in 
Spinoza’s philosophy, he was wrong to group him together with the ‘Epicureans’, 
who ‘deny the immortality of  the soul’, for this is, as we have seen, part and parcel 
of  his conception of  ethical fulfilment (at least, in the Short Treatise). 
This kind of  ethic of  human mortality was not unprecedented. As mentioned, it 
is implicit in certain strands of  Buddhism.39 Nor was it foreign to the western 
religious culture of  Spinoza’s time either. As Carlisle has pointed out, there are 
certain parallels between Spinoza’s account and the doctrine of  eternal life in the 
Johannine books of  the New Testament: 
My contention is that while Spinoza rejects the orthodox Christian teaching on 
eternal life… he presents an alternative account of  human eternity that is in 
certain respects faithful to the Johannine doctrine of  eternal life, particularly as 
this is articulated in the First Letter of  John.40 
It is worth remembering that Spinoza chose a quotation from the First Letter of  
John for the title page of  his Theological-Political Treatise: ‘Through this means we 
recognise that we remain in God, and God remains in us - that He gave to us from 
His own Spirit’.41 As for the First Letter of  John itself, ‘eternal life’ is given a present, 
as well as a future, dimension, and is explained as a qualitatively distinct existential 
orientation arising out of  love for others: 
                                                          
37 Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, p. 128. This remark bears a (perhaps coincidental) resemblance to a line 
spoken by Laertes in Hamlet: ‘Thought and affliction, passion, hell itself ’. William Shakespeare, 
Hamlet, Act 4, Scene v. 
38 Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, pp. 128-9, emphasis added. 
39 However, mainstream Buddhist theology would probably align more with the kind of  
transcendental picture against which Spinoza was rebelling. As Ray Anderson observes: ‘What appears 
to be a common assumption between the Hindu, Buddhist and Greek concept of  death is a 
fundamental dualism with regard to the reality of  the “otherworldly” and the unreality of  this present 
temporal existence.’ Ray S. Anderson, Theology, Death and Dying (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 8. 
40 Carlisle, ‘Spinoza on Eternal Life’, forthcoming. 
41 The Holy Bible, King James Version, 1 John 4: 13.  
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We know that we have passed from death to life because we love one another. 
Whoever does not love abides in death. All who hate a brother or sister are 
murderers, and you know that murderers do not have eternal life abiding in 
them.42 
Spinoza, too, can be read as having articulated a philosophy of  life. The ‘wisdom’ of  
the ‘free man’ consists in ‘a meditation on life, not on death’.43 Sylvain Zac has a 
lovely way of  characterising this comportment of  Spinoza’s philosophy: 
One can centre all Spinozist themes around the notion of  life: God is life 
itself; extension, an attribute of  God, constitutes a living dynamism; all things 
live in God and are animated to different degrees; living beings are not 
machines and exhibit the traits of  individuality, uniqueness, specificity and 
adaptation; reason, adequate consciousness of  oneself, of  things and of  God, 
is the “true life of  the mind”; eternity is an “eternity of  life” and not an 
“eternity of  death”.44 
The Judaism in which Spinoza was first schooled also includes certain tendencies 
towards a more immanent, or realised, eschatology, as expressed, for example, in the 
Kaddish: ‘May He establish His Kingdom during your life and during your days, and 
during the life of  all the house of  Israel.’45 However, if  Nadler’s recent suggestion is 
correct, then despite their presence in Judaism itself, it was perhaps Spinoza’s 
endorsement of  these very strands that led to his virulent expulsion from the 
Amsterdam Synagogue. For an insistence on strict adherence to a doctrinal belief  in 
the afterlife may have arisen, Nadler suggests, out of  a deep concern for the souls of  
converso brethren in Iberia, who had ostensibly left the nation of  Israel and thus 
‘forfeited their right to a place in olam haba’.46 Nadler explains: 
One can easily imagine, in fact, that the Dutch Sephardim generally, solicitous 
as they were about the eternal fate of  those members of  Israel still compelled 
to live as Christians in Iberia, were very sensitive on the question of  
immortality, and would not have been tolerant of  one who would deny 
altogether a future life in the hereafter.47 
Whether Nadler’s conjecture is correct or not, it is clear that, from an early stage, 
Spinoza was beginning to apply his more general framework of  immanence to the 
                                                          
42 1 John 2:14-5. 
43 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p67. 
44 Zac, L’idée de vie, p. 15, translation my own. 
45 Kaddish, in Authorised Daily Prayer-Book, trans. S. Singer (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1908),  p. 
86. Quoted in Dodd, Parables of  the Kingdom, p. 23. Compare this with John 18:36: ‘My kingdom is not 
of  this world.’ 
46 Nadler, Spinoza’s Heresy, p. 160. 
47 Ibid. p. 165. 
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question of  human eschatology. However, as mentioned above, the application of  
this framework to theological matters was not carried out with total conviction in the 
Short Treatise. As is characteristic of  the text more generally, these inklings of  a 
realised eschatology jostle with incompatible vestiges of  a more traditional, 
transcendent, notion of  an afterlife. The text of  the Short Treatise is highly complex, 
and its palimpsestic quality defies any simple, straightforward interpretation. In 
Chapter 4, I will venture a hypothetical reconstruction of  the evolving eschatology 
buried in its diachronic layers. For now it may be enough to note that these remnants 
of  a transcendental eschatology seem to go hand-in-hand with Spinoza’s earlier 
conceptions of  ‘eternity’ and ‘mind’, or ‘soul [ziel]’. For this reason, and not least 
because, when Spinoza came to compose the Ethics, he dispensed with the language 
of  ‘immortality [onstervelijkheid]’ altogether, preferring to elaborate a doctrine of  the 
‘eternity of  (part) of  the mind [æternitas (partis) mentis]’, I will now turn to look more 
closely at the notion of  eternity and its evolving place in Spinoza’s thought. 
 
 
From here to eternity 
 
Although Spinoza defines ‘eternity’ at the very outset of  the Ethics, what he means 
by the term is still fraught with debate today. At times it seems as though he 
endorses the Platonic view that, while eternity (aeon, for Plato) in a sense 
characterises the true nature of  things, duration (or time, chronos, for Plato) is 
somehow illusory, a mere ‘moving image of  eternity’.48 ‘Eternity’, Spinoza explains, is 
‘existence itself ’, whereas ‘duration [duratio]’ is merely ‘existence insofar as it is 
conceived abstractly’.49 But he also seems unwilling to deny the reality of  duration. It 
is defined as ‘an indefinite continuation of  existing’, which sounds real enough.50 It is 
also a notion implicated in key parts of  the Ethics involving change, such as the 
infinite mode of  ‘motion and rest’, the physics outlined in the ‘digression’ of  Part II, 
and the transition between joy and sadness which underpins the psychology of  the 
                                                          
48 Plato, Timæous, 37d, in The Dialogues of  Plato, ed. and trans. Benjamin Jowett, vol. III (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 723. 
49 Spinoza, Ethics, 1def8, 2p45s. 
50 Ibid. 2def5. 
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affects in Part III.51 This is further complicated by the problem of  how these two 
notions relate to each other. While eternity ‘cannot be explained by duration or time, 
even if  the duration is conceived to be without beginning or end’, and ‘in eternity, 
there is neither when, nor before, nor after’, nevertheless ‘God’s omnipotence has been 
actual from eternity and will remain in the same actuality to eternity’, and - our old 
friend - ‘something of  [the mind] remains which is eternal’.52 
It is unsurprising, then, that the debate continues unabated. What is surprising, 
perhaps, is that the debate should lend itself  to a reasonably linear spectrum of  
positions. For interpretative responses to these issues tend to cluster around one of  
two poles, corresponding to two different meanings of  ‘eternity’, whose joint history, 
Wolfson points out, can be traced back to antiquity: 
Like the twofold meanings with which so many of  our other philosophic 
terms have started their historical careers, they may be designated the Platonic 
and the Aristotelian. Briefly stated, the difference between these two meanings 
is as follows. To Plato eternity is the antithesis of  time and it means the 
exclusion of  any kind of  temporal relations. To Aristotle eternity is only 
endless time.53 
In the Timæous, Plato complains that there is a kind of  category mistake involved in 
applying tensed language to something that exists eternally and therefore timelessly: 
For there were no days and nights and months and years before the heaven 
was created, but when he constructed the heaven he created them also. They 
are all parts of  time, and the past and future are created species of  time, which 
we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to the eternal being; for we say that it 
“was”, or “is”, or “will be”, but the truth is that “is” alone is properly 
attributed to it, and that “was” and “will be” are only to be spoken of  
becoming in time, for they are motions, but that which is immovably the same 
for ever cannot become older or younger by time.54 
Thus Plato calls time a ‘moving image of  eternity... moving according to number’, to 
contrast it with the principle that ‘eternity itself  rests in unity’.55 For Aristotle, on the 
other hand, there is at least one legitimately temporal sense of  ‘eternity’, for he takes 
the beginningless and endless existence of  the cosmos, though not in time in the 
sense of  being contained by it, to be at least with time in that it exists ‘when time 
exists’: 
                                                          
51 Letter 64; Spinoza, The Letters, p. 299; Ethics, 2p13s and passim; 3p11s. 
52 Spinoza, Ethics, 1def8, 1p33s2, 1p17s, 5p23, emphasis added. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Plato, Timaeous, 37d. 
55 Ibid. 
  52 
 
 
Clearly then “to be in time” has the same meaning for other things also, 
namely, that their being should be measured by time. “To be in time” is one of  
two things: (1) to exist when time exists, (2) as we say of  some things that they 
are “in number”… [T]he “now” and the “before” and the like are in time, just 
as “unit” and “odd” and “even” are in number… If  this is so, they are 
contained by time as things are contained by place.56 
So Aristotle allows a conception of  eternity, i.e. (1), ‘when time exists’, that amounts 
to ‘existence at all times’, or what Kneale calls ‘sempiternity’.57 This forms the 
substance of  Wolfson’s distinction between the ‘Platonic’ and ‘Aristotelian’ meanings 
of  ‘eternity’. 
The Aristotelian sense of  eternity is perhaps the more intuitive of  the two, and 
corresponds to the way that people tend to think about the term. Expressions like 
‘for all eternity’, and ‘it would take an eternity’, which occur in everyday discourse, 
certainly suggest a temporal, and perhaps even an omni-temporal meaning. It is also, 
according to Kneale, the easier of  the two to define: 
Of  the two notions with which we are concerned, that of  sempiternity is 
comparatively simple. A sempiternal object is one which exists at all moments 
of  time, whether we believe time to be finite in one or both directions or 
infinite in both.58 
Eternity in the sense of  ‘timelessness’, on the other hand, is somewhat further 
from everyday thinking, and somewhat more difficult to explicate. For one thing, the 
term ‘timelessness’ by itself  seems to have no positive content of  its own, meaning 
what it does only through a negation of  the term ‘time’. The Platonic meaning of  
eternity seems to be defined in a primarily negative way, which serves to highlight the 
crucial respect in which it contrasts with the Aristotelian meaning. In itself, the term 
is, so to speak, ‘empty’, open to different ways of  supplying the positive content. 
How did Plato himself  understand the positive content of  ‘eternity’? 
Beginning as an adjective of  those eternal beings… it came to be used, as it so 
often happens with terms, as a surrogate for those beings… In this capacity of  
                                                          
56 Aristotle, Physica, in The Works of  Aristotle, ed. and trans. William D. Ross, vol. II (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1930), IV.12, 221a. 
57 Kneale, ‘Eternity and Sempiternity’, p. 223. 
58 Ibid. p. 227. 
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a substantive, the term eternal… epitomised to Plato all the essential 
differences between his world of  ideas and his world of  sense.59 
There are two important things to note about this characterisation of  Plato’s 
conception of  eternity. Firstly, the term refers to a kind of  existence, and in 
particular to a ‘ceaseless existence’ that differs in further specifiable ways from the 
kind of  existence enjoyed by ‘other kinds of  beings’. Secondly, there is a set of  
‘characteristics’ that serves to specify the nature of  this kind of  existence. This set of  
characteristics derives, for Plato, from the ‘differences between his world of  ideas 
and his world of  sense’.60 Whereas ‘the world of  ideas is beginningless... the world of  
sense had a beginning in an act of  creation’, and whereas ‘the world of  ideas is 
immovable, immutable, and indivisible... the world of  sense is subject to motion, 
change and division’.61 Therefore, the positive content of  eternity, for Plato, came to 
include ‘permanence, unity, immutability, identity, and indivisibility’.62 However, the 
set of  characteristics by which the kind of  existence said to be ‘eternal’ is 
distinguished from other kinds of  existence could be otherwise. Thus whereas the 
Aristotelian sense of  eternity is defined principally in quantitative terms, that is, in 
terms of  a maximal number of  moments in time, the Platonic sense of  eternity, put 
positively, is defined in qualitative terms, that is, in terms of  a certain kind of  
existence, the nature of  which could well be specified in different ways. 
Returning to Spinoza, then, one finds that interpretations generally tend to 
attribute to him either a Platonic or an Aristotelian understanding of  eternity, that is, 
either a qualitative, or a quantitative, conception. For clarity, and to avoid the 
temptation to import peculiarities from either Plato or Aristotle, I will set aside 
Wolfson’s labels for the distinction and refer to these two senses of  eternity with the 
neutral adjectives ‘qualitative’ and ‘quantitative’. At first sight, it seems fairly 
straightforward that Spinoza adopted a ‘qualitative’ understanding of  the term. For 
the definition at (1def8) emphatically insists that eternity ‘cannot be explained by 
duration or time, even if  the duration is conceived to be without beginning or end’, 
which seems unequivocally to rule out a definition in terms of  ‘moments in time’, 
even if  the number of  moments is infinitely many. This is an interpretation with a 
long and distinguished pedigree. Pollock, for example, concluded that eternity for 
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Spinoza ‘is not a continuance of  existence but a manner of  existence; something 
which can be realised here and now as much as at any other time and place’.63 
Similarly, Joachim was of  the view that ‘eternity’, for Spinoza, ‘expresses timeless 
necessity of  being, and has nothing to do with lasting through an ‘infinitely long’ 
time’.64 More recently, Harris has joined this cohort, concluding that ‘eternity’, for 
Spinoza, ‘is thus not a continued duration... but a quality of  being’.65 
But the opposing, ‘quantitative’, interpretation has its fair share of  eminent 
adherents too. Wolfson at times seemed to hold that, at least with respect to the 
infinite modes, Spinoza countenanced a temporal sense of  eternity: 
“Eternal” means only to be immutable, or to exist forever, as Spinoza directly 
expresses himself  in Proposition XXI, or to have indeterminate existence or 
duration, as he indirectly expresses himself  in the Demonstration to 
Proposition XXI where he describes the opposite of  it to have “determinate 
existence or duration.”66 
Curley has since agreed that ‘always [semper]’ at (1p21) implies temporality 
(‘omnitemporality to be sure, but temporality none the less’), and more recently 
Donagan has sought to deflect the ‘appearance’ that ‘Spinoza conceived eternity 
‘Platonically’, as no more than an ‘illusion.’67 Siding with Kneale, he argues that it is 
‘closer to his usage to say that eternity, as he conceived it, is equivalent to necessarily 
omnitemporal existence, understanding “omnitemporal” as meaning “at all moments 
in the passage of  time”’.68 
Some have taken a more complicated view of  the matter. Kneale, for example, 
has submitted a certain ‘conjecture as to history’: 
Spinoza began with a Platonic view of  eternity as timelessness sharply 
separated from duration… a way of  thinking [that] persists into the Ethics… 
but by the time he came to write Part V, he was thinking in a more Aristotelian 
way.69 
Clearly this is a somewhat bold stance to adopt (reflecting perhaps the desperate 
nature of  the puzzle), implying, as it does, either that Spinoza did not make a 
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considered review of  the overall consistency of  the Ethics, or that he did do this but 
somehow allowed this particular dissonance to remain in the work. Having said that, 
Kneale’s ‘conjecture as to history’ is not implausible either. Given the lengthy 
gestation period of  the Ethics, in which time Spinoza could well have changed his 
mind about certain things, and the fact that the work was composed in successive 
stages and circulated piecemeal among friends, which could have allowed disparities 
to creep in between one part and another, Kneale’s conjecture is possible (though I 
think it fails to accommodate the Platonic remarks in what she takes to be the 
Aristotelian section of  the text).70 
The secondary literature thus offers a rich spectrum of  interpretations for 
Spinoza’s conception of  æternitas. Where on that spectrum, assuming it is exhaustive, 





In Spinoza’s earlier works, one finds a somewhat ambiguous use of  the concept of  
eternity. One reads, in the opening passage of  the Treatise on the Emendation of  the 
Intellect, of  his ambition to discover ‘the true good’, which, ‘once found and acquired, 
would continuously give [him] the greatest joy, to eternity’, the adverb ‘continuously 
[continua]’ apparently suggesting a kind of  eternity involving a stretch or quantity of  
duration.71 But towards the end of  the work one encounters an interesting passage in 
which there begins to emerge a foreshadowing of  the distinction in his mature 
writings between the category of  duration - of  time and place, and, in a word, 
circumstance - and the category of  the eternal, that is, of  the fixed and immutable, 
‘inmost’ essence of  things: 
The essences of  singular, changeable things are not to be drawn from their 
series, or [sive] order of  existing, since it offers us nothing but extrinsic 
denominations, relations, or at most, circumstances, all of  which are far from 
the inmost essence of  things. That essence is to be sought only from the fixed 
and eternal things, and at the same time from the laws inscribed in these 
                                                          
70 For the publication history of  the Ethics, and compelling evidence vindicating the consistency of  
the text (pace Keale), see Piet Steenbakkers, Spinoza’s Ethica from manuscript to print: Studies on text, form 
and related topics (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1994). For an example of  a remark left unaccounted for by 
Kneale’s conjecture, see Spinoza, Ethics, 5p29dem. 
71 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §1, emphasis added. 
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things, as in their true codes, according to which all singular things come to be, 
and are ordered.72 
That the category of  the eternal is conceived here in a fundamentally sui generis 
way is then confirmed by the further affirmation that ‘by nature, all these [fixed and 
eternal] things are at once’, which is to say, they are not to be understood as ordered 
in temporal succession, and so perhaps not to be understood as temporal at all.73 
There is a good deal more about eternity in the Short Treatise, though here too 
much of  it can seem incongruous. In a chapter titled ‘Of  God’s Necessary Actions’, 
the reader finds an incongruous juxtaposition of  the Platonic-sounding claim that ‘in 
eternity there is neither before nor after’ with the Aristotelian-sounding 
characterisation of  God as one ‘who is now, ever has been, and will remain to all 
eternity’.74 Later on in the work, there is some reflection on ‘what our love of  God is, 
and its effect, our eternal duration’, and then in the concluding chapter, and ‘in a 
different way than before, [on] the eternal and constant duration of  the intellect’, 
apparently without any concern for the difficulty there may be in assimilating eternity 
to duration.75 
Can these early vacillations be accounted for by attributing to Spinoza a non-
univocal conception of  eternity, as in the tradition of  Aristotle or Boethius?76 Such a 
hypothesis would in fact fit these two earlier texts, but it is not in the end compelling, 
because if  Spinoza did think about ‘eternity’ in a multivalent way, one would expect 
some indication of  this in the text. In any case, he would soon give what appears to 
be a fairly univocal explication of  the concept in the Metaphysical Thoughts, appended 
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75 Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, p. 142, p. 149, emphasis added. 
76 Aristotle distinguishes between at least two possible senses of  eternity, including the ‘qualitative’ 
sense that Wolfson attributes to Plato and his own sense of  ‘being with time’. See note 56 above. 
Boethius distinguishes between God’s eternity and the world’s perpetuity: ‘The endless and infinite 
changing of  things in time is an attempt to imitate eternity, but it cannot equal its immobility and it 
fails to achieve the eternal present…it is balanced on the knife-edge of  the present… All this is to say 
that if  we use proper terms, then, following Plato, we should say that God is eternal but the world is 
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to his exposition of  Descartes’ “Principles of  Philosophy”.77 The verdict on Spinoza’s 
earliest writings on eternity seems then to be that he was from the beginning 
sympathetic to a sharp distinction between the temporal (or ‘durational’) and the 
eternal, that is, sympathetic to a ‘qualitative’ conception of  eternity, but he had 
perhaps not yet become accustomed to abiding at all times to his own admonitions 
not to conflate the two. Thus, in this younger stage of  his development, he would at 
one moment warn sternly against confusing the eternal with the durational, only at 
the next moment to make such a slip himself. Such wavering is perhaps to be 
expected at a stage of  one’s intellectual development when the course of  time has 
yet to instil the habit of  conforming at all times to some sharply drawn distinction. 
It is in the Metaphysical Thoughts that Spinoza eventually sets out a more careful, 
considered and, apparently univocal, conception of  eternity.78 In a chapter dedicated 
to the nature ‘Of  God’s Eternity’, the reader is told that eternity differs from 
duration in the same way that the existence of  God differs from that of  created 
things, with the fundamental difference between these two kinds of  existence being 
that, whereas existence is of  the very essence of  God, the same is not true of  
created things.79 Given the essence of  a created thing, its ‘whatness’, a question can 
still be raised about its ‘thatness’ (that is, whether or not it exists), but the same 
cannot be said of  God. Understanding the essence of  God, according to Spinoza, 
simply is to understand that he exists, and conversely, to understand that God exists, 
is to understand what God is, that is, Being itself: 
From this we conclude… that the created thing can be said to enjoy existence, 
because existence is not of  its essence; but God cannot be said to enjoy 
existence, for the existence of  God is God himself, as is his essence also; from 
which it follows that created things enjoy duration, but that God does not in 
any way.80 
It is interesting to note, and it will be addressed in the next chapter, that in the 
Metaphysical Thoughts both eternity and duration are characterised as attributes ‘under 
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pp. 249-52. Translations of  this text, unless stated otherwise, are from Appendix Containing Metaphysical 
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which we conceive’ these different kinds of  existence.81 Whereas eternity is said to be 
‘an attribute under which we conceive the infinite existence of  God’, duration is said to be ‘an 
attribute under which we conceive the existence of  created things insofar as they persevere in their 
actuality’.82 It is here also that Spinoza defines time as a sort of  concept, or a ‘mode 
of  thinking’, formed in the intellect through a comparison between the duration of  
things that have ‘a certain and determinate motion’ and the duration of  other things, 
so as to measure or ‘determine’ the latter with reference to the former.83 
So when Spinoza came to compose his mature philosophy in the Ethics, a sharp 
qualitative distinction between eternity and duration was by then well rooted in his 
thought. In light of  this, the reader is not surprised to find that the definition of  
eternity given at the outset of  the work is supplemented with the warning that it 
‘cannot be explained by duration or time, even if  the duration is conceived to be 
without beginning or end’.84 This distinction is upheld throughout Part I. For 
example, Spinoza insists that ‘in eternity, there is neither when, nor before, nor after’.85 It 
persists into Part II, in which duration is characterised as ‘existence insofar as it is 
conceived abstractly’, and so implicitly contrasted with ‘the very nature of  existence’, 
which, the reader remembers from the definition, is how one is to understand 
eternity (that is, as ‘existence itself’).86 There is nothing that contravenes the 
distinction in Parts III and IV. It is only with the passage concerning the mind’s 
eternity in Part V that the reader seems to encounter a flagrant transgression. The 
problematic passage is introduced with a surprising mention of  duration: ‘So it is 
time now to pass to those things which pertain to the Mind’s duration without relation 
to the body.’87 If  the discussion that follows is indeed about the mind’s eternity, and 
eternity and duration are, by the time of  the Ethics, sharply distinguished, then how 
could the ensuing discussion have anything to do with the mind’s duration? 
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Joachim has brushed this solecism aside as a mere ‘momentary slip’,88 but it is a 
‘slip’ that reappears at least twice in the same critical passage. Something of  the mind 
is said to ‘remain’ at (5p23), and it is said that ‘the more the Mind knows things by 
the second and third kind of  knowledge, the greater the part of  it that remains’.89 
The language of  ‘remaining’ in these remarks seems to involve a decidedly temporal 
significance, and it is because of  this sudden transgression of  Spinoza’s strict 
distinction between eternity and duration that Kneale has proposed her ‘conjecture 
as to history’. Her suggestion is that, ‘by the time he came to write Part V... Spinoza 
was thinking in a more Aristotelian way’ about eternity, a change which Kneale 
suggests took place in the course of  the writing the Ethics itself.90 
I have already granted that this suggestion, though bold, is not wildly implausible, 
since the Ethics was composed in distinct fragments over a lengthy period of  time. 
However, aside from the unwelcome implication that he somehow allowed this 
inconsistency to creep in and remain in the finished work, Kneale’s conjecture is 
compromised by what Spinoza actually says about eternity in this very passage. The 
crucial evidence is at (5p29dem), in which the strict distinction between eternity and 
duration is reaffirmed, citing, no less, the strict definition at (1def8): ‘eternity’, 
Spinoza reiterates, ‘cannot be explained by duration (by Id8 and its explanation)’.91 
This seems sufficient to disprove Kneale’s conjecture, and so the history of  the 
development of  this concept over Spinoza’s successive writings seems more likely to 
be something like that sketched in this chapter. That is, from the beginning Spinoza 
was impressed with the Platonic antithesis between eternity and duration, but he 
would not succeed in consistently keeping the two terms and their respective 
entailments apart until later in his intellectual development, perhaps not until around 
the time of  writing the Metaphysical Thoughts. By the time he came to write the Ethics, 
however, the distinction was firmly embedded. But what, then, are we to make of  
the problematic remarks in Ethics V? 
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Immortality as eternity, eternity as a way of  life 
 
What I hope has emerged over the course of  this chapter is the following. Prior to 
writing the Ethics, Spinoza advocated a certain doctrine of  the immortality of  the 
soul. Also prior to the Ethics, despite his sporadic insistence that the concepts of  
eternity and duration be kept strictly apart, he would still occasionally conflate the 
two. When one turns to the Ethics, however, one notices two interesting and, it 
seems, related things. Firstly, Spinoza’s language changes. Where he had previously 
spoken of  the immortality of  the soul, he now speaks only of  the eternity of  (part 
of) the mind. Secondly, when Spinoza comes to write the Ethics, he is by now a 
practised adherent to a sharp distinction between eternity and duration. Taken 
together, these two things may seem to support the line of  interpretation favoured 
by Yovel, Moreau and Nadler, outlined at the beginning of  this chapter. If, in the 
Ethics, eternity has nothing to do with duration, then the eternity of  the mind need 
not entail any continuation of  the mind’s existence beyond the death of  the body, 
and so it is perhaps unsurprising that Spinoza no longer seems to care about the 
immortality of  the soul. The problematic remarks of  Ethics V could perhaps just be 
accounted for as ‘slips’ à la Joachim, or as a kind of  concession to popular 
imagination à la Curley.92 
But there is a nagging dissatisfaction in reducing these climactic pages of  the 
Ethics to silly blunders or imaginative exaggerations, neither of  which are exactly 
typical of  Spinoza. Moreover, one cannot help feeling that a ‘reductive’ approach to 
Spinoza’s religiosity loses something of  the philosopher’s intellectual profile. The 
change in language between the Short Treatise and the Ethics may well reflect a 
significant change in how Spinoza thought about the problem of  human mortality, 
but it need not reflect a dismissal of  that problem altogether. Perhaps the 
eschatology presented in the Short Treatise was in a sense the first step towards a more 
refined response that would not come fully to fruition until the Ethics. Obscured by a 
patchy adherence to the distinction between eternity and duration - notions that 
would only be carefully separated once and for all in the Metaphysical Thoughts - as well 
as a conception of  mind-body union yet to outgrow all of  its Cartesian origins, the 
Short Treatise could perhaps do no more than show the tangled beginnings of  the 
kind of  response that Spinoza was beginning to envisage. 
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However, despite these limitations, there is undoubtedly already in that work a 
focus on the ethical transformation that one should seek to undergo in ‘this life’, a 
transformation that is at once cognitive, psychological, agapic, moral and, it seems, 
spiritual. If  there is a unity in all these aspects, then it is that there is to be found in 
each of  these dimensions a certain freedom: freedom from dogma or ignorance, 
freedom from the turmoil of  the passions, freedom from material and sensual 
diversions, freedom from an anti-social all-against-all, and finally even a freedom (of  
some kind) from death. Phrasing these kinds of  freedom as being ‘from’ their 
respective form of  captivity is not to suggest that Spinoza understood freedom as 
‘negative’, or as consisting in the absence of  outside pressures, but rather that these 
outside pressures are to be mastered through a positive, and active, expression of  
one’s true nature. The central and unifying importance of  freedom for this ethical 
transformation explains the title of  the concluding chapter of  the Short Treatise, ‘Of  
True Freedom’, in which Spinoza rounds up, ‘[t]o bring this work to an end, it 
remains now to indicate briefly what human freedom consists in’.93 In this 
characterisation of  ‘true freedom’, Spinoza adds the mind’s eternity: 
The true intellect can never come to perish, for in itself  it can have no cause to 
make itself  perish... And because it has not proceeded from external causes, 
but from God... and he is an internal cause, it follows necessarily that it cannot 
perish, so long as this, its cause, remains... Now this, its cause, is eternal. 
Therefore, it too [is eternal].94 
Of  course, orthodox theology had itself  always made what awaits us in the 
afterlife a punishment or reward for what one does in this life, but if  one is to be 
sensitive to the spirit of  Spinoza’s philosophy, one must, like Yovel, find the theology 
of  a transcendental quid pro quo to be ‘totally foreign’ to it. But unlike Yovel et al, who 
deny that there is any doctrine of  the immortality of  the soul in the Ethics, and so 
posit a sharp departure in his thought from the earlier endorsement of  such a 
doctrine in the Short Treatise, to be truly faithful to the spirit of  Spinoza’s ethical 
thought from its earliest expression, one must find this traditional theological picture 
to be foreign even to his younger sensibility. Indeed, as early as the Treatise on the 
Emendation of  the Intellect, Spinoza had warned of  imagining ‘confusedly’ the true 
nature of  immortality.95 Instead of  a radical change of  view between his earlier 
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works and the Ethics, it might make more sense to acknowledge a certain continuity 
in his thought, if  not in every detail, or in the clarity and consistency, of  his response 
to the problem, then at least in his enduring preoccupation with it, and even in the 
novelty of  his emerging response to it. 
It can therefore be conceded to Yovel et al that, to Spinoza, the ‘transcendent-
religious idea of  an afterlife... is foreign’, but this insight must be extended further 
and asserted of  both the young and mature Spinoza. As a result, and contrary to the 
implication that there was an abandonment in the Ethics of  what had been in the 
Short Treatise a heartfelt engagement with the question of  human immortality, the 
Short Treatise might instead be read as being more continuous with the Ethics than 
such a sharp break might allow. However, and herein lies the significance of  this 
picture of  Spinoza’s development for the meaning of  the eternity of  the mind in his 
later thought, the Ethics might, equally, be read as being more continuous with the 
Short Treatise. This makes room for a compromise between (1), the idea that in the 
Short Treatise there were already the beginnings of  a radical eschatology that would 
nevertheless only come fully to maturity in the Ethics because they were still 
entangled in a confused way with temporality and mind-body dualism, and (2), the 
idea that the Ethics, despite shaking off  many of  these confusions, in doing so 
abandoned neither the eschatological concerns of  the Short Treatise nor the general 
shape of  this incipient response to them. 
If, in the Ethics, Spinoza is willing to subvert the popular, ‘quantitative’, 
understanding of  eternity, then why should he not be just as willing to subvert the 
corresponding conception of  immortality? If  the eschatology of  the Ethics conveys a 
state of  existence for which death has lost its force, a kind of  ‘deathlessness’ or 
‘immortalitas’, then that doctrine, under the rubric of  the ‘eternity of  the mind’, 
perhaps deserves to be understood as a continuation of  the efforts in the Short 
Treatise to radicalise the theology of  immortality. And, if  so, then the ‘immortality 
reading’ endorsed by Wolfson et al might be granted as much a concession as that of  
Yovel et al. Such a compromise between the two sides of  the debate becomes 
possible if  one accepts the hypothesis that, whereas the Short Treatise contains a 
muddled earlier version of  Spinoza’s attempt to respond to this theological problem, 
limited essentially because certain ideas and distinctions had yet to be clearly thought 
through or kept separate, the Ethics brings this nascent approach to its maturity 
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through a more refined and developed treatment of  those same constituent ideas 
and distinctions. 
That Spinoza had already begun in the Short Treatise to transpose the 
eschatological from the ‘next’ to ‘this’ life is evident from his rejection in that work 
of  the traditional theology of  eternal punishment: ‘sadness, despair, envy, fright, and 
other evil passions... are the real hell itself.’96 The flip-side of  this kind of  ‘damnation’ 
is the condition of  one who has undergone a ‘rebirth’ and lives a life of  true 
knowledge and love, and can sing as much with Belinda Carlisle that ‘heaven is a 
place on earth’, as with the Spinoza of  the Ethics that ‘Blessedness is not the reward of  
virtue, but virtue itself’.97 This is the ‘true freedom’ described in the closing chapter of  
the Short Treatise. However, despite taking these early steps towards the radical 
eschatology of  the Ethics, the Short Treatise, with its occasional conflation of  eternity 
and duration and its underdeveloped conception of  mind-body union, could never 
do more than express these ideas in a way that jumbled them together with the more 
conservative, Cartesian approach of  providing a philosophical basis for a traditional 
and dualistic notion of  an afterlife. This is the kind of  eschatology to which Spinoza 
alludes when he claims that what has been shown in the work is ‘the eternal and 
constant duration of  the intellect’.98 It would only be when he came to write the 
Ethics that his eschatology would benefit from a sustained separation of  eternity and 
duration, and a completed subversion of  the Cartesian conception of  the mind-body 
relationship. But if  he was in the process of  overturning the orthodox theology of  
human immortality, then just what was this new way of  responding to the problem? 
If  the path to ‘deathlessness’ need not involve a traditional appeal to the afterlife, 
then how else might it be understood? Finding an answer to this question calls for an 
inquiry into just what it was for Spinoza about the way of  life meant by ‘eternity’ that 
secures for the mind (or at least a ‘part’ of  it) a freedom of  sorts from death, and 




                                                          
96 Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, p. 128. 
97 Carlisle, ‘Heaven is a Place on Earth’; Spinoza, Ethics, 5p42s. 
98 Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, p. 149. 







Aspects of  Substance 
 
 
In the previous chapter, it was noted how, in the Ethics, Spinoza came to replace the 
language of  the ‘immortality of  the soul’ with that of  the ‘eternity of  (part of) the 
mind’. I have suggested that this lexical shift reflects less a rejection of  the earlier 
work’s innovative (but inchoate) response to the theological question of  human 
mortality than a renewed effort to underline how unorthodox his take on this 
question had been all along. Although not entirely clearly or consistently, he had in 
the Short Treatise begun to transpose the eschatological from the ‘next’ to ‘this’ life. 
By the time he came to write the Ethics, he had disentangled and refined this 
approach, deeming it to be more clearly expressed with the language of  ‘eternity’. 
This is because Spinoza had come to settle on what I have called a ‘qualitative’ 
conception of  eternity. With this shift in language, his innovative approach to human 
eschatology, already faintly visible in the Short Treatise, could now more easily be seen 
to be about an existential condition pertaining to ‘this life’, a question of  directing 
oneself  towards life and not death. In order to explain what it is about this particular 
kind of  existence that he thought renders an adequate response to the question of  
human mortality, it is first necessary to explain the basic metaphysical category to 
which eternity belongs in his philosophy. This broader category, which he calls 
‘species [species]’, includes two contrasting modes of  existence (and cognition): 
‘duration [duratio]’ and ‘eternity [æternitas]’. By comparison with another basic 
metaphysical category in his system, the ‘attributes [attributi]’, I will in this chapter 
suggest a way of  understanding the species of  duration and eternity that will clarify 
the sense in which eternity is to be understood as a certain ‘way of  life’. 
Yet, when we have settled what the Attributes are not, 
there is no small difficulty in finding an unexceptionable 
term to describe what they are… The least unsatisfactory 
word I can suggest is aspect. 
 
Frederick Pollock, Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy 
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‘What is substance?’1 
 
In the Metaphysical Thoughts, Spinoza devotes a small subsection to the double-edged 
question, ‘What eternity is; What duration is’.2 He says there, somewhat elliptically: 
‘Of  eternity we shall speak more fully later. Here we say only that it is an attribute under 
which we conceive the infinite existence of  God. But duration is an attribute under which we 
conceive the existence of  created things insofar as they persevere in their actuality’.3 This is an 
intriguing gloss on these two notions for at least three reasons. It is intriguing 
because (1), the two concepts are characterised in tandem - as being two kinds of  the 
same thing, that is ‘attributes [attributi]’ under which existence is conceived; (2) they 
are characterised as attributes at all - a term with a very precise role in Spinoza’s 
mature metaphysics; and (3), they are defined in terms of  their relation to 
‘conceiving [concipere]’ - an epistemological notion. Except for the use of  the term 
‘attribute’, this characterisation resembles that of  the kind of  cognition Spinoza says 
is framed ‘under a certain species of  eternity [sub quadam specie æternitatis]’.4 Of  
course, in the Metaphysical Thoughts, he is still ostensibly rehearsing the philosophy of  
Descartes, who indeed regards ‘the duration of  a thing simply as a mode under 
which we conceive the thing in so far as it continues to exist’, and understands by 
‘mode… exactly the same as what is elsewhere meant by an attribute’.5 So, in order to 
separate Descartes’ position on the question of  ‘attributes’ from Spinoza’s, and, at 
the same time, trace the immediate historical precedent for Spinoza’s use of  the 
term, it will be illuminating to set out in brief  Descartes’ views on the matter. 
Despite his famous caricature as the radical upstart who set philosophy on its 
modern course by liberating it from the obscure extravagances of  scholasticism, 
Descartes himself  in fact retained a keen interest in at least one of  the central 
metaphysical questions that had exercised Aristotle and the ‘schools’ that later 
                                                          
1 Aristotle, Metaphysica, in The Works of  Aristotle, ed. and trans. William D. Ross, vol. VIII (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1908), Z.1, 1028b. 
2 Spinoza, Metaphysical Thoughts, I, p. 310. 
3 Ibid. (emphasis in original). 
4 Spinoza develops an account of  this kind of  cognition both in the Treatise on the Emendation of  the 
Intellect and in the Ethics. This being a constant in his thought, he would clearly have been aware of  the 
resemblance here. See Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §108; Ethics, 2p44c2. 
5 Descartes, Principles of  Philosophy, I, §§55-6, p. 211, AT VIII.26. 
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inherited and developed his thought. The question, Aristotle remarked presciently in 
the Metaphysics, is one ‘which was raised of  old and is raised now and always, and is 
always the subject of  doubt’.6 It is the question, ‘what being is’, which is ‘just the 
question, what is substance?’7 One answer that he gives, is that anything ‘which is not 
predicated of  a stratum, but of  which all else is predicated’ is a thing per se and 
therefore a substance (ousia).8 Conversely, that which exists only by being predicated 
of  another thing cannot be said to exist per se, but belongs instead to ‘quantity, 
quality, and the other categories’, a list of  predicables expanded and elaborated in the 
Categories.9 The latter depend on the former, in which they inhere, and the former can 
remain what they are through changes in the latter. 
One is reminded of  Aristotle’s account when one encounters the famous ‘wax 
example’ in the second of  Descartes’ Meditations.10 Although all of  the perceived 
qualities of  the wax undergo some change when it is heated, it in a sense remains the 
same wax. Aside from supporting Descartes’ point in the context of  that meditation 
that there must be an indispensable role played by the judgement of  the mind in 
regarding the wax as identical through change, the example also illustrates Aristotle’s 
point that, in diachronic possession of  all these qualities, there is ‘something definite 
which underlies them (i.e. the substance or individual)’.11 Indeed, the point is a logical 
one. In order to predicate change of  something, there must be something of  which to 
predicate change. 
Although Descartes is not concerned with the ‘question which was raised of  old’ 
in this particular meditation, he does give his attention to it elsewhere. In fact, in the 
Principles of  Philosophy, he makes a rather Aristotelian distinction between those ‘items 
which we regard as things’ and those which we regard as ‘modes of  things’.12 ‘By 
substance’, he explains, ‘we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in 
such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence’.13 However, Descartes, a 
devout Catholic, was also committed to the view that everything depends on God 
                                                          
6 Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1028b. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. Z.3, 1029b. 
9 Ibid. Z.9, 1034b. Aristotle, Categoriæ, in The Works of  Aristotle, ed. and trans. William D. Ross, vol. I 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), Z.1, 1028b. 
10 Descartes, Meditations, pp. 20-1, AT VII.30-2. 
11 Aristotle, Metaphysica, Z.1, 1028a. 
12 Descartes, Principles of  Philosophy, I, §51, p. 210, AT VIII.24. 
13 Ibid. 
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for its existence, both for coming into existence and for continuing in existence. So, 
‘there is only one substance which can be understood to depend on no other thing 
whatsoever, namely God’.14 By way of  compromise, he allowed a sense in which, 
though something may depend for its existence on God, it need not depend on 
anything else: 
Hence the term “substance” does not apply univocally, as they say in the 
Schools, to God and to other things; that is, there is no distinctly intelligible 
meaning of  the term which is common to God and his creatures.15 
The compromise is spelled out in the French translation: 
In the case of  created things, some are of  such a nature that they cannot exist 
without other things, while some need only the ordinary concurrence of  God 
in order to exist. We make this distinction by calling the latter “substances” 
and the former “qualities” or “attributes” of  those substances.16 
It is only through ‘attributes’, Descartes explains, that we can have any cognitive 
awareness of  a substance at all: 
[W]e cannot initially become aware of  a substance merely through its being an 
existing thing, since this alone does not of  itself  have any effect on us. We can, 
however, easily come to know a substance by one of  its attributes, in virtue of  
the common notion that nothingness possesses no attributes, that is to say, no 
properties or qualities.17 
Each substance, he adds, has ‘one principal property [i.e. attribute] which constitutes 
its nature and essence’.18 In particular, ‘extension in length, breadth and depth 












17 Ibid. AT VIII.25. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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Attributes ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ 
 
Spinoza, too, would inherit the ‘question which was raised of  old’ concerning 
substance and its predicables. Indeed, his philosophy as it is presented in the Ethics 
purports to be a comprehensive and systematic disclosure of  the logical implications 
contained in these concepts. He was clearly under the influence of  Descartes, 
according to whom ‘nothingness possesses no attributes’, when he provided an early 
characterisation of  God in the Short Treatise: 
[S]ince Nothing can have no attributes, the All must have all attributes; and just 
as Nothing has no attributes because it is nothing, Something has attributes 
because it is something. So the more it is Something, the more attributes it 
must have. Consequently, God, being most perfect, infinite, and the 
Something-that-is-all, must also have infinite, perfect, and all attributes.20 
But he was also clearly departing from his famous predecessor here, because he had 
eschewed the secondary, pluralist, sense of  substance. Conforming more to 
Descartes’ injunction than Descartes himself, Spinoza argued that ‘if  we must stop 
somewhere (as we must), we must stop with this unique substance’:21 
[I]t follows that of  Nature all in all is predicated, and that thus Nature consists 
of  infinite attributes, of  which each is perfect in its kind. This agrees perfectly 
with the definition one gives of  God.22 
Having ‘spoken of  what God is’, Spinoza continues, ‘now we shall say only a word 
about his attributes’:23 
[T]hose which are known to us consist of  only two, viz. thought and 
extension, for we are speaking here only of  attributes which one could call 
God’s proper attributes, through which we come to know him in himself, and not 
as acting outside himself.24 
With this, he echoes Descartes’ distinction between the ‘principal’ attributes and 
other, secondary, attributes through which (a) substance can be known. The former, 
for Descartes, disclose the very ‘nature and essence’ of  (a) substance, and for 
Spinoza, they are that ‘through which we come to know him in himself ’. 
                                                          
20 Spinoza, Short Treatise, I, p. 65, note ‘a’. 
21 Ibid. p. 68. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. p. 73. 
24 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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Therefore, when in the Metaphysical Thoughts Spinoza refers to eternity and 
duration as ‘attributes’, it can only be in the secondary, or ‘improper’, sense of  the 
term. He had earlier explained why this must be the case in the Short Treatise: 
Everything which men ascribe to God besides these two attributes [i.e. thought 
and extension], must, if  it does otherwise belong to him, either be an extrinsic 
denomination, such as existing through himself, being eternal, one, immutable, 
etc., or be in respect to his actions... These are all propria of  God, but they do 
not give us any knowledge of  what he is.25 
As for the ‘proper attributes’, i.e. thought and extension, he follows Descartes in 
taking them to be that in virtue of  which we are ‘affected’ by substance: 
It should be noted, that by affections we here understand what Descartes has 
elsewhere called attributes (Principles I, 52). For being, insofar as it is being, 
does not affect us by itself  alone, as substance. It must, therefore, be explained 
by some attribute, from which, nevertheless, it is distinguished only by a 
distinction of  reason.26 
Thus it is perhaps because eternity and duration are not ‘proper attributes’, in the 
way that extension and thought are, that Spinoza ceased to refer to them as 
‘attributes’ at all in the Ethics. But what are the ‘proper attributes’? 
Attributes play a precise role in Spinoza’s mature metaphysics. His ontology 
consists of  (the one and only) substance (‘what is in itself  and is conceived through 
itself ’) and its modes (‘the affections of  substance, or that which is in another’).27 
But, being something rather than nothing, substance has to have some positive 
nature through which it is what it is, and this nature is what is meant by an attribute, 
i.e. ‘what the intellect perceives of  a substance, as constituting its essence’.28 
However, ‘being most perfect, infinite, and the Something-that-is-all’, as Spinoza 
puts it in the Short Treatise, substance cannot be limited in any way and so it must 
have any positive nature that it is possible to have, for if  there were some nature that 
it did not have, then this would be a limitation.29 Therefore, it must have ‘infinite, 
perfect, and all attributes’.30 
These three metaphysical components - substance, attributes and modes - provide 
all the necessary ingredients for a consistent account of  the ‘one and the many’. That 
                                                          
25 Ibid. 
26 Spinoza, Metaphysical Thoughts, I, p. 306. 
27 Spinoza, Ethics, 1def3, 1def5. 
28 Ibid. 1def4. 
29 Spinoza, Short Treatise, I, p. 65, note ‘a’. 
30 Ibid. 
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is, qua substance, everything is one, immutable and eternal, but in virtue of  its modes 
and attributes there is also quantitative and qualitative variety respectively. Finite 
modes in this ontology are the distinct individuals that populate the world, and thus 
account for quantitative, or numerical, variety. Attributes, on the other hand, are the 
most general determinations of  nature, the more specific determinations of  which 
constitute the essence or nature of  particular things. The relationship between the 
general and specific here can be thought of  as that between a determinable and its 
determinate. Burgundy is a determinate shade of  the determinable ‘red’, which, in 
turn, is a determinate way of  being the determinable ‘colour’. In the same way, a 
particular body is a determinate configuration of  the determinable ‘motion and rest’, 
which, in turn, is a determinate way (in fact, the only way) in which the determinable 
‘extension’ is arranged. Given the attribute of  extension, there exists a logical space 
containing all the possibilities that could be realised under it. For Spinoza, these 
possibilities are not ‘mere’ possibilities as such, but exist eternally in this essential 
way. 
What, then, is to be made of  Spinoza’s characterisation of  eternity and duration 
as ‘attributes’ in the Metaphysical Thoughts? As noted above, Spinoza is still, on the face 
of  it, commenting on Descartes’ philosophy. So perhaps it is worth hesitating before 
reading too much into this otherwise striking characterisation. But there are in fact 
further remarks - in texts where he is undoubtedly speaking in propria persona - that 
independently support the notion that there is a connection of  some kind between 
his conception of  the attributes and his conception of  the species of  duration and 
eternity. I have already quoted from the Short Treatise, in which he distinguishes 
between the ‘proper attributes’, such as thought and extension, and, by implication, 
the ‘improper attributes’ through which we do not know the nature, or ‘whatness’, 
but nonetheless do still know something, of  God.31 In addition to this, eternity is 
defined in the Ethics as being ‘existence itself  insofar as [quatenus] it is conceived to 
follow necessarily from the definition alone of  the eternal thing’, while duration is 
said to be ‘existence insofar as [quatenus] it is conceived abstractly’.32 Elsewhere there is 
that all-important notion of  a kind of  cognition that takes place ‘under a certain 
species of  eternity [sub quadam specie æternitatis]’.33 Contrasted with this kind of  
cognition in the Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect is its durational counterpart, 
                                                          
31 Ibid. p. 73.  
32 Spinoza, Ethics, 1def8, 2p45s (emphasis added). 
33 Ibid. 2p44c2; Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §108. 
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cognition that takes place ‘under a certain… duration [sub certo… duratione]’.34 These 
last points regarding eternity and duration (and especially the significance of  the 
adverb ‘insofar as [quatenus]’) are all reminiscent of  the close relationship between the 
‘proper attributes’ and the cognition of  substance. 
Spinoza inherited Descartes’ understanding of  attributes as being that through 
which there is cognitive apprehension of  substance (which seems reasonable 
enough, given that to be aware of  something, one must be aware of  it as something, 
that is, as having some positive nature or other). Like attributes, which are 
understood in this way to be intimately involved in the possibility of  cognition, 
eternity and duration are also presented as ‘certain [quadam, certo]’ ways of  conceiving 
(or species under which to conceive) existence. In fact, so intimate is this connection 
in the case of  the ‘proper attributes’ that they are defined in terms of  ‘what the 
intellect perceives of  a substance’.35 For many this has seemed to imply a kind of  
idealism in Spinoza’s thought, which, in many ways, is a tempting interpretation. If  
the attributes are indeed just alternative ways of  perceiving what is in itself  one, 
immutable, and so on, then one need not worry about the further ontological 
problem of  explaining how what is one, immutable, etc., can also objectively and in 
itself  have all of  these different natures at once. A similar rationale, only applied to 
eternity and duration instead of  the ‘proper attributes’, would also seem to make 
sense. On this kind of  reading, the different species would consist in alternative ways 
of  apprehending the same underlying thing, something that is ‘now comprehended 
under this species, now under that’, to slightly modify one of  Spinoza’s well-known 
formulations.36 But what are we to make of  this ‘idealist’ reading of  Spinoza’s 






                                                          
34 Ibid. 
35 Spinoza, Ethics, 1def4. 
36 ‘[T]he thinking substance and the extended substance are one and the same substance, which is 
now comprehended under this attribute, now under that [jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attributo 
comprehenditur].’ Ibid. 2p7s. 
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A false dichotomy 
 
The so-called ‘subjective-objective’ debate concerning Spinoza’s attributes, which one 
finds in the secondary literature, is an old one. The definition given at the outset of  
the Ethics, according to which an attribute is said to be ‘what the intellect perceives 
of  a substance, as [tanquam] constituting its essence’, has appeared to the two sides 
of  the debate to be open to two contrasting interpretations, depending on where one 
places the emphasis.37 If  stress is placed on ‘what the intellect perceives’ in the 
definition, then it seems as though attributes can indeed be no more than modes of  
thought, mere ways of  perceiving that reflect no more than a subjective perspective 
on substance. This way of  reading the definition is further reinforced by translating 
the ambiguous adverb ‘tanquam’ as ‘as if ’, rather than as ‘as’, for it can then only be as 
if, or as though, that which the intellect perceives of  a substance does in fact constitute 
its essence. It also tends to favour taking the term ‘intellectus’ to mean a ‘finite’ rather 
than ‘infinite’ intellect, since it is then more clearly a matter of  how one or another 
individual mind perceives substance from its particular point of  view.  This is known 
as the ‘subjectivist’ interpretation of  Spinoza’s attributes. On the other hand, if  the 
‘constituting its essence’ phrase is stressed, and ‘tanquam’ is rendered as ‘as’, then 
attributes seem to enjoy a far more independent status. They would have to be 
understood as genuinely objective features of  the world, independent of  any 
particular perspective.38 
Before considering the merits of  these rival interpretations, it is worth noting the 
position of  Spinoza’s predecessor, from whom he inherited so much of  this 




                                                          
37 Ibid. 1def4. 
38 For an outline of  this interpretative debate, see Wolfson, Philosophy of  Spinoza, vol. I, p. 146 and 
passim. His own view is that ‘the abundance of  both literary and material evidence is in favour of  the 
subjective interpretation’. But Martineau has warned of  making Spinoza into a Kantian avant la lettre, 
for ‘no pre-Kantian reader would have put such a construction on Spinoza’s language’. Martineau, 
Study of  Spinoza, p. 184. On the ambiguity in Spinoza’s definition of  an attribute, see Francis S. 
Haserot, ‘Spinoza’s Definition of  Attribute’, Philosophical Review, 62, no. 4 (1953), pp. 499-513. For a 
recent attempt to dissolve the debate by tracing it back to a false dichotomy, see Noa Shein, ‘The False 
Dichotomy between Objective and Subjective Interpretations of  Spinoza’s Theory of  Attributes’, 
British Journal for the History of  Philosophy, 17, no. 3 (2009), pp. 505-32. 
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Now some attributes or modes are in the very things of  which they are said to 
be attributes or modes, while others are only in our thought. For example, 
when time is distinguished from duration taken in the general sense and called 
the measure of  movement, it is simply a mode of  thought… Yet nothing is 
thereby added to duration, taken in its general sense.39 
Thus Descartes takes at least some attributes to be bona fide features of  the world, 
independent of  any apprehension of  it. Nevertheless, attributes are still very closely 
related to human cognition for Descartes, since it is only ‘through’ these features of  
the world that there can be any cognition of  a substance at all. Since Spinoza’s 
‘attributes’ correspond more to Descartes’ ‘principal attributes’ than to their less 
essential, or less objective, relatives, one would expect them also to be, in Descartes’ 
words, ‘in the very things’ themselves. 
This indeed seems to be the case. For the ‘subjectivist’ interpretation would 
appear to have been effectively disproven by Martial Gueroult: 
[F]rom the fact that an attribute is defined as what the intellect perceives as 
constituting the essence of  substance, some have thought that it expresses only 
that which, in the latter, is intelligible to the mind, and giving a subjective view 
of  it, conceals from us its true nature… This is an unacceptable thesis, which 
doubly contradicts the Spinozist concept, rendering human understanding 
ontologically prior to attributes and therefore also to substance, of  which it is a 
mode, which is absurd.40 
The epistemological consequences are no less absurd within the context of  
Spinoza’s philosophy, since if  attributes only seem ‘as though’ they constitute the 
essence of  substance, so that the nature of  substance in itself  is out of  reach, then 
knowledge of  substance becomes impossible, contradicting the extraordinary 
confidence that Spinoza clearly had in the human capacity for knowledge.41 
But, Noa Shein has argued, opponents to this interpretation have often fallen into 
the inverse trap. For they, ‘each in their own way, introduce an attribute-neutral 
structure’, in order to reconcile the ‘real distinction’ that Spinoza says obtains 
between the attributes, on the one hand, with their unity in a single substance, on the 
other.42 This additional metaphysical layer seems necessary to them in order to 
underlie the heterogeneous attributes and unify them into one and the same 
                                                          
39 Descartes, Principles of  Philosophy, I, §57, p. 212, AT VIII.27. 
40 Martial Gueroult, Spinoza, vol. I (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1968), p. 50, translation my 
own. See, also, ibid. pp. 428-61. 
41 See Bennett, Study of  Spinoza’s Ethics, p. 146. See, also, Michael De La Rocca, Representation and the 
Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 157. 
42 Shein, ‘False Dichotomy’, p. 521. On the ‘real distinction’ between the attributes, see Spinoza, 
Ethics, 1p10s. 
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substance. But, like the ‘subjectivist’ interpretation, this introduces an untenable ‘gap’ 
between substance and its attributes: 
The subjectivist account, as traditionally conceived, introduces this gap by 
claiming that attributes are something the finite mind adds to its perception of  
substance. For the objectivists this gap forms when introducing a “trans-
attribute” structure into the metaphysics, which they believe they are forced to 
do in order to maintain the “real distinction” among the attributes, on the one 
hand, and the unity on the other.43 
Like so many ‘subjective-objective’ debates in philosophy, this too seems to be 
more a verbal dispute than, to risk the pun, a difference of  any substance. One is 
reminded of  Spinoza’s diagnosis of  a false argument between confused parties: 
And most controversies have arisen from this, that men do not rightly explain 
their own mind, or interpret the mind of  the other man badly. For really, when 
they contradict one another most vehemently, they either have the same 
thoughts, or they are thinking of  different things, so that what they think are 
errors and absurdities in the other are not.44 
Both sides of  this recurring debate in philosophy seem to be saying something 
substantially contrary to each other in virtue of  a shared picture that has taken hold 
of  the imagination. According to the picture, the objective lies on the far side of  a 
kind of  chasm, while the subjective lies on the near side. With this picture 
bewitching the imagination, the ‘subjectivist’ position in these debates feels 
compelled to remain modestly within the confines of  the ‘near side’, giving the 
impression to the advocate of  the ‘objectivist’ position of  having closed itself  off  
from the ‘far side’, and of  having lost touch with objectivity. Conversely, the 
‘objective’ position feels compelled to show in what way the goings-on of  the near 
side are related to those of  the far side, by postulating some kind of  bridge between 
the two. However, as Shein observes in the case of  interpreting Spinoza’s conception 





                                                          
43 Shein, ‘False Dichotomy’, p. 525. 
44 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p47s. 
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Immersed in meaning 
 
The interpretation that I recommend is like Shein’s, in that it is meant to go beyond 
this stalemate between subjectivist and objectivist readings, but in a way that retains 
the kernels of  truth from which each of  them began. Each attribute structures (and 
is structured by) the same reality, but exhibits its own character or meaning, 
untranslatable into that of  any of  the other attributes. In making ‘what the intellect 
perceives’ constitutive of  what it is to be an attribute, Spinoza has built into his 
conception a reference to what is conceptually meaningful, given one or another of  
these fields of  meaning, from the point of  view of  a suitably attuned intellect, to 
whomever it happens to belong. There is no loss of  objectivity, since anyone 
inculcated into the field of  meaning of, say, extension (which we as human beings 
typically are simply by virtue of  a perceptual and cognitive makeup that has evolved 
in harmony with this aspect of  the world), will be bound by the very same limits of  
meaningfulness as anyone else (in this case, the principles and laws of  physics). 
These limits are imposed on one by the world itself. The same applies to the 
attribute of  thought and, indeed, to any of  the infinity of  attributes, though Spinoza 
did not think that we as human beings are ‘tuned in’ to any attributes other than 
thought and extension. 
This I think makes good sense of  the force behind Spinoza’s view that the mind 
and body are, in a sense, identical, which he presents as a radical dissolution of  the 
Cartesian ‘mind-body problem’. This aspect of  his philosophy will be explored in 
greater depth in the following chapter, but since it illustrates rather well the 
interpretation being suggested it will be useful to briefly outline it here. The point 
behind Spinoza’s mature conception of  the union between mind and body is that 
what one is presented with is always fundamentally one and the same reality. So, 
looking at a human being, one can on one occasion think about (or indeed see) that 
person in purely physical, or physiological, terms (a convenient mode of  
consideration when, say, assessing a person’s health). But, equally, one can, on some 
other occasion, think about (or see) that person as a mindful being, as manifesting 
intelligent (or perhaps not so intelligent) behaviour. The point is that, for Spinoza, 
understanding a person in either of  these two ways confines one conceptually within 
its respective field of  meaning. Therefore, contemporary hopes to the contrary, it 
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does not make sense to, say, reduce mindful activity to physical causes, or vice versa 
(even if  neither can exist in the absence of  the other): 
But these prejudices can easily be put aside by anyone who attends to the 
nature of  thought, which does not at all involve the concept of  extension. He 
will then understand clearly that an idea (since it is a mode of  thinking) 
consists neither in the image of  anything, nor in words. For the essence of  
words and of  images is constituted only by corporeal motions, which do not at 
all involve the concept of  thought.45 
Although of  course departing from Spinoza’s own language, I would suggest that, 
at least structurally, it is something like this that is at play in his notion of  an 
attribute: that an attribute consists in a way of  understanding the world that at the 
same time constitutes the very essence of  the world.46 That it is of  the very nature of  
the world that it be intelligible is a fundamental principle of  Spinoza’s philosophy, 
and one that will be explored further in the next chapter. Reflecting a more general 
strategy of  replacing binary oppositions with his own immanently structured 
synthesis, Spinoza avoided a common tendency among early modern philosophers to 
set the existence of  the world apart from our knowledge of  it (generating the 
familiar philosophical project of  building a bridge between the two), choosing 
instead to synthesise the ontological and the epistemological in this basic way right at 
the foundations of  his system. The ubiquitous preoccupation with ‘gaps’ separating 
subject and object seems to arise out of  a preconceived independence of  the 
‘epistemological’ from the ‘ontological’, whereas, for Spinoza, such preoccupations 
simply cannot arise, because this parent distinction is not one of  ‘substance’, even 
though it is ‘real’ and not merely ‘of  reason’.47 The expression of  existence and its 
intelligibility (if  not to this or that finite intellect, then at least to the infinite intellect) 
are two inseparable aspects of  what it is to exist. If  the nature of  substance, as 
expressed through the ‘proper’ attributes, is in this intimate way a direct 
manifestation of  substance (obviating any sceptical ‘gaps’), then the expression itself, 
framed under one or other of  the species, is as much a factor in one’s cognition of  it. 
                                                          
45 Ibid. 2p49s. 
46 For two very different, yet curiously congenial, twentieth-century presentations of  the view that 
the ‘world’, in the only sense in which we can understand the term, is irreducibly infused with 
meaning, see Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967), and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. 
Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953). 
47 For Spinoza’s catalogue of  the different kinds of  distinction, see his Metaphysical Thoughts, II, p. 
323. Compare this with Descartes’ earlier catalogue. Descartes, Principles of  Philosophy, I, §60, p. 213, 
AT VIII.28-9. 
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Therefore, as well as applying to the ‘proper’ attributes, I would suggest extending 
this interpretation to the ‘improper’ attributes of  eternity and duration. Of  course, in 
the Ethics, these features of  reality are not called ‘attributes’ at all, but their analogous 
characterisation in terms of  ‘existence insofar as it is conceived’ suggests a 
significance that is at least structurally related to that of  the attributes of  thought and 
extension. If  existence is the expression of  something, and that something is of  
such-and-such a nature or essence, I would suggest that, whereas the ‘proper’ 
attributes, such as thought or extension, constitute the latter, the ‘improper’ 
attributes of  eternity and duration constitute the former, i.e., the very expression of  
that which is expressed. 
Spinoza appreciated as much as Descartes before him that thought and extension 
are conceptually independent. But, because he conformed to Descartes’ definition 
of  ‘substance’ more closely than Descartes himself, he could not, like the famous 
Frenchman, reify this conceptual independence into a distinction at the level of  
substance. Although Spinoza, like Descartes, held that ‘two attributes may be 
conceived to be really distinct’, he did not allow that we can ‘infer from that that they 
constitute two beings, or two different substances’.48 Therefore, Spinoza’s conception 
of  a ‘real distinction’ is, in an important way, different from Descartes’.49 What is 
ultimately constitutive of  Spinoza’s ‘real distinction’, I suggested above, is a variance 
in the respective conceptual physiognomy of  the various attributes, which are to be 
thought of  as fields of  meaning, each shaped, and immanently shaping, concrete 
practical situations in the world. Each is as concretely objective as can be, but each 
also irreducibly infused with meaning (and so also with its correlate, the 
understanding, or (infinite) intellect). 
 
 
‘Improper attributes’: The ‘species’ of  eternity and duration 
 
Thus, the interpretation above would seem to apply mutatis mutandis to the ‘improper’ 
attributes, or species, of  eternity and duration. As with his definition of  an attribute, 
Spinoza builds into his characterisations of  eternity and duration a reference to the 
intellect, and so the reasons adduced in favour of  interpreting the attributes as fields 
                                                          
48 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p10s. 
49 See Descartes, Principles of  Philosophy, I, §60, p. 213, AT VIII.28-9. 
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of  meaning apply here also. But the similarity between the two is only partial. 
Whereas the ‘proper’ attributes together constitute the ‘essence’ of  substance, 
eternity and duration are not aspects under which the nature of  substance is known. 
As he puts it in the Metaphysical Thoughts, the essence of  substance is its ‘whatness’, 
whereas eternity and (one can infer by extension) duration are aspects under which 
the ‘thatness’ of  substance is grasped. Eternity is ‘existence itself, insofar as it is 
conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of  the eternal thing’.50 It is 
thus an aspect under which existence is understood to follow from the very nature or 
essence of  the thing, a way of  apprehending the existence of  something that sees it 
as an autonomous expression of  that thing’s true nature. Duration, on the other 
hand, is to be understood in a contrastive way. It is a way of  understanding the 
‘thatness’ of  something, not as flowing from ‘within’ the thing in question, but as 
coming about through a confluence of  external circumstances and conditions. It is 
existence conceived as ‘contingent’, mediated by an incidentally favourable time and 
place, which, because ‘[i]n nature there is nothing contingent’, can only amount to 
‘existence insofar as it is conceived abstractly’.51 Thus, built into the difference 
between the two species of  eternity and duration, is an epistemological valuation. 
Duration, qua mode of  cognition, pertains to a metaphysically misleading modality, 
and qua mode of  expression, it pertains to a ‘superficial’ kind of  existence (until 
subsumed by a conception of  things under an eternal aspect (qua cognition), and 
enfolded by a more authentic kind of  existence, (qua expression)). 
So whereas the ‘proper’ attributes of  extension and thought are infinite only ‘in 
their own kind’ (because ‘we can conceive infinite attributes which do not pertain to 
[their] nature’), eternity and duration do not exclude other ‘determinable essences’ of  
substance from their field of  meaning, for they are not themselves essences at all.52 
Instead, these aspects under which things are apprehended reflect a way of  standing 
in relation to the essence, or ‘whatness’, of  substance. The two kinds of  field map 
orthogonally on to each other, forming a matrix, not at the expense of, but 
complementary to, each other, each providing a necessary dimension for the 
determination of  the existence of  substance, or, in Aristotle’s words, ‘that which is’. 
Both attributes ‘proper’ and the species of  eternity and duration, however, involve a 
relation to the intellect, which carries important implications, both epistemological 
                                                          
50 Spinoza, Ethics, 1def8. 
51 Ibid. 1p29, 2p45s. 
52 Spinoza, Ethics, 1def6. 
  79 
and ontological. It is under the attributes of  extension and thought that there can be 
cognition of  the essence or nature of  things, while it is under the species of  eternity 
and duration that there can be cognition of  a thing’s existence, whether that is 
apprehended as necessary (which it is) or taken to be contingent (which it is not). 
Ontologically, each of  these categories expresses its own dimension of  existence, 
and in grasping this for what it is the knower’s ontological status is transformed as 
well. Conceiving things sub specie æternitatis is, for Spinoza, not only a higher form of  
cognition, but a higher manner of  existence. 
These implications will be explored further in Chapter 5, which focuses on 
Spinoza’s account of  human cognition. But prior to the topic of  human cognition, in 
both the order of  priority and that of  Spinoza’s own exposition in the Ethics, is the 
question of  what it is that cognises, that is, the question of  the ‘Nature and Origin 
of  the Mind’ (the title of  Ethics II), and so it is to this question I now turn. 





Mind and Body 
 
 
Spinoza came to understand the mind as bound together with the body in the most 
intimate of  ways, so his views on the mind could not easily be addressed in isolation 
from this context. Therefore, this chapter will be concerned jointly with both of  
these inextricable notions - mind and body.1 Whether or not it was true of  his ‘order 
of  discovery’, it was Spinoza’s contention that in the order of  nature, whose 
systematic disclosure he aimed to present in the Ethics, it is ‘metaphysics, and 
knowledge of  this [that] must always come first’).2 If  this is true of  anything in his 
philosophy, it is certainly true of  his philosophy of  mind. For, in Spinoza’s system, 
the nature of  the human mind consists in a particular instantiation of  the more 
general metaphysical nature of  thought, understood as one among an infinity of  
attributes, which together express the ‘eternal and infinite essence’ of  God or 
Nature.3 The same thing is true of  the human body, which likewise consists in a 
particular instantiation of  extension, another of  God’s infinity of  attributes. 
Therefore, I will approach Spinoza’s conception of  mind and body via his 
metaphysics of  thought and extension. But, in light of  the observation made in 
Chapter 2, that the allusions in the Short Treatise to a more dualistically construed 
eschatology appear to reflect the lingering presence of  a more or less Cartesian 
                                                          
1 As Wolfson puts it: ‘This must be considered the essential point in Spinoza’s theory of  the mind - 
its inseparability from the body. It runs counter to the entire trend of  the history of  philosophy down 
to his time, for everybody before him, for diverse reasons, insisted upon the separability of  mind 
from body.’ Even if  his second claim here is somewhat strong, the first is surely right. Wolfson, 
Philosophy of  Spinoza, vol. II, p. 53.  
2 Letter 27; Spinoza, The Letters, p. 177. Wolfson, pointedly, refers to Spinoza’s ‘literary pretension 
that his entire philosophy was evolved from his conception of  God’. Wolfson, Philosophy of  Spinoza, 
vol. II, p. 4. 
3 Spinoza, Ethics, 1def6. 
Over Descartian vortices you hover. And perhaps, at midday, 
in the fairest weather, with one half-throttled shriek 
you drop through that transparent air into the summer sea, 
no more to rise fore ever. Heed it well, ye Pantheists! 
 
Herman Melville, Moby Dick 
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conception of  mind and body, the reconstruction in this chapter will also proceed 
genetically, with the aim of  bringing into relief  its gradual evolution from its earlier 
incarnation in the Short Treatise to its eventual culmination in the Ethics, and the role 
it plays there in the doctrine of  the eternity of  the mind. 
 
 
The ‘idea of  the body’ 
 
If  Spinoza’s conception of  mind and body underwent a certain metamorphosis 
between the earlier stages of  his thought and the mature position reached in the 
Ethics, it nevertheless retained through all these changes a curious yet persistent 
character, expressed in his definition of  the mind as the ‘idea of  the body’. In the 
Short Treatise, Spinoza explains that ‘the essence of  the soul [ziel] consists only in the 
being of  an Idea, or objective essence, in the thinking attribute’, the object (voorwerp) 
of  which is the body (lighaam).4 This is echoed in the Ethics, in which it is proven that 
the ‘object [objectus] of  the idea constituting the human Mind [mens] is the Body 
[corpus]’.5 Two questions arise at this point. Firstly, what does Spinoza mean by 
glossing the familiar term ‘idea’ with the less familiar term ‘objective essence’? And, 
secondly, to whom does such an idea belong? These two questions may seem to pull in 
opposing directions. For an answer to the first question might seem to point towards 
a representative quality inherent in the nature of  an idea, suggesting a specifically 
epistemological sense of  the term that had recently been popularised by Descartes, 
whereas, if  one accepts this natural answer to the first question, then it seems that an 
answer to the second must refer to someone or other who, in this epistemological 
sense, has an idea of  the relevant body. But the claim that, for every body there is an 
idea or ‘objective essence’ expressed ‘in the thinking attribute’, seems intended to 
prescind from the various particular apprehensions that this or that person might 
have of  a particular body. 
Whether or not this assimilation of  two different senses of  the term amounts to 
an illegitimate conflation is perhaps a question that strikes at the very heart of  
Spinoza’s philosophy of  mind. One might object that, despite conjuring up the effect 
of  having synthesised the epistemological and ontological aspects of  his system in a 
                                                          
4 Spinoza, Short Treatise, Appendix II, p. 154. 
5 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p13. 
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single stroke, this mixed-use of  the term ‘idea’ can only amount to a double 
entendre, incapable, unfortunately, of  harmonising into a unified concept. Such is 
the conclusion, for example, of  one of  Spinoza’s otherwise charitable interpreters, 
Pollock, who takes the equivocation to be, not only specious in itself, but also the 
source of  so many of  the puzzles that beset Spinoza’s philosophy. ‘The blending, 
logically not to be justified, of  the two meanings of  idea’, he says, ‘seems to give us 
the key to some of  the difficulties we must hereafter face in the Ethics’.6 In order to 
address this criticism, I will venture a response to each of  the two questions from 
which it arose. I will answer the first by tracing in outline the historical origins of  the 
terms, ‘idea’ and ‘objective essence’, against the background of  which I will explain 
Spinoza’s specific employment of  them. My response to the second question will 
draw on this same historical background in order to show how the two apparently 
conflicting threads have been fused together in Spinoza’s account. 
Meaning something like ‘what one sees’ or ‘appearance’ in Homer’s epics, the 
ancient Greek term ‘eidos’ later came to be associated with a thing’s characteristic 
property or type, and was used, for example, in fifth-century medical circles, to refer 
to the unseen cause of  a disease. This sense of  a thing’s ‘constitutive nature’ which 
remains nevertheless distinct from its outward appearance was therefore already 
established when Plato set about giving a metaphysical account of  the eide as the 
fixed, intellectual (non-sensible) archetypes that are instantiated to varying degrees 
within the changing, fluctuating world of  sensation, which he thought necessary if  
genuine knowledge (which must be fixed and stable) is to be possible.7 Aristotle, too, 
incorporated this notion of  a thing’s characteristic ‘form’ into his ontological 
framework, but as the necessary complement to bare, shapeless matter in his 
form/matter dichotomy. Where Aristotle differed from Plato was in construing the 
eide as immanently informing this prime matter, as opposed to having an 
independent, transcendent existence apart from (and ontologically prior to) the 
sensible world. Complementing this ‘hylomorphic’ framework, Aristotle also 
formulated an influential theory of  human cognition, whereby the ‘thinking part of  
the soul must… be, while impassible, capable of  receiving the form of  an object; 
that is, must be potentially identical in character with its object without being the 
                                                          
6 Pollock, Spinoza, p. 134. 
7 On the use of  this term by ancient Greek philosophers, see Francis E. Peters, Greek Philosophical 
Terms: A Historical Lexicon (London: University of  London Press, 1967), p. 46 and passim. 
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object’.8 Plato’s theory would later prove conducive to Christian theology, in which 
the transcendent eide could be identified with God’s creative - and transcendent –
‘plans’ for things with which to populate the world.9 When Aquinas subsequently 
incorporated Aristotle’s theory of  human cognition into the picture, the result was a 
curious hybrid of  both.10 
It was in conscious allusion to the Christian appropriation of  the term ‘eidos’, 
which had been rendered ‘idea’ in Latin, that Descartes explained his use of  the term 
with respect to human cognition: ‘Idea. I understand this term to mean the form of  
any given thought, immediate perception of  which makes me aware of  the 
thought.’11 As he explained to Hobbes, ‘I used the word “idea” because it was the 
standard philosophical term used to refer to the forms of  perception belonging to 
the divine mind’.12 But in availing himself  of  the sense in which ideas give ‘form 
[forme]’ to the mind, and in such a way that ideas involve ‘objectively’ the existence of  
that of  which they are ideas, he was also clearly harking back to the Aristotelian 
theory of  cognition that Aquinas had integrated into the Christian account of  ideæ 
Dei.13 However, although Descartes alluded to this essentially Aristotelian principle 
of  human cognition (modifying it for his own purposes), he did not of  course wish 
to reintroduce the old hylomorphic metaphysics (and physics) he had otherwise 
worked so ardently to oppose. He makes, therefore, no use of  the term ‘idea’ in that 
more general sense of  an object’s ‘form’. Spinoza, on the other hand, would inherit 
the more selective use of  the term as developed by Descartes, but he would also 
                                                          
8 Aristotle, De Anima, in The Works of  Aristotle, vol. III, ed. and trans. William D. Ross, vol.  (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1930), 429a. 
9 ‘Quod si hae rerum omnium creandarum creatarumque diuina mente continentur… atque has rationes rerum 
principales appellat ideas Plato, non solum sunt ideæ, sed ipsæ ueræ sunt, quia æternæ sunt et eiusdem modi atque 
incommutabiles manent [For if  these creative reasons of  all created things are contained in the divine 
mind, and these principal reasons of  things Plato calls ideas, then not only are they ideas, but they 
themselves are true, because they are eternal and remain unchangeable].’  St. Augustine, De Diversis 
Quæstionibus, ed. Almut Mutzenbecher (Turnhout: Brepols, 1975), XLVI, pp. 72-3, translation my 
own. 
10 ‘It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind... either to be the type of  that of  which it is 
called the form, or to be the principle of  the knowledge of  that thing.’ Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 
ed. and trans. the Dominican Fathers (London: Blackfriars, 1963), I, q. 15, art. 1. 
11 Descartes, Meditations, ‘Replies to Second Set of  Objections’, p. 113, AT VII.160.  
12 Ibid. ‘Replies to Third Set of  Objections’, p. 127, AT VII.181. 
13 The question of  Descartes’ sources is an interesting trail for any curious detective to follow. 
Although his immediate sources almost certainly included more recent scholastics, such as Francisco 
Suarez, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, and Abra de Raconis, he had also been, since his school days at 
the Jesuit college La Fléche, well versed in the writings of  Aquinas (the officially decreed authority 
in philosophical and theological matters for Jesuits). See, for example, Ètienne Gilson, Index 
scolastico-cartésien (Paris: Fèlix Alcan, 1913); Roland Dalbiez, ‘Les sources scolastiques de la théorie 
cartésienne de l’être objectif. À propos de M. Gilson’, Revue d’Histoire de la Philosophie, 3 (1929); 
Timothy J. Cronin, Objective Being in Descartes and in Suarez (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1966). 
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effectively reunite it with its original hylomorphic connotations. He did so by 
defining an idea as ‘a concept of  the Mind that the Mind forms because it is a 
thinking thing’, while allocating an idea in God’s mind for each thing that exists: ‘In 
God there is necessarily an idea, both of  his essence and of  everything that 
necessarily follows from his essence’.14 What enabled him to synthesise these two 
pictures so seamlessly was that, for him, God’s mind consists of  the totality of  ideas 
that immanently (as opposed to transcendentally) express the ‘objective essence’ of  
each thing, even though, under the attribute of  extension, things conceived 
materially could still be quantified in the way that the new mathematical alternative to 
Aristotle’s (qualitative) physics required. 
In the same way, it is instructive to compare Spinoza’s notion of  ‘objective 
essence’ with this Cartesian and scholastic background. As with the term ‘idea’, 
Descartes was indebted to the tradition for his appropriation of  the distinction 
between ‘objective’ and ‘formal’ reality:15 
The nature of  an idea is such that of  itself  it requires no formal reality except 
what it derives from my thought, of  which it is a mode. But in order for a 
given idea to contain such and such objective reality, it must surely derive it 
from some cause which contains at least as much formal reality as there is 
objective reality in the idea.16 
This is to endorse the Aristotelian view that human thought must, in some way, be 
‘capable of  receiving the form of  an object; that is, must be potentially identical in 
character with its object without being the object.’17 The ‘formal reality’ of  a thing 
refers to its existence as it is in itself, whether the thing is an idea (a mode of  
thought), something corporeal (a mode of  extension), or anything else. In addition 
to having ‘formal reality’, however, it is a special quality peculiar to the nature of  
ideas that they involve ‘objectively’ the existence of  that of  which they are ideas, that 




                                                          
14 Spinoza, Ethics, 2def3, 2p3. 
15 Descartes at times makes this same distinction, but between ‘objective’ and ‘formal’ being. See, for 
example, Descartes, Meditations, ‘Replies to First Set of  Objections’, pp. 74-5. 
16 Ibid. pp. 28-9, AT VII.41. 
17 Aristotle, De Anima, 429a. 
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By this I mean that the idea of  the sun is the sun itself  existing in the intellect - 
not of  course formally existing, as it does in the heavens, but objectively 
existing, i.e. in the way in which objects normally are in the intellect.18 
Siding this time with the scholastics who had followed Scotus rather than Aquinas on 
this particular point (such as Eustachius a Sancto Paulo and Abra de Raconis), 
Descartes explains that even though this ‘objective reality’ is ‘of  course much less 
perfect than that possessed by things which exist outside the intellect… it is not 
therefore simply nothing’.19 That is, the manner in which a thing is (re-)presented in 
thought is not itself a mere ‘being of  reason’, as Aquinas had held, but is itself  a 
genuine reality, as Scotus had urged (and, therefore, according to Descartes, as much 
in need of  an efficient cause as anything ‘formally’ real). 
 
 
‘Formal’ and ‘objective’ essence 
 
Against this background, Spinoza developed his own version of  the distinction 
between the ‘formal [formalis]’ and the ‘objective [obiective]’ in relation to ideas, 
introducing at least two important modifications. Firstly, in place of  ‘reality’ (or 
‘being’), Spinoza applies the distinction a thing’s ‘essence [essentia]’, defined as ‘that 
which, being given, the thing is [NS: also] necessarily posited and which, being taken 
away, the thing is necessarily [NS: also] taken away; or that without which the thing 
can neither be nor be conceived, and which can neither be nor be conceived without 
the thing’.20 Secondly, whereas Descartes takes the ‘objective reality’ involved in an 
idea to represent a thing outside the mind, so that there arises a concern as to how it 
can be known whether or not that which is represented does in fact match up with 
the way it is being represented, for Spinoza the ‘objective essence’ of  a thing simply 
is the very thing itself, immediately present (as opposed to only represented) to the 
mind, so that no such sceptical anxiety can arise. ‘Certainty’, Spinoza explains in the 
Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, ‘is nothing but the objective essence itself, i.e., 
                                                          
18 Descartes, Meditations, ‘Replies to First Set of  Objections’, p. 75, AT VII.102. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Spinoza, Ethics, 2def2. 
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the mode by which we are aware of  the formal essence is certainty itself ’.21 This 
‘direct’, that is, unmediated, account of  cognition is reiterated in the Ethics: 
[A]s to the last, viz. how a man can know that he has an idea that agrees with 
its object? …[T]his arises solely from his having an idea that does agree with 
its object – or that truth is its own standard. Add to this that out Mind, insofar 
as it perceives things truly, is part of  the infinite intellect of  God.22 
What can there be which is clearer and more certain than a true idea, to serve 
as a standard of  truth? As the light makes both itself  and the darkness plain, 
so truth is the standard both of  itself  and of  the false.23 
Aside from these innovations, the underlying distinction remained that of  the 
tradition: 
Peter, for example, is something real; but a true idea of  Peter is an objective 
essence of  Peter, and something real in itself, and altogether different from 
Peter himself. So since an idea of  Peter is something real, having its own 
particular essence, it will also be something intelligible, i.e., the object of  a 
second idea, which will have in itself, objectively, whatever the idea of  Peter 
has formally.24 
Having identified the origins of  Spinoza’s use of  the term ‘objective essence’, and 
having noted the key modifications in virtue of  which it differs from its antecedents, 
the second question can now be addressed, i.e., ‘to whom do these ideas, or 
“objective essences”, belong?’ Continuing the example of  ‘a true idea of  Peter’ 
(which, being an immediate presentation of  Peter himself, is self-certifying), Spinoza 
adds that ‘[e]veryone can experience this, when he sees that he knows what Peter is, 
and also knows that he knows, and again, knows that he knows that he knows, etc.’25 
As well as reiterating the way in which Peter is immediately present to someone who 
knows him (i.e., that ‘certainty and an objective essence are the same thing’), this 
clearly indicates that Spinoza is talking about the ‘idea’ or ‘objective essence’ that 
some particular person might have of  Peter.26 But if  the mind is the idea of  the 
body, then does that mean that Peter’s mind is somehow only instantiated in virtue 
of  the idea of  his body formed by this or that particular person? Would it mean that, 
at those times when nobody happens to be having an idea of  Peter’s body, Peter’s 
                                                          
21 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §35. 
22 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p43s. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §34. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. §35. 
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mind simply does not exist? The sense in which, for every body there is an idea or 
‘objective essence’ in ‘the thinking attribute’, which constitutes the mind correlated 
with that body, is clearly intended to prescind from the various particular 
apprehensions that this or that person might have of  the body in question. It is in 
this way that the two questions raised earlier seem to pull in opposing directions. For, 
in explaining what is meant by ‘objective essence’, Spinoza alludes to the more 
specifically epistemological relationship between some particular person and the 
object of  their cognition, as in Descartes’ picture: ‘Everyone can experience this, 
when he sees that he knows what Peter is, etc.’27 Yet, in order for the ‘objective 
essence’ of  a person’s body to constitute that person’s mind, it seems necessary that 
it prescind from any particular act(s) of  cognition. 
The means for resolving this apparent tension are furnished by the innovations in 
Spinoza’s particular application of  the notion of  ‘objective essence’. As noted above, 
Descartes’ notion of  ‘objective reality’ applies to an idea as it exists in the mind of  
the person who has it, inviting the question whether that which the idea represents, 
i.e., that which the idea involves ‘objectively’, does in fact match up with the 
represented object. For Descartes, the ‘objective reality’ involved in an idea of  the 
sun is indeed the sun itself, but only insofar as it exists ‘in the intellect… i.e. in the way 
in which objects normally are in the intellect’.28 For Spinoza, on the other hand, a 
thing’s ‘objective essence’ belongs to the thing itself, whether that thing is an idea (a 
modification of  thought), something corporeal (a modification of  extension), or 
something made up of  both (such as Peter). It is simply that thing itself  insofar as it 
is an object capable of  being thought, that is, insofar as it is intelligible. That 
absolutely everything is intelligible, for Spinoza, is a fundamental result proven in the 
first proposition of  Ethics II: ‘Thought is an attribute of  God, or God is a thinking 
thing’.29 For that which can be thought is intelligible, and thought is an essential 
characteristic of  God or Nature, therefore all of  God or Nature is intelligible. The 
objective essence of  Peter, then, is Peter himself, insofar as he is intelligible or 
knowable to others (and not in fact known by this or that particular person). It is an 
immediate and publicly available presentation of  Peter to anyone who gets to know 
him. Joachim expresses this most clearly: 
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On the one hand, then, a true idea is other than, and “quite different from”, its 
ideatum; and yet, on the other hand, they are inseparably united, and their union 
is, in a certain sense, identity... This two-sided identity, this single something 
with a duality of  aspects, is the “essence” or “what”. On one side of  itself, Peter’s 
essence constitutes his “form”. It is his “formal essence”, or what he really is. 
But Peter, precisely in respect to what he really is, is also intelligible - i.e. the 
possible object of  a “true idea” or knowledge. On its other side, therefore, Peter’s 
“essence” is what he is ideally (objiective), what he is “in the true idea of  him”. 
Peter’s essentia objiective (as Spinoza calls it) is what Peter is truly conceived, or 
known, to be.30 
The resulting picture is therefore an interesting fusion of  prior traditions. As in 
the Christian tradition, there is in God’s infinite intellect ‘an idea, both of  his essence 
and of  everything that necessarily follows from his essence’.31 However, unlike this 
tradition, Spinoza’s ideæ Dei are not the transcendent archetypes for a fluctuating, 
sensible world in which we enjoy our limited existence, but are rather the immanent 
expression, under the attribute of  thought, of  the intelligibility of  things. This 
immanent intelligibility with which things are informed is therefore also reminiscent 
of  Aristotle’s hylomorphism, albeit without the need to relinquish the recent 
paradigm of  quantitative (as opposed to qualitative) scientific analysis, which can 
simply be delegated to the attribute of  extension, a level of  explanation conceptually 
independent of  thought.32 In answer to the second question raised above, therefore, 
the answer must, in the first instance, be that it is God to whom these ideas, or 
objective essences, belong. But, as we have seen, this is not in conflict with the 
answer to the first question, which is framed in terms of  an idea, or objective 
essence, that this or that particular person might have of  something. The two 
answers are complementary in Spinoza’s picture because, to say that there is an idea 
of  a thing in God’s mind, just is to say that the thing is intelligible, or capable of  
being thought by this or that particular person. This is possible, because in knowing, 
or having a true idea of  something, one does not have a private representation of  it, 
but knows it directly as it is itself. A true idea does not therefore belong to anyone in 
particular, but is rather a publicly available idea, shared, to varying degrees, by 
everyone. There is nothing mysterious about this, given the distinction between 
objective and formal essence. For a thing’s objective essence is publicly accessible, 
even if  that which enables its apprehension by this or that particular mind is the 
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formal essence of  an idea, which is a constituent mode of  thought within the 
complex idea of  that particular person’s body, that is, within his or her mind.33 My 
mind is the ‘true idea’ of  my body, but, being a publicly available idea (as opposed to 
the incorrigible preserve of  a private ego), I am required as much as anyone else to 
seek to understand it, even though, being embodied in its object, I am peculiarly 
well-placed to do so.34 So, for Spinoza, there is a very real sense in which ‘who we 
are’ is determined by how we are known (or, at least, how we are knowable) by others 
(as well as by ourselves). Pollock’s criticism, quoted above, can therefore be deflected 
as not having taken account of  the role played by Spinoza’s reinterpretation of  the 
‘formal’ and ‘objective’ with respect to ideas. 
Having assuaged the worry that Spinoza was conflating two different senses of  
the term ‘idea’ in his definition of  the mind (or soul), his specific formulations of  
that definition can now be recounted. In both earlier and later works, Spinoza begins 
with a certain schema of  human nature. In the supplement to the Short Treatise 
entitled ‘Of  the Human Soul [Van de Menschelyke Ziel]’, he first considers the nature 
of  a human being qua ‘created, finite, thing [geschapen eyndige zaak]’, which he takes to 
consist in both thinking and extended aspects.35 Since human nature is finite (eyndige), 
these aspects could be no more than modifications (wijzen) of  those infinite 
attributes of  substance called ‘thought’ and ‘extension’ respectively.36 This pattern is 
repeated in the Ethics, in which the nature of  a human being is set out axiomatically 
in the preliminaries of  Part II: ‘Man thinks’; ‘We feel that a certain body is affected in 
many ways’.37 Here too, the essentially modal character of  human existence is 
stressed.38 In both texts, the nature of  thought is said to be such that it expresses 
‘objectively’ the essence of  everything that exists. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza 
                                                          
33 Spinoza’s discussion of  the ‘difference between the idea of, say, Peter, which constitutes the 
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34 Ibid. 2p23. 
35 Spinoza, Short Treatise, Appendix II, p. 152. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Spinoza, Ethics, 2a2, 2a4. 
38 Ibid. 2a1, p10.  
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articulates this by stating that ‘it is necessary that... there is produced in thought an 
infinite Idea, which contains in itself  objectively [voorwerpelyk] the whole of  Nature, 
as it is in itself ’.39 Similarly, in the Ethics, it is proven that ‘[i]n God there is necessarily 
an idea, both of  his essence and of  everything that necessarily follows from his 
essence’.40 He concludes, in the Short Treatise, that what ‘man... has of  thought, and 
what we call the soul’, is ‘an Idea arising from an object which exists in Nature’.41 
Because the other aspect of  human nature is furnished by a mode of  extension, this 
‘object’ consists in ‘a certain proportion of  motion and rest’.42 ‘So this existing 
proportion’s objective essence in the thinking attribute is the soul of  the body.’43 
Similarly, in the Ethics, because ‘the essence of  man (by p10c) is constituted by 
certain modes of  God’s attributes, viz. (by a2) by modes of  thinking... the first thing 
that constitutes the actual being of  a human Mind is the idea of  a singular thing 
which actually exists’.44 Since ‘[w]e feel that a certain body is affected in many ways’, 
this ‘singular thing’ is none other than the human body.45 ‘Therefore, the object of  
the idea that constitutes the human Mind is the Body, and it actually exists’.46 
 
 
A speculative ‘geology’ for an evolving conception 
 
But if  the definition of  the mind (or soul) as the ‘idea of  the body’ remained 
constant through Spinoza’s successive writings, his overall conception of  mind and 
body underwent an important transformation in the interim between the Short 
Treatise and the Ethics. As noted in Chapter 2, this development appears to be 
correlated with a corresponding change in his eschatological views, from an earlier 
phase in which the first hints of  a realised, this-life, construal of  eternal life are 
muddled together with a more dualistic picture of  the separate survival of  the soul, 
into a mature phase in which these more orthodox, supernatural, elements have been 
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more fully subverted. Therefore, before turning to examine the celebrated 
‘parallelism’ of  the Ethics, it will be apposite to the aim of  this dissertation to trace 
the origins of  that thesis to its younger precursors in the Short Treatise. However, 
owing to the curious nature of  the text, this search for earlier versions of  Spinoza’s 
conception of  mind and body will have to invite a more or less speculative geological 
excavation. 
The Short Treatise was not discovered until the nineteenth century, after mention 
of  it in a separate document indicated where two manuscript copies might be found, 
which in a dream discovery for any scholar they soon enough were. The manuscripts 
that were found were copies of  a work that was possibly written as early as 1658-
1660, or if  Mignini is correct, between 1661-1662. It seems to have been intended 
solely for circulation among friends, as the closing word of  caution suggests: 
To bring this all to an end, it remains only for me to say to the friends to 
whom I write this... as you are aware of  the character of  the age in which we 
live, I would ask you urgently to be very careful about communicating these 
things to others.47 
An unfinished work-in-progress, it consists almost in a kind of  montage of  
staggered amendments and marginalia. For this reason, as Curley puts it, the text 
‘bristles with difficulties... inconsistencies, repetitions, and expressions of  uncertainty 
about whether particular topics would be treated later’.48 In the past, these difficulties 
led to the text earning a problematic status, with scholars like Jacob Freudenthal 
warning that it was corrupt and should perhaps be dismissed as the bumbling efforts 
of  an inept student or follower of  Spinoza.49 Since then there has emerged more of  
a consensus that Spinoza is indeed the author, and that the text, albeit diachronic and 
at times conflicted, can nonetheless reward careful study.50 
The palimpsestic quality of  the text means that it contains a stratification of  
differently dated passages interspersed among one another, and this peculiar 
character is especially vivid in the work’s mercurial treatment of  the relationship 
between soul (ziel) and body (lighaam). The early twentieth-century scholar, Abraham 
Wolf, put this suggestively: 
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As it is, we seem to have here several different views on the relation between 
mind [or soul] and body. And as we have no independent knowledge of  the 
chronological orders, or of  the geological formation (so to say) of  the parts of  
the Treatise, it is impossible to speak with absolute confidence of  the actual 
order or sequence among these views.51 
Without independent evidence for the chronological sequence in which these various 
conceptions found their way into the work, any theories advanced in that capacity 
must remain more or less speculative. However, notwithstanding this hypothetical 
character, there is at least one obvious heuristic principle with which to approach the 
question, as Wolf  pointed out: 
It seems reasonable... to suppose that their [i.e., the various conceptions’] 
logical order is also more or less representative of  their chronological 
sequence. His final view, we take it, was what has since become familiar as that 
of  psycho-physical parallelism. This view is the one adopted in the Ethics, 
though with occasional lapses. The other views may be regarded as leading up 
to this one.52 
With the aim of  tracing the evolution of  this conception over the course of  
Spinoza’s intellectual development, I will take up the suggestion made by Wolf, and 
attempt an excavation of  these ‘geological’ layers deposited in the Short Treatise. 
If  the eventual result is agreed to be the ‘psycho-physical parallelism’ of  the 
Ethics, then what was the initial starting point, prior even to the phases traversed in 
the Short Treatise? There are not enough clues in the Treatise on the Emendation of  the 
Intellect on the basis of  which to reconstruct an earlier conception of  mind, even 
though some conception clearly is presupposed, since the work is predominantly 
concerned with the powers of  the mind. On the other hand, the earliest letters that 
we have date to 1661, that is, to around the time when the Short Treatise was already 
in composition. In lieu of  any such evidence, a conjecture might again be ventured. 
Knowing the philosophy of  Descartes to have partly shaped Spinoza’s early ideas 
and vocabulary (even if  only so far as to be turned around and used against their 
purveyor), a possible candidate for this germinal conception could be something that 
Spinoza may have taken from Descartes. This conjecture need not even be true in 
order to serve its heuristic role. For it need not be true that Spinoza ever actually 
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subscribed to any Cartesian orthodoxy on the mind and body in order for such a 
position to nonetheless serve as the imaginary origin of  a timeline terminating with 
the parallelism of  the Ethics. The idea is that the various conceptions of  soul and 
body deposited in the Short Treatise might be situated along this timeline, such that 
those that are logically further from the Cartesian origin might also be taken to be 
correspondingly later in the chronological order of  the work’s composition. 
Even the logically ‘oldest’ of  the strata will show some departure from the 
Cartesian position, for Spinoza had already replaced Descartes’ substance pluralism 
with his own monism: ‘[I]f  we must stop somewhere (as we must), we must stop 
with this unique substance.’53 Thus, nowhere in the Short Treatise does Spinoza 
advocate the full-blown Cartesian doctrine of  an immaterial substance interacting 
with a material substance. Nevertheless, there are remarks that explicitly or implicitly 
imply a causal influence in one or the other direction between mind and body, 
without any indication that Spinoza found this problematic. Of  the influence that 
the body exerts on the mind, it is said, for example, that ‘there is in Nature a body by 
whose form and actions we are affected, so that we perceive it’, that ‘the Soul is an 
Idea... in the thinking thing, arising from the existence of  a thing which is in Nature’, 
whose ‘duration and change’, are determined by ‘the duration and change of  the 
thing [in Nature]’, such that, as ‘one of  these [bodily] modes (motion or rest) 
changes, either by increasing or by decreasing, the Idea also changes... [such that] if  
the rest happens to increase, and the motion to decrease, the pain or sadness we call 
cold is thereby produced... [or] if  this [increase] occurs in the motion, then the pain 
we call heat is thereby produced’.54 It seems that, at this stage at least, Spinoza did not 
consider the issue of  mind-body interaction to be particularly problematic. As such, 
it perhaps reflects an earlier stage of  his thought, predating a revision of  the 
conception under the pressure of  a growing anxiety that something about it was not 
quite right. Perhaps it seemed to him, in this earlier phase, as though the issue should 
no longer pose a problem, as it had for Descartes and his interlocutors, precisely 
because he had replaced his predecessor’s substance pluralism with his own monism, 
since there ought no longer to be any mystery about how a material substance could 
interact with an immaterial one. Despite this initial confidence, however, Spinoza 
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would come to agonise over the question, and would borrow, tellingly, from 
Descartes’ strategy for dealing with it. 
Availing himself  of  the old Galenic theory of  ‘animal spirits’, according to which 
neural stimuli and responses are mediated by a kind of  invisible or immaterial 
‘pneuma’ (‘wind,’ or ‘breath’), Descartes had taken the conduction of  these spirits in 
the pineal gland to serve as a kind of  plausible intermediary in the exchanges 
between immaterial soul and material body: 
The parts of  the blood which penetrate as far as the brain serve not only to 
nourish and sustain its substance, but also and primarily to produce in it a 
certain very fine wind [vent très subtil], or rather a very lively and pure flame, 
which is called the animal spirits. For it must be noted that the arteries which 
carry blood to the brain from the heart, after dividing into countless tiny 
branches… come together again around a certain little gland situated near the 
middle of  the substance of  the brain.55 
The anatomical location, uniqueness and delicacy of  the pineal gland all seemed to 
suggest to Descartes that this was the likely site of  exchange between the material 
and the immaterial: 
[T]he part of  the body in which the soul directly exercises its functions is not 
the heart at all, or the whole of  the brain. It is rather the innermost part of  the 
brain, which is a certain very small gland situated in the middle of  the brain’s 
substance… The slightest movements on the part of  this gland may alter very 
greatly the course of  these spirits, and conversely any change, however slight, 
taking place in the course of  the spirits may do much to change the 
movements of  the gland.56 
His account seemed, at least, to accommodate the principle that the total quantity 
of  motion and rest in the universe should remain constant, which would otherwise 
be compromised by an anomalous generation of  motion (or reduction in rest) 
caused by the action of  an immaterial will on the body, or by an equally anomalous 
disappearance of  motion (or increase in rest) caused by the body acting on the mind. 
It could now be held that, far from affecting the quantity of  motion and rest in the 
universe, mind-body interaction proceeds by changing the course or reversing the 
direction of  the animal spirits, via the pineal gland, preserving the constant overall 
quantity of  motion and rest. However, even if  this principle is better accommodated 
by such an account, the original problem remains unsolved. For despite their 
diaphanous and ‘subtil’ nature, Descartes’ ‘animal spirits’ are still ultimately material 
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(unlike classic formulations of  the theory), as is the pineal gland, so it is not clear 
why he thought that describing their mechanism stole any kind of  march on the 
original problem concerning material-immaterial interaction. Perhaps he allowed his 
imagination (or a vague awareness of  the original, immaterial, sense of  ‘animal 
spirits’) to lead him to entertain a kind of  matter that was of  such great subtlety as to 
be neither fully material nor immaterial, but somehow in between so as to offer a 
possible bridge between the two. 
Whatever Descartes’ reasons, Spinoza would find himself  following in the famous 
philosopher’s footsteps in order to render the interaction between mind and body 
more tractable. It seems that he felt the need to do so in light of  the growing 
recognition that the problem of  interaction was one that carried over to his own 
metaphysics of  attributes, since it is no less mysterious how an attribute, immutable 
and infinite in its own kind, could affect or be affected by another attribute, itself  
immutable and infinite in its own kind, and hence of  a completely different, and 
incommensurable, nature. Amid this layer of  the stratified deposits in the Short 
Treatise, one finds Spinoza’s attempts to carefully separate the heterogeneous 
attributes of  thought and extension: 
So we should note that all the effects which we see depend necessarily on 
extension must be attributed to this attribute, e.g., Motion and Rest... For if  
one thing produces another, there must be some being in it through which it 
can produce that rather than something else... E.g., if  a stone is lying at rest, it 
is impossible that it should be able to be moved by the power of  thinking, or 
anything else but motion, as when another stone, having more motion than 
this has rest, makes it move... So it follows, then, that no mode of  thinking will 
be able to produce either motion or rest in the body.57 
The generality of  these reflections had already been announced: ‘What we say here 
about extension, we say also about thought, and everything there is.’58 This 
reappearance of  Descartes’ bane, and Spinoza’s growing concern about it, signals 
perhaps a mid-point in the evolution of  the conception of  mind and body in the 
Short Treatise, reflected in these troubled remarks on the impossibility of  interaction 
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It is perhaps in response to anxieties such as these that Spinoza at times resorts to 
the Cartesian gambit of  interposing the ‘animal spirits’ between the soul and body: 
[T]he soul’s power to move the spirits can also be hindered, either because the 
motion of  the spirits is much decreased, or because it is much increased. It is 
decreased, for example, when we have run a great deal... It is increased, for 
example, when we drink too much wine or other strong drink, thereby 
becoming merry, or drunk, and destroying the soul’s power to govern the 
body.59 
Now what is it that medicines or wine bring about? This: that by their action 
they drive these spirits from the heart and make room again. When the soul 
becomes aware of  this, it gets relief... This cannot be an immediate action of  
the wine on the soul, but only an action of  the wine on the spirits [and thereby 
on the soul].60 
However, despite interposing the animal spirits in this way, Spinoza, unlike 
Descartes, seems to have appreciated that this leaves the crucial problem unresolved: 
 [A] possible objection is this: we see that the soul, though it has nothing in 
common with the body, nevertheless can bring it about that the spirits, which 
would have moved in one direction, now however move in another direction - 
why, then, could they not also make a body which is completely at rest begin to 
move? Similarly, why could it not also move wherever it will all other bodies 
that already have motion?61 
In response to this ‘possible objection’, Spinoza finally begins to anticipate the 
mature conception of  mind and body developed later in the Ethics. Thus, in perhaps 
the ‘youngest’ stratum of  the Short Treatise, the relationship between mind and body 
is framed more in terms of  a ‘union’ that consists in a shared substantial ground 
expressed through different attributes: 
But if  we recall what we have already said about the thinking thing, we will be 
able to remove this difficulty very easily. We said then that although Nature has 
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But why should this offer a way around the problem? Spinoza explains in a lengthy 
note: 
There is no difficulty here as to how this one mode, which differs infinitely 
from the other, acts on the other... Between the Idea [i.e. the soul] and the 
object [i.e. the body] there must necessarily be a union... For there is no thing 
of  which there is not an Idea in the thinking thing, and no idea can exist unless 
the thing also exists... [So] the object cannot be changed unless the Idea is also 
changed, and vice versa, so that no third thing is necessary here which would 
produce the union of  soul and body.63 
But even here, the question is put in terms of  how ‘one mode, which differs 
infinitely from the other, acts on the other’, that is, it still assumes a fundamentally 
interactionist relationship between mind and body. 
Having sketched out a conjectural ‘excavation’, there appear to be three principal 
phases to the evolution of  Spinoza’s conception of  mind and body in the Short 
Treatise: the oldest stratum is characterised by an untroubled acceptance of  mind-
body interaction, but is not yet framed in terms of  a shared substantial ground; the 
mid-stratum consists in a kind of  crisis-phase in which recourse is made to the 
Cartesian strategy of  interposing the ‘animal spirits’ between mind and body; and in 
the youngest stratum, in which Spinoza comes closest to the parallelism of  the 
Ethics, the interaction between mind and body is grounded on the co-attribution of  a 
single shared substance. However, even this most developed conception in the Short 
Treatise falls short of  the position eventually reached in the Ethics, for the appeal to 
‘one unique Being, of  which all these attributes are predicated’, is still made in an 
attempt to support an interactionist account. The last crucial step with which this 
growing conception is finally completed does not come until the Ethics, in which the 
very notion of  interaction is subverted in light of  the true nature of  mind and body, 
understood as distinct expressions of  one and the same reality. Edging ever nearer in 
the Short Treatise towards appreciating these implications of  the incommensurability 
of  thought and extension, Spinoza would only finally consummate the train of  
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[Because] each attribute is conceived through itself  without any other (by 
IP10)... the modes of  each attribute involve the concept of  their own attribute, 
[and] not of  another one; and so (by IA4) they have God for their cause 
insofar as he is considered under the attribute of  which they are modes, and 
not insofar as he is considered under any other.64 
This, of  course, is the final stepping-stone before the celebrated statement of  
‘parallelism’: 
[W]hatever can be perceived by an infinite intellect... pertains to one substance 
only, and consequently the thinking substance and the extended substance are 
one and the same substance, which is now comprehended under this attribute, 
now under that. So also a mode of  extension [i.e. a body] and the idea of  that 
mode [i.e. its mind or soul] are one and the same thing, but expressed in two 
ways. Some of  the Hebrews seem to have seen this, as if  through a cloud, 
when they maintained that God, God’s intellect, and the things understood by 
him are one and the same.65 
 
The ‘parallelism’ of  attributes in general, and of  mind and body in particular 
 
The inescapable conclusion of  the Ethics is that ideas can be affected by the ideal 
alone, while bodies can be affected by the corporeal alone. The ‘problem’ of  mind-
body interaction simply dissolves, because there is no interaction to account for. This 
might seem to leave a gap in need of  filling in, if  only by way of  explaining why it 
should seem as though there is mutual influence between mind and body, and it is 
here that Spinoza’s famous doctrine of  parallelism comes into play. According to the 
doctrine, there is always a mental aspect to bodily goings-on, and indeed always a 
bodily aspect to mental goings-on. Misdescribing what happens at the metaphysical 
level, one confuses the two aspects by describing either direction of  influence in 
terms of  mind-body interaction. But that is not to say that there is no metaphysically 
legitimate description at all, since there is still intra-, if  not inter-attribute, causation. 
When presenting the doctrine in the Ethics, Spinoza begins, as he does in the Short 
Treatise, by explaining the particular in light of  the general. That is, it is because of  
the nature of  thought and extension in general that particular ideas and bodies 
should correlate with each other locally. It remains the case in the Ethics that it is of  
the nature of  thought to express ‘objectively’ whatever exists in nature, and so every 
causal interaction between individual bodies will be mirrored by a relationship of  
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entailment between the objective essence of  the cause and the objective essence of  
the effect. Spinoza points out that this should already be ‘clear from 1a4’, which 
states that ‘[t]he knowledge of  an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of  
its cause’.66 It helps to remember that, for Spinoza, the ‘objective essence’ of  a thing, 
or its ‘idea’, exists in the ‘infinite intellect’ of  God, and therefore counts as true 
knowledge, even if  attainment of  this knowledge by this or that particular person is 
only ever partial or ‘inadequate’. These ‘mirror images’ - the determination of  a 
physical effect by its cause, on the one hand, and the entailment of  a consequent 
from its reason, on the other - are one and the same relationship, just viewed in two 
different ways. ‘The order and connection of  ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of  things.’67 
Although it may seem as though Spinoza has retained a priority of  sorts in favour 
of  the attribute of  extension, since he continues to hold that it is of  the nature of  
ideas to be of  things in nature, suggesting that what comes first (at least logically) are 
these things in nature, this is not the case. The more or less dualistic conception of  
mind and body found in the Short Treatise does seem to involve a priority of  this kind 
in favour of  the body over the mind. ‘The essence of  the soul’, is said to consist in 
‘the being of  an Idea, or objective essence, in the thinking attribute, arising from the 
essence of  an object which in fact exists in Nature.’68 This priority is implied in 
various places in the text, even though it is in violation of  the core metaphysical 
principle on which the Short Treatise is based, according to which, ‘Nature is a being 
of  which all attributes are predicated’.69 But, then again, so are all the versions of  the 
dualistic conception from which the text never quite frees itself. Both throwbacks are 
only finally purged in the Ethics, with the demonstration of  the ‘parallelism’ of  the 
attributes. Although it continues to be of  the nature of  thought in general, and of  
ideas in particular, to be about things in nature, the trick of  the later work consists in 
dissolving any priority or imbalance among the attributes, so that what remains is 
only symmetry. Peter’s essence is expressed jointly by both his essentia formalis and his 
essentia obiective; neither precedes the other. Peter is, at one and the same time, both 
who he is and who he is known (or knowable) to be. 
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What might appear to be an asymmetry among the attributes can only seem that 
way when the ‘direction of  expression’, that is, the principle that all attributes jointly 
and in tandem express the nature of  substance, is ignored. Comparing the attributes 
one with another, it might seem as though thought depends on extension, or perhaps 
that the attribute of  thought is ‘overinflated’ (since there is an idea for each thing 
under each attribute, including thought itself, so that there is an idea for every idea, 
and another idea for that idea, and so on ad infinitum).70 But this kind of  comparison 
begins from the modal level, taking this to be most fundamental, and attempts to 
measure the attributes against each other, which, Spinoza warned, is to violate their 
intrinsic incommensurability. When a perspective is instead adopted from the natural 
priority of  substance, or nature as a whole, the various different attributes can only 
be understood as being on the same ontological footing, each in their own distinctive 
way expressing the nature of  substance. This perspective was already available, albeit 
in nascent form, at the time of  the Short Treatise. As sketched above, Spinoza came 
steadily closer to drawing out the implications of  this perspective for the relationship 
among the attributes, for he already held that ‘God, the first cause of  all things’, is ‘a 
being of  which all, or infinite, attributes are predicated, each of  which is infinitely 
perfect in its own kind’.71 
But the implications of  the order of  nature for the symmetry of  the attributes 
would only be fully recognised in the Ethics. Determined in the mature work to 
follow the order of  nature as faithfully as possible, he begins by demonstrating the 
necessary existence of  ‘a substance consisting of  infinite attributes, each of  which 
expresses eternal and infinite essence’, before turning to the modifications of  
substance, which ‘can neither be nor be conceived without substance’.72 From this 
perspective, each attribute is equally credited with expressing the nature of  substance 
in its own way, and they are all on this fundamental level, so to speak, ‘on a par’, 
equally infinite but mutually autonomous. It is ultimately as a result of  this view of  
the order of  nature that the Ethics must be read as having overturned any residual 
priority or imbalance among the attributes, and also in which the fundamental unity 
in ‘the order and connection of  ideas’ and ‘the order and connection of  things’ lies.73 
                                                          
70 What Bennett calls the ‘lopsidedness’ of  the attribute of  thought, together with the problem that 
it poses for my reading, will be addressed in Chapter 7. Bennett, Study of  Spinoza’s Ethics, p. 62. 
71 Spinoza, Short Treatise, I, p. 65. 
72 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p11, 1p15dem. 
73 Of  course, it is true that the structure of  the Short Treatise was also very much intended to follow 
this same order of  nature, the first part concerned with the most general nature of  God and the 
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Just as there is no dependence of  the ideal on the extended, nor is there any 
dependence of  the extended on the ideal: 
[T]he formal being of  things which are not modes of  thinking does not follow 
from the divine nature because [God] has first known the things; rather the 
objects of  ideas follow and are inferred from their attributes in the same way 
and by the same necessity as that with which we have shown ideas to follow 
from the attribute of  Thought.74 
Although I have focussed on the relationship between thought and extension, it is 
important to remember that this is only one application of  a general thesis (hence 
the conjunctive adverb at (2p7s), ‘and consequently’). That is, there is within the 
infinite intellect of  God an objective essence for each and every formal essence, 
whether the formal essence belongs to something extended, something mental, or 
indeed to something under any of  the infinity of  God’s attributes. In the case of  an 
objective essence expressing the formal essence of  a mode of  thought, for example, 
the result is the idea of  an idea, or idea ideæ.75 But for precisely the same reasons that 
‘a mode of  extension and the idea of  that mode are one and the same thing, but 
expressed in two ways’, an idea and the idea of  that idea are likewise ‘one and the 
same thing’, only in this case ‘conceived under one and the same attribute, viz. 
Thought’.76 As for the distinction between an idea and the idea of  that idea, Spinoza 
explains, ‘the idea of  the idea is nothing but the form of  the idea insofar as this is 
considered as a mode of  thinking without relation to the object’.77 Of  course, by 
‘object’, Spinoza means the object of  which the first-order idea is an idea, not that 
idea itself, which is indeed the object of  the second-order idea. This relationship 
between ideas and ideas of  ideas is, as discussed above, another angle from which to 
understand Spinoza’s ‘direct’ model of  thought, according to which truth is self-
illuminating and knowledge self-certifying: ‘For as soon as someone knows 
something, he thereby knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he 
knows that he knows, and so on, to infinity’.78 
                                                                                                                                                              
second with the particular fortunes of  humanity, but it seems that the full extent of  the implications 
that this order has for the relationship among the attributes, taken generally, and between an 
individual mind and body, in particular, would only dawn on Spinoza when he came to write the 
Ethics. 
74 Ibid. 2p6c. 
75 Ibid. 2p20, 2p21. 
76 Ibid. 2p7s, 2p21s. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
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So committed was Spinoza to the generality of  this ‘parallelism’, that he was 
willing to embrace what some critics have taken to be one of  the more outlandish 
tenets of  his system, that is, the ‘mindedness’ of  each and every thing in nature, right 
down to the most seemingly lifeless sticks and stones: ‘For the things we have shown 
so far are completely general and do not pertain more to man than to other 
Individuals, all of  which, though in different degrees, are nevertheless animate.’79 To 
some this has seemed a step too far, for while it might be reasonable to assign a 
distinct ‘form’ - or intelligibility - to each thing, including mundane sticks and stones, 
it seems like an altogether more extravagant requirement that we credit such things 
with a mental life. But in fact this result is not as bizarre as it may at first seem, and 
Spinoza himself  is careful to add the qualification, ‘though in different degrees’.80 
Although ideas are all self-illuminating (in virtue of  their respective ideæ idearum), and 
so all involve some degree of  ‘knowledge’, publicly available to all but peculiarly 
available to that which happens to be ‘encased’ in the first-order idea’s ideatum, the 
nature of  the ideas will vary to precisely the same extent as the nature of  the things 
themselves, so that what, to us, is the most familiar and paradigmatic kind of  mind, 
i.e. the human mind, will be as different in nature to the mind of  a stone as a human 
being is to the stone itself. Yet, despite this vast distance between our own mental life 
and that of  sticks and stones, anyone who has seen a time-lapsed recording of  the 
growth of  crystals, looked through a powerful microscope at the crawling micro-
particles on the surface of  what otherwise seem to be motionless sticks or stones (as 
Spinoza, the lens grinder and acquaintance of  Johannes Hudde, presumably spent 
some time doing), or taken a long view of  the geology of  the earth, can surely 
sympathise with the generality of  the claim that all things are, in their own way, 
‘animate’.81 
Self-consciousness, which is so readily associated with mindedness, need only be 
attributed to beings endowed with a sufficient degree of  complexity, both 
anatomically and socially: 
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81 See, for example, the letter Spinoza wrote to Hudde asking for advice on polishing lenses. 
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And so to determine what is the difference between the human Mind and the 
others, and how it surpasses them, it is necessary for us, as we have said, to 
know the nature of  its object, i.e., of  the human Body.82 
If  we do so, we will find that it is ‘more capable than others of  doing many things at 
once, or being acted on in many ways at once’, or, in other words, that it is 
embedded in a network of  interactions that is of  far greater complexity than that in 
which other things are embedded.83 Therefore ‘its Mind is more capable than others 
of  perceiving many things at once’, including, even, its own mindedness, as in the 
reflective awareness characteristic of  self-consciousness.84 The ‘physical digression’ 
which follows (2p13s) is essentially concerned with elaborating this scale of  
complexity within nature as a whole, portraying nature as a vast unchanging system 
made up of  sub-systems, changing relative to the parent system but unchanging in 
themselves, which in turn are made up of  further sub-systems, and so on, until one 
considers the particular system of  humanity, made up of  individual human bodies 
related to each other in complex ways, themselves consisting of  organs, the organs 
of  tissue, the tissue of  cells, and so on. Spinoza actually proceeds in the opposite 
direction, from the less to the more complex, and does not yet of  course have 
recourse to this kind of  biological language. Nevertheless, one cannot help reading 
this passage as the expression of  an inherently organic view of  nature, in light of  
which one enjoys a far more intuitive grasp of  the initially startling claim that 
everything in nature is ‘animate’, or ‘minded’: 
So far we have conceived an Individual which is composed only of  bodies 
which are distinguished from one another only by motion and rest, speed and 
slowness, i.e., which is composed of  the simplest bodies. But if  we should now 
conceive of  another, composed of  a number of  Individuals of  a different 
nature, we shall find that it can be affected in a great many other ways, and still 
preserve its nature... But if  we should further conceive a third kind of  
Individual, composed [NS: of  many individuals] of  this second kind, we shall 
find that it can be affected in many other ways, without any change of  its 
form. And if  we proceed in this way to infinity, we shall easily conceive that 
the whole of  nature is one Individual, whose parts, i.e., all bodies, vary in 
infinite ways, without any change of  the whole Individual.85 
It is no wonder that the later rise of  organicism among the German Romantics 
should accompany a resurgence of  enthusiasm for Spinoza’s philosophy. 
                                                          
82 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p13s. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 2l7s. 
  104 
In summary, by applying what is a completely general thesis about the attributes 
of  substance to the particular nature of  a human being, ‘we understand not only that 
the human Mind is united to the Body, but also what should be understood by the 
union of  Mind and Body’.86 As discussed above, the union between mind and body 
is to be understood as a kind of  ‘identity’. It is only a kind of  identity, because 
although the mind and body are one and the same thing in the sense that they are 
distinct expressions of  the same reality, nevertheless (and simply shifting the 
emphasis) it remains true that they are distinct expressions of  the same reality, that is, 
they are modes of  substance under attributes that are in themselves complete and 
forever mutually incommensurable expressions of  nature. As in the example from 
the previous chapter, when looking at a human being, one can at times think about 
(or see) that person in purely physical, or physiological, terms, and at other times 
think about (or see) him or her as a mindful being. The point is that, understanding a 
person in one or another of  these two ways confines one conceptually within a 
certain field of  meaning, neither of  which is conceptually subordinate to the other. It 
does not, therefore, make sense to reduce mindful behaviour to physical causes, nor 
vice versa. In contrast to the implied imbalance in the Short Treatise such that there is a 
certain priority of  extension over thought, the Ethics contains a powerful argument 
for the mutual irreducibility and ontological parity of  the attributes, with perhaps 
much to contribute to contemporary discussions on the subject. 
 
 
What this means for Spinoza’s eschatology 
 
What can be concluded on the basis of  the trajectory charted from the Short Treatise 
to the Ethics? It was noted that, even in the most logically developed conception of  
the earlier text, Spinoza still ultimately retains an essentially ‘interactionist’ model of  
the mind-body relationship. Although he had already conceived of  thought and 
extension as attributes of  the same unique reality, and had at times begun to 
construct a conception of  mind-body union on that basis, he still clearly regarded 
the nature of  thought and extension to be sufficiently disconnected for there to be a 
question of  how the one might interact with the other. That is, he still ultimately 
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understood the mind (a mode of  thought) and the body (a mode of  extension) as 
enjoying an ontological independence amounting even, perhaps, to a separability of  
the two (if  not in fact, then at least in principle, as in Descartes’ conception).87 If  this 
is true of  the most developed conception one finds in the Short Treatise, in which 
Spinoza came closest to the parallelism of  the Ethics, then it is of  course all the more 
true of  the earlier incarnations in that work. 
It is perhaps understandable, then, why at the time of  writing the Short Treatise, 
Spinoza at times appeared to entertain a more temporally framed doctrine of  human 
immortality, in which the soul can exist apart, subsequent to the death of  the body. 
Just as Descartes, who apparently brought his entire metaphysical conception of  
mind and body into the service of  this traditional Judaeo-Christian doctrine, had 
premised the possibility of  the soul surviving the death of  the body on the ultimate 
separability of  the two, so too would Spinoza, at the time of  writing the Short Treatise, 
be entitled to that same application.88 If, in addition, one recalls the adventures of  
Spinoza’s conception of  eternity traced in Chapter 2, a conception which itself  
underwent a gradual transformation over the same period of  time as his conception 
of  mind, then it begins to make sense why at certain points in the Short Treatise he 
veers towards an eschatology involving the continued existence, in time and 
following the death of  the body, of  a separate entity called the ‘soul’. If  one keeps an 
eye on this earlier phase of  both conceptions in the Short Treatise, then one may read 
Spinoza’s claim to have proven ‘the eternal and constant duration of  the intellect’ as 
an earnest assessment of  what he had shown, i.e., the unending, temporal, existence 
of  the soul, both when the body exists and when it does not.89 
But perhaps the principal insight to be gleaned from having charted the successive 
stages in the evolution of  Spinoza’s conception of  mind is that the Short Treatise 
contains a patchwork of  distinct yet related notions. In particular, it makes sense of  
the apparent indecision or vacillation in the eschatological remarks found in the 
                                                          
87 ‘Hence the fact that I can clearly and distinctly understand one thing apart from another is 
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work. It would not be surprising were it to turn out that the variation in 
eschatological views expressed in the Short Treatise followed a similar pattern, both 
logically and chronologically, as that of  the various conceptions of  mind. It seems 
plausible to suggest that, as his conception of  mind progressed away from its more 
or less Cartesian origins (involving causal interaction between mind and body), and 
towards its eventual culmination in the parallelism of  the Ethics, so too, at the same 
time, did the eschatology of  the Short Treatise move gradually further away from a 
Cartesian model, and closer to the ‘philosophical eschatology’ of  the Ethics, 
eventually to be framed in terms of  the ‘eternity of  the mind’. 
This would explain why there are already glimpses of  a ‘realised,’ or ‘this-life’, 
eschatology in the Short Treatise itself. Spinoza replaces, for example, the traditional 
eschatology of  eternal punishment with a naturalised re-interpretation, arguing that 
‘sadness, despair, envy, fright, and other evil passions’ are the ‘real hell itself ’.90 
Conversely, and in the same passage, he gives a ‘this-life’ re-interpretation of  the 
eschatology of  ‘eternal salvation’: 
[T]his knowledge [of  the human condition, as set out in the second part of  the 
work] also brings us to the point where we attribute everything to God, love 
him alone, because he is most magnificent and supremely perfect, and offer 
ourselves entirely to him. For that is what true religion and our eternal salvation and 
happiness really consist in.91 
In other words, just as the concluding proposition of  the Ethics finds that 
‘blessedness is not the reward of  virtue, but virtue itself ’, the implicit eschatology of  
these more advanced strata of  the Short Treatise casts ‘eternal salvation’, less as an 
afterlife awaiting us in reward for having loved nature and its inhabitants, and more 
as a kind of  immortality, or, as will emerge over the following chapters, a ‘freedom 
from death’, that consists in the very quality of  such a life itself.92 For, in light of  the 
parallelism of  the Ethics, the soul cannot outlast the body in any familiar, temporal, 
sense. As will be explored in the following chapters, there is instead in the later work 
a consummation of  the inchoate ‘this-life’ eschatology beginning to appear in the 
Short Treatise, according to which one’s relationship with one’s own mortality is 
understood in terms of  an existential orientation of  the life one lives as one lives it. 
As will emerge in what follows, however, there is far more involved in this 
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naturalised, ‘philosophical’, reinterpretation of  the eschatological than has so far 
been touched on, inasmuch as it draws on the full extent of  Spinoza’s philosophical 
resources to give substance to his own distinctive response to the question of  human 
















Spinoza’s account of  human cognition plays a key role in the eschatology of  the 
Ethics. Not only does the ‘third kind of  cognition [tertium cognitionis genus]’ depend ‘on 
the mind, as on a formal cause, insofar as the mind itself  is eternal’, but also ‘death is 
less harmful to us, the greater the mind’s clear and distinct cognition [clara et distincta 
cognitio major est]’.1 There is thus a reciprocal relationship - in both directions - 
between this higher form of  cognition and the eternality of  the mind. This chapter 
will therefore be concerned with Spinoza’s account of  cognition. After setting out 
the physiological basis for cognition as he conceived it (building on the conception 
of  mind already examined in Chapter 4), I will turn to Spinoza’s famous hierarchy of  
the various kinds of  cognition. I will consider the way in which these different 
modes of  cognition relate to the species of  duration and eternity (discussed in 
Chapter 3), concentrating on the peculiar nature of  the kind of  cognition he calls 
‘intuitive knowledge [scientia intuitiva]’, and its close connection with the eternal nature 
of  God or Nature through a state of  ‘intellectual love [amor intellectualis]’. Delving 
into the significance of  Spinoza’s correlation of  adequate ideas with the species of  
eternity, on the one hand, and inadequate ideas with duration, on the other, I will 
suggest that the crucial difference between these kinds of  ideas consists in the extent 
to which a person autonomously forms them, since adequate ideas, on Spinoza’s 
view, are the fruits of  mental action, whereas inadequate ideas result from the mind 
being acted on. This will suggest that Spinoza’s ‘rationalism’ might be best understood, 
not in terms of  an opposition between the sensual and the intellectual, but rather in 
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 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p31, 5p38s. 
Enough for me the mystery of  the eternity of  life,  
and the inkling of  the marvellous structure of  reality, 
together with the single-hearted endeavour to 
comprehend a portion, be it never so tiny, 
of  the reason that manifests itself  in nature. 
 
Albert Einstein, The World as I See it 
  109 
terms of  a distinction between autonomy and heteronomy. As a result of  
reconsidering Spinoza’s rationalism in this way, it will become possible to appreciate 
the more inclusive and holistic nature of  his account of  cognition, the highest 
expression of  which involves a kind of  harmony among the deliverances of  
imaginatio and opinio, the organising role of ratio, and the immediate flash of  insight 
glimpsed through scientia intuitiva. 
 
 
From the physiology of  perception to the varieties of  cognition 
 
With the essential nature of  the mind qua ‘idea of  the body’ established in the first 
thirteen propositions of  Ethics II, the next port of  call for this part of  the work is to 
explain the mechanism of  cognition. This transition is facilitated by an interlude 
consisting of  ‘a few things concerning the nature of  bodies’, now generally known as 
the ‘physical digression’, in which the outlines of  a more or less Cartesian, 
mechanistic, physics are laid out.2 It is on the basis of  this mechanistic physics that 
the nature of  human perception is established. 
All modes by which a body is affected by another body follow both from the 
nature of  the body affected and at the same time from the nature of  the 
affecting body.3 
From this axiom, together with the parallelism established at (2p7) and indeed 
already anticipated at (1a4), Spinoza can deduce the fundamental nature of  
perception: 
For all the modes in which a body is affected follow from the nature of  the 
affected body, and at the same time from the nature of  the affecting body (by 
a1”). So the idea of  them (by 1a4) will necessarily involve the nature of  each 
body.4 
However, although these ideas necessarily involve (involvere) the nature of  external 
objects in this way, they reflect more the perspective of  the perceiver than the true 
nature of  those objects. This is because ‘[t]he knowledge of  an effect depends on, 
and involves, the knowledge of  its cause’, but at this stage of  human cognition, the 
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order is reversed, such that the nature of  the external thing is known only through the 
nature of  its effect, i.e., the affection of  the perceiver’s body.5 This is illustrated 
nicely by one of  Spinoza’s favourite examples: 
[W]hen we look at the sun, we imagine it as about 200 feet away from us... 
because an affection of  our body involves the essence of  the sun insofar as 
our body is affected by the sun.6 
The ‘affections of  the human Body whose ideas [re-]present [repræsentant] external 
bodies as present to us’, Spinoza calls the ‘images of  things [rerum imagines]’, which 
are ‘imagined [imaginari]’ by the mind.7 Curley translates ‘repræsentant’ here as ‘present’ 
rather than as ‘represent’, a translation that would seem to support my ascription of  
a ‘direct’ account of  cognition to Spinoza.8 But it is not necessary to opt for this 
translation in order to maintain my interpretation, since the point here is, in any case, 
to introduce a form of  cognition not yet vindicated as adequate, but framed instead in 
terms of  the relativity of  perspective and the ‘random [vaga]’ effects of  external 
objects on the perceiver, or, in other words, more a form of  representation than 
presentation. 
However, it is important to recognise that this foundational level of  cognition, 
which Spinoza terms ‘imagination [imaginatio]’, is not in itself  erroneous. We are not 
mistaken in seeing the sun as though it were a small disc in the sky, perhaps a few 
hundred feet away, because of  our particular vantage point. It is only if  we fail to 
grasp the general relationship between perspective and spatial positioning that we 
may be misled into taking this appearance of  the sun to constitute its nature, that is, 
if  we judge that the sun is in fact a small disc a few hundred feet away in the sky. On 
the contrary, our perception provides at least a partial presentation of  the sun’s true 
nature, even if  this idea stands in need of  further refinement. The partiality of  this 
presentation can also be characterised as a kind of  ‘representation’, which stands to 
become less of  a representation and more of  a presentation in the light of  further 
cognitive assimilation. So this foundational level of  cognition plays an important role 
in our overall cognition of  things. Indeed, in ideal circumstances the faculty of  
imagination should be considered a powerful virtue: 
                                                          
5 Ibid. 1a4. See Gueroult, Spinoza, vol. II, pp. 196-7. 
6 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p35s. Clearly fond of  this particular example, Spinoza mentions it in several 
places in his writings. Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §§21, 78; Spinoza, Ethics, 4def6, 
4p1s. Wolfson traces the example back to Aristotle’s De Anima, 428b2-4. 
7 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p17s. 
8 See Chapter 4, pp. 87-9. 
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For if  the Mind, while it imagined non-existent things as present to it, at the 
same time knew that those things did not exist, it would, of  course, attribute 
this power of  imagining to a virtue of  its nature, not to a vice - especially if  
this faculty of  imagining depended only on its own nature, i.e. (by ID7), if  the 
Mind’s faculty of  imagining were free.9 
As will emerge in what follows, it is not in virtue of  the relativity of  sensory 
perception that this form of  cognition is ranked ‘below’ those of  ratio and scientia 
intuitiva, but rather, because, in the absence of  such ‘higher’ forms of  cognition, it 
must remain essentially unfree. 
Spinoza’s division of  the cognitive faculties, which recurs with only minor 
variations at each stage of  his intellectual development, was his contribution to an 
established tradition of  ranking lower and higher forms of  cognition according to a 
scale of  ‘clearness’ or ‘truth’. Plato, in the Republic, had set a precedent: 
[L]et there be four faculties in the soul - reason answering to the highest, 
understanding to the second, faith (or conviction) to the third, and perception 
of  shadows to the last, [such] that the several faculties have clearness in the 
same degree that their objects have truth.10 
There are distinct echoes of  Plato’s classification in each of  Spinoza’s formulations, 
one of  which, in the Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, distinguishes four 
faculties, and two of  which, including the mature version of  the Ethics, distinguish 
three. But if  this tradition of  ranking the cognitive faculties can be traced at least as 
far back as Plato, it is in fact the Aristotelian approach to explicating the distinct 
functions of  the faculties to which Spinoza is most indebted.11 For Spinoza inherited 
the broadly Aristotelian framework whereby the psychological mechanism of  
cognition is to be explained in terms of  a metaphysical relationship between knower 
and known. It might be ventured, further, that Spinoza adopted a version of  this 
framework in a way that is especially reminiscent of  Aquinas, for whom the highest 
form of  knowledge, or ‘scientia’ - higher than discursive reasoning, ‘ratio’ or 
                                                          
9 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p17s. 
10 Plato, Republic, in The Dialogues of  Plato, vol. II, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1953), 511d. 
11 In fact, it predates Plato, with an early expression, for example, in the fragments attributed to 
Parmenides, whose early fifth century BC poem, known as On Nature, warns ‘you’ (the reader) to ‘let 
not habit do violence to you on the empirical way of  exercising an unseeing eye and a noisy ear and 
tongue, but decide by reason (logos) the controversial test enjoined by me’. Parmenides, The Fragments 
of  Parmenides: A Critical Text with Introduction and Translation, the Ancient Testimonia and a Commentary, ed. 
Allan H. Coxon and Richard McKirahan, trans. Richard McKirahan (Las Vegas: Parmenides 
Publishing, 2009), p. 62. 
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‘ratiocinatio’ - was intuition (intuitus), in which the knower is united with what is 
known, namely God, in an immediate and incorrigible episode of  intellection.12 
In each of  Spinoza’s formulations of  the hierarchy, the lowest kind of  cognition 
is linked to ‘report or... some conventional sign [ex auditu aut ex aliquo signo]’, and to 
‘random experience [experientia vaga]’.13 It seems he regarded the latter as in a way 
superior to the former, ranking it higher in the hierarchy as he presents it in the 
Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, and in the Short Treatise describing its possessor 
as being of  ‘quicker perception’ than one who rests content with mere report.14 But 
he would ultimately group the two together (both in the Short Treatise and in the 
Ethics) under the heading of  ‘cognition of  the first kind, opinion [opinio] or 
imagination [imaginatio]’.15 Again, he was consistent in all his writings in ranking a 
kind of  cognition above this, which includes the adequate ideas called ‘common 
notions’ and those adequate ideas that can be inferred from them, or from other 
adequate ideas, a kind of  ‘[p]erception that we have when the essence of  a thing is 
inferred from another thing’.16 He calls this level in the hierarchy ‘reason [ratio]’, 
which is ranked above ‘opinion or imagination’ as ‘the second kind of  cognition’. But 
the pinnacle of  his hierarchy is reserved for a kind of  cognition that is ‘intuitive 
[intuitiva]’, ‘immediate’, and ‘the clearest of  all’. He describes this kind of  cognition in 
notably experiential terms, akin to the familiar experience of  simply ‘seeing’ that 
something is a certain way, or that two things are related in a certain way. For 
example, when it comes to grasping the proportionality ‘in the simplest numbers’, 
say in ‘1, 2, and 3, no one fails to see that the fourth proportional number is 6’, a 
relation that, ‘in one glance, we see the first number to have to the second’.17 This 
flash of  intellectual perception, in which the essential properties or relations of  
things are simply ‘seen’ in a basic and primitive way, he calls ‘intuitive knowledge 
[scientia intuitiva]’. 
 
                                                          
12 It cannot be asserted with any certainty that Spinoza derived this kind of  conception from 
Aquinas, but this is true of  tracing his sources generally, since he rarely cites these in his writings. In 
any case, the similarity between the two thinkers on the nature of  cognition is worth noting. 
13 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §19. KV, II, p. 97. In the Short Treatise, the lowest 
kind of  cognition, ‘belief ’, is said to arise ‘either from experience or from report [of  door onderfinding, 
of  door hooren zeggen]’. Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, p. 97. In the Ethics, we are said to ‘perceive many 
things… from signs [ex signis]’. Spinoza, Ethics, 2p40s2. 
14 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §19; Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, p. 98. 
15 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p40s2. 
16 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §19. 
17 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p40s2. 
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The cognitive hierarchy in relation to duration and eternity 
 
Along with these contrasting specifications of  the varieties of  cognition, Spinoza 
would also coordinate his scale with reference to the distinct species of  duration and 
eternity. In the course of  elaborating on the nature of  the intellect in the Treatise on 
the Emendation of  the Intellect, he includes the following characterisation: 
It perceives things not so much under duration as under a certain species of  
eternity [sub quadam specie æternitatis], and in an infinite number - or rather, to 
perceive things, it attends neither to number nor to duration; but when it 
imagines things, it perceives them under a certain number, determinate 
duration and quantity [sub certo... duratione]’.18 
There are at least four points worth noting here. Firstly, Spinoza appears to be 
distinguishing between two functions of  the intellect, i.e., ‘perception’ and 
‘imagination’. This is interesting because, instead of  contrasting the intellect with the 
imagination, as one might expect, he in fact makes the latter a species of  the former, 
as Descartes had done before him.19 Secondly, by ‘perception’ in the narrow sense, 
that is, as contrasted with ‘imagination’, he implies something epistemically ‘factive’, 
in the way that ‘seeing’ is taken to imply a veridical visual experience, as opposed to 
merely ‘seeming to see’. Therefore perception in this narrow sense is not 
epistemically neutral, like the broader sense of  the term. It is the broader, neutral, 
sense of  the term in Spinoza’s claim that ‘when it [i.e., the intellect] imagines things, 
it perceives them’, since the imagination is potentially, but only potentially, a source of  
error. Thirdly, in glossing ‘infinite number’ as ‘in fact’, attending ‘neither to number 
nor to duration’, it seems clear that what Spinoza is rejecting is not the application of  
the notion of  number to the infinite tout court, but rather any putatively ‘quantitative’ 
understanding of  the infinite, an interpretation confirmed by comments that he 
makes in the ‘letter on the infinite’, which I will discuss below. Finally, while there is, 
on the one hand, a correlation between the species of  eternity and veridical 
perception, there is equally, on the other hand, a correlation between the species of  
duration and the imagination, which is considered to be potentially fallible in lieu of  
                                                          
18 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §108. 
19 Descartes subdivides the operations of  the intellect into ‘sensory perception, imagination and 
pure understanding,’ all of  which are taken to be ‘perceptions’ in a broader sense. Descartes, Principles 
of  Philosophy, I, §32, p. 204, AT VIII.17. 
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further guidance and integration by the higher faculties into a fuller grasp of  the 
thing in question. 
So the imagination perceives things ‘under a certain... determinate duration [sub 
certo... duratione]’, whereas the intellect (narrowly construed) perceives things ‘under a 
certain species of  eternity [sub quadam specie æternitatis]’. This correlation in the Treatise 
on the Emendation of  the Intellect between a cognitive hierarchy and the species of  
duration and eternity is maintained and developed in subsequent works. In the Short 
Treatise we find, while not quite the same talk of  perceiving things ‘under’ (a species 
of) duration or eternity, nevertheless at least implicitly the same correlation. Love, 
which is said to arise ‘from the perception and knowledge which we have of  a thing’, 
can be for objects ‘corruptible in themselves’, or for objects which, ‘through their 
cause, are not corruptible’, or for a third kind of  object which, ‘solely through its 
own power and capacity, is eternal and incorruptible’.20 If  love depends on ‘the 
perception and knowledge which we have of  a thing’, then to be able to love this 
third kind of  object one must first have perception and knowledge of  it which, in 
order to be true, must be framed under a ‘certain species of  eternity’, since the thing 
is itself  eternal. Similarly, the category of  ‘corruptible’ things is said to include ‘all the 
singular things, which have not existed from all time, but have had a beginning’, and 
so would, by parity of  reasoning, be framed under a ‘certain species of  duration’.21 
As for the second kind of  object, it is said to include ‘all those modes which we have 
said are the cause of  the singular modes’ – a category that Spinoza would develop in 
the Ethics under the rubric of  the ‘infinite modes’.22 Again, the correlation, indeed 
union, between the eternal nature of  God and the eternal ‘effects of  the intellect’ is 
suggested once more in the Short Treatise, when it is said that ‘the effects of  the 
intellect which are united with [God or Nature] are the most excellent... [and] 
moreover, they also must be eternal, for their cause is eternal’.23 
The correlation between the cognitive hierarchy and the species of  duration and 
eternity is implicitly reiterated in the ‘letter on the infinite’ that Spinoza wrote to his 
friend, Lodewijk Meyer: 
                                                          
20 Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, p. 105.  
21 Here we must remember that, at the time of  writing the Short Treatise, Spinoza had yet to 
decisively separate the meaning of  eternity from that of  simply endless time. See Chapter 2. 
22 Spinoza, Ethics, 1p21 and passim. 
23 Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, p. 148. 
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[W]e conceive quantity in two ways: either abstractly, or [sive] superficially, as 
we have it in the imagination with the help of  the senses; or as Substance, 
apprehended solely by means of  the intellect. So if  we have regard to quantity 
as it exists in the imagination (and this is what we most frequently and readily 
do), it will be found to be divisible, finite, composed of  parts, and manifold. 
But if  we have regard to it as it is in the intellect and we apprehend the thing, 
as it is in itself  (and this is very difficult), then it is found to be infinite, 
indivisible and one alone.24 
In light of  the distinction between duration and eternity discussed in Chapter 2, it 
seems clear that what is being distinguished in this letter is quantity qua quantity and 
quantity qua quality. Quantity qua quantity would be number conceived as an 
aggregate, and, in the case of  duration, in terms of  a series of  discrete moments in 
time conjoined together in a continuous extension of  existence. But the confusion in 
such an ‘abstract’ conception can be appreciated from its generation of  Zeno’s 
famous paradox: 
When someone has conceived Duration abstractly, and by confusing it with 
Time begun to divide it into parts, he will never be able to understand, for 
example, how an hour can pass. For if  an hour is to pass, it will be necessary 
for half  of  it to pass first, and then half  of  the remainder… So if  you subtract 
half  from the remainder in this way, to infinity, you will never reach the end of  
the hour.25 
Quantity qua quality, on the other hand, is the only possible way to understand the 
infinite, which is indivisible and unique, and which has reference ‘neither to number 
[qua quantity] nor to duration’. A qualitative grasp of  the infinite is, like a qualitative 
grasp of  eternity, a task for the intellect (in the narrow sense). It seems that Spinoza 
regarded the two notions, ‘infinity’ and ‘eternity’, not as synonymous in meaning, but 
in a sense two sides of  the same coin. 
Although the imagination is not erroneous in itself, when it is left to wander 
(which is the sense of  the Latin ‘vaga’), unguided by the higher forms of  cognition, it 
has the potential to lead one astray epistemically. It is in this qualified sense that 
Spinoza infers that, to this rank of  the hierarchy ‘pertain all those ideas which are 
inadequate and confused’, and that it is ‘the only cause of  falsity’.26 By the same 
token, cognition of  the second and third kinds must be ‘necessarily true’, since the 
first kind is the only cause of  falsity.27 Therefore, these higher forms of  cognition 
                                                          
24 Letter 12; Spinoza, The Letters, p. 103. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p41. 
27 Ibid. 
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perceive things ‘as they are in themselves, i.e. (by 1p29), not as contingent but as 
necessary’.28 That there is no genuine contingency in the world, and that everything 
unfolds as a necessary consequence of  the eternal nature of  God or Nature, is a 
result proven as early as (1p29). It is only because of  an unguarded impression 
produced by a wandering imagination that we regard things as contingent, as arising 
out of  a chance confluence of  time and place. This form of  cognition is therefore 
limited to the species of  duration. Spinoza illustrates why this should be the case 
with an example. If  a child, he explains, sees Peter in the morning, Paul at noon, and 
Simon in the evening, then the involuntary effect on his imagination will be to 
associate each man with a certain time. As it stands he will ‘imagine the sun taking 
the same course through the sky as he saw on the preceding day’ and at the thought 
of  Peter will relate Paul and Simon to a future time.29 At the thought of  Simon, 
however, he will relate Peter and Paul to a past time. But if  on another day he sees 
James instead of  Simon in the evening, then the following day his imagination will 
‘vacillate’ and he will ‘imagine now this one, now that one, with the future evening 
time’.30 In other words, ‘he will regard neither of  them as certainly future, but both 
of  them as contingently future’.31 Nor is this natural tendency limited to thinking in 
terms of  the past or future, but applies to reckonings about spatially or temporally 
distant occurrences generally. Equally illustrative of  the errant tendency of  our 
imaginative faculties are the associations formed with other ideas in our memory: 
For example, a soldier, having seen traces of  a horse in the sand, will 
immediately pass from the thought of  a horse to the thought of  a horseman, 
and from that to the thought of  war, etc. But a Farmer will pass from the 
thought of  a horse to the thought of  a plough, and then to that of  a field, etc. 
And so each one, according as he has been accustomed to join and connect 
images of  things in this or that way, will pass from one thought to another.32 
On the other hand, since the ‘necessity of  things is the very necessity of  God’s 
eternal nature’, the result that cognition of  the second and third kinds perceives 
things ‘as they are in themselves... [and thus] as necessary’, amounts to the view that 
these forms of  cognition ‘perceive things under a certain species of  eternity’.33 It 
                                                          
28 Ibid. 2p44dem. 
29 Ibid. 2p44s. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 2p18s. 
33 Ibid. 2p44c2dem, 2p44c2, 5p31dem. 
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follows that a conception of  things sub specie æternitatis consists in conceiving things 
under the aspect of  their necessary existence, that is, insofar as they are understood 
to be expressions of  God’s nature. Just what this ‘aspect of  necessary existence’ 
means, I will come back to. For it will not be possible to reduce ‘necessary existence’ 
to ‘extrinsic denominations, relations, or... circumstances’, parameters that can only 
be taken to structure reality as it is conceived sub specie durationis, and ‘which are far 
from the inmost essence of  things’.34 Therefore, necessary existence will have to be 
understood according to a very specific sense of  determination - not a determination 
of  an entity transitively determined by another, but a determination flowing from 
within ‘the fixed and eternal things, and at the same time from the laws inscribed in 
these things, as in their true codes, according to which all singular things come to be, 
and are ordered’ - a sense of  determination that Spinoza will, in the Ethics, 
characterise as ‘immanent’. 
 
 
Inferiority of  the first kind of  cognition understood as a deficiency of  freedom 
 
Having set out a preliminary map of  the connections between Spinoza’s cognitive 
hierarchy and the two species of  duration and eternity, I will now turn to look more 
closely at each individual rank in the hierarchy. In particular, why is it that cognition 
of  the first kind, opinio or imaginatio, should be the source of  ‘all those ideas which 
are inadequate and confused’ and ‘the only cause of  falsity’, while cognition of  either 
the second or third kinds is ‘necessarily true’?35 An explanation often given for this 
divergence between the different kinds of  cognition is that Spinoza regarded the 
sensory quality of  the first kind of  cognition to unavoidably involve the illusion of  
mere surface appearances. Confined to an illusory dance of  shadows, it is hopelessly 
incapable of  penetrating into the immutable essence or inner nature of  things, which 
is where the truth of  things lies. This familiar ‘rationalist’ reading of  Spinoza has an 
element of  truth in it, but it is misleading in where it locates the crucial point of  
difference between the different kinds of  cognition. It is also a reading that tends to 
undermine the collaboration and interaction that takes place among the different 
kinds of  cognition, all of  which together serve the shared aim of  adequately 
                                                          
34 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §101. 
35 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p41, 2p41dem. 
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perceiving the world. In order to separate out the element of  truth from what is 
misleading in this reading, it will be helpful to present it in more detail. 
The reading in question often emphasises Spinoza’s apparent invective for the 
first kind of  cognition, exemplified in his description of  it as merely ‘random 
experience [experientia vaga]’, a troublesome source of  perception that is ‘mutilated, 
confused and without order [mutilate, confuse et sine ordine]’.36 In this way he is 
presented as heir to Plato’s valuation of  the intellectual as more truthful or real than 
the sensory, as expressed by Socrates in the Phædo: 
He too has been captive. But philosophy has spoken to him, and he has heard 
her voice; she has gently entreated him, and brought him out of  the ‘miry clay’, 
and purged away the mists of  passion and the illusion of  sense which envelop 
him; his soul has escaped from the influence of  pleasure and pains, which are 
like nails fastening her to the body.37 
Socrates explains to his interlocutors that ‘all who apply themselves to the study of  
philosophy aright are… engaged in nothing else than in studying the art of  dying and 
death’, for in turning away from the illusion and captivity of  the body, the soul is 
preparing itself  for a purely intellectual existence after the death of  the body, just as 
it existed before birth.38 Not coincidentally, Spinoza’s more immediate precedent, 
Descartes, combined a similar disparagement of  the sensory and bodily with the 
hope of  a future life for the soul after it departs from its corporeal prison. But this 
cannot have been Spinoza’s position. In light of  the parallelism explored in the 
previous chapter, each mode of  thought, or idea, is correlated with a mode of  
extension, or bodily aspect, and in an important sense, these two modes are ‘one and 
the same’. The Platonic, and Cartesian, notion of  a ‘purely intellectual’ idea, 
separated from the body, is rejected on this account. Spinoza does not seem to be 
distinguishing between kinds of  ideas, even though he is distinguishing between the 
kinds of  cognition of  ideas. The ideas, or objective essences, of  things are what they 
are, and in grasping one of  them in virtue of  an idea formally existing within one’s 
mind, one does so more or less successfully. A ‘merely’ sensory apprehension of  an 
idea would remain precariously partial, but it would not be made redundant or 
invalidated by an increase in one’s grasp of  that idea through an active use of  one’s 
rational faculties. Thus, the notion that Spinoza split ideas into two fundamentally 
                                                          
36 Ibid. 2p40s2. 
37 Plato, Phædo, in The Dialogues of  Plato, vol. I, trans. Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1952), 83. 
38 Ibid. 64. 
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distinct categories, the sensory and the intellectual, cannot be entirely correct.39 
Hobbes and Gassendi had each objected to Descartes categorising ‘perceptions’ in 
this way, complaining that philosophical reasoning cannot be substantially different 
in kind from what takes place in the imagination. Rather, it consists of  those same 
ideas, only ordered in a certain ratiocinative way.40 
Spinoza steers a middle course between Descartes and his critics. He does not 
recoil from the opposition between the sensory and the intellectual to a kind of  
‘empiricism’, such that ideas are all sensory and rationality consists only in the way 
that they are ordered. This insight is indeed incorporated in his account, under the 
category of  ratio, which concerns the ordering of  ideas, but he also crucially includes 
a dimension in which one’s grasp of  an individual objective essence, or idea, can 
itself  be enriched through a more penetrating perception of  its nature. Contrary to 
the reading under consideration, it does not seem correct to attribute to Spinoza a 
dualism between sensory and intellectual ideas. It is not the ideas themselves that 
should be divided in this way, but rather the various ways in which someone grasps 
and organises the ideas. To return to the sun example, someone might begin with a 
(re-)presentation of  the sun furnished by his or her perception of  it, an idea that can 
at this stage be no more than a partial apprehension of  its true nature. As noted 
above, this is in some sense a precarious stage in a person’s awareness of  the sun, 
since his or her imagination might inadvertently ‘wander’ on to any number of  
involuntary associations engendered by the experience, which could lead him or her 
to misjudge the case. On the other hand, a person may come to appreciate more 
about the nature of  the sun through learning certain astronomical truths that are 
expressed in the sun’s existence. In doing so, however, the original idea of  the sun 
will not be replaced by a better, purely intellectual, idea, but will simply be grasped 
more fully by that person. Because the objective essence of  the sun belongs to the 
sun itself, and is publicly available to everyone, the question is not whether an idea 
that is privately formed by someone is sensory or intellectual, but rather how much 
                                                          
39 Gary Hatfield, for example, includes Spinoza among those ‘post-Cartesian rationalists of  the 
seventeenth-century... [who] shared a core position on the cognitive faculties, which underlies their 
grouping as “rationalists”’.  He attributes to him a division among ideas: ‘sensory ideas are simply one 
sort of  idea found in the idea that constitutes the human mind - the sort that have as a bodily 
counterpart some activity in the liquid and soft parts of  the body... whose current state... is partly 
caused by external objects’, to be contrasted with ‘purely intellectual ideas’. Gary Hatfield, ‘The Cognitive 
Faculties’, in The Cambridge History of  Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, vol. II (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), pp. 997-8, emphasis added. 
40 Descartes, Meditations, ‘Third Set of  Objections’, p. 125, AT VII.178; Ibid. ‘Fifth Set of  
Objections’, p. 186, AT VII.266-7. 
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of  the objective essence of  the sun is grasped by a given person. In augmenting 
one’s awareness of  the nature of  the sun, one can then see the sun in a cognitively 
enriched way. So the sensory and the intellectual are not opposed, even if  they are at 
times ‘out of  joint’. The interplay between the experiential and the intellectual is 
most evident in the case of  scientia intuitiva, which, in addition to the experience of  
immediately ‘seeing’ or grasping something, is also suffused with the intense 
experience of  ‘intellectual love [amor intellectualis]’. 
The truth in the reading under consideration is that Spinoza did inherit elements 
of  a tradition that could be broadly labelled as ‘rationalist’. Like Plato and many after 
him, Spinoza was moved to provide a hierarchical valuation of  distinct forms of  
cognition, and he reserved the pride of  place in his hierarchy for an inherently 
intellectual form of  cognition.41 But the reading in question glosses all too quickly 
over what Spinoza himself  actually says about the different kinds of  cognition. It 
ignores the inclusion of  the deliverances of  ‘hearsay’ and ‘report’ within the first 
kind of  cognition, neither of  which seem obviously reducible to sensory perception 
or the ‘dance of  shadows’ in the imagination. Because his conception of  cognition is 
based on a perceptual model, and experiential across the board in perhaps an even 
stronger sense than that held by previous ‘rationalist’ philosophers, the distinctive 
feature of  experientia vaga cannot be simply that it is a kind of  experience (experientia). 
Rather, it must be that the experience involved is specifically of  a ‘wandering [vaga]’, 
or, as many have rendered the Latin, ‘random’, kind. Experience per se need not imply 
a hopelessly degenerate mode of  cognition, even if  that experience is sensory 
experience. On the contrary, it has been convincingly shown by Moreau that Spinoza 
did not reduce experientia to experientia vaga.42 Indeed, ‘one of  the strongest reasons 
why commentators have not been interested in experience’, as it figures in Spinoza’s 
philosophy, ‘is without doubt its reduction to experientia vaga’.43 
So the defining feature of  the first kind of  cognition, when it comes from 
experience, is just that it is in some sense ‘errant’ or ‘random’. This explains what it 
has in common with cognition arising from ‘hearsay’ or ‘report’, an affiliation that 
may otherwise seem arbitrary. For in each case the person in question is blindly and 
                                                          
41 I follow Maria Rosa Antognazza’s history of  the rationalist tradition, which, as far as such a broad 
term goes, can be shown to consist in a debt to certain key strands of  Plato’s thought. Maria Rosa 
Antognazza, ‘Rationalism’, in The Oxford Handbook of  the History of  Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 312-36. 
42 Moreau, Spinoza, p. 245 and passim. 
43 Ibid. 
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uncritically following what is suggested to him or her by a ‘random’ outside source in 
a whimsical (and potentially wayward) way. Cognition from experience, when 
defective, resembles a naïve trust in the reports of  others, in unquestioningly 
accepting the way that surface appearances ‘suggest’ things to be, and, conversely, 
cognition from report resembles that from experience in gullibly accepting whatever 
one hears in the reports of  others, as if  through an unguarded sense (often, literally, 
through the sense of  hearing). In both cases, what is problematic is not the 
experiential quality of  the cognition, but the capricious and whimsical way in which 
one is led to view things without subjecting one’s ideas to any critical scrutiny. This 
naïve submission to the ‘random’ influence of  hearsay or anecdotal experience is - 
not coincidentally - parallel to our submission to our own passions, amidst which, 
‘like waves on the sea, driven by contrary winds, we toss about, not knowing our 
outcome and fate’.44 For in fact this is the psychological aspect of  the same condition 
of  passivity, as is clear from Spinoza’s definition of  a ‘passion’, that is, an ‘affect’ of  
which we are not the ‘adequate cause’, but which is the effect of  something outside 
ourselves, in conjunction with ourselves as only a ‘partial cause’.45 ‘[I]nsofar as the 
Mind has inadequate ideas, it necessarily undergoes certain things’, and ‘it follows 
that the Mind is more liable to passions the more it has inadequate ideas’.46 The 
passivity (and lack of  freedom) at the heart of  both the cognitively wayward and the 
emotionally turbulent life, has been nicely put by Susan James: 
This constellation of  interconnected states - being acted on, possessing 
inadequate ideas, experiencing affects or passions, being unfree - maps the 
limited and vulnerable condition that is basically ours. But Spinoza juxtaposes 
it with a contrasting state of  being which serves to define human liberty.47 
This, then, is the crucial point of  difference between the first kind of  cognition 
and those higher than it in Spinoza’s hierarchy. That is, what constitutes cognition of  
the first kind, when it has yet to be enfolded by the higher kinds, is its unfiltered 
delivery of  information from outside oneself, either from the verbal reports of  
others or from the impressions received through the senses. The power of  ‘report’ 
or ‘hearsay’ to sway the beliefs and superstitions of  people was indeed a concern 
close to Spinoza’s heart. He was deeply troubled by how easily a crowd of  people 
                                                          
44 Spinoza, Ethics, 3p59s. 
45 Ibid. 3def3. 
46 Ibid. 3p1, 3p1c. 
47 Susan James, ‘Power and Difference: Spinoza’s Conception of  Freedom’, Journal of  Political 
Philosophy, 4, no. 3 (1996) p. 215. 
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could be won over to a certain belief  or passion through rhetoric or spectacle. 
Denounced as heretical for questioning the blindly accepted authority of  self-serving 
theologians and clergy, his polemic was no less directed at the manipulation of  the 
multitude by a well-practised orator or politician. It is through such manipulation 
that a murderous mob would be incited by Orangists to kill Spinoza’s fellow 
republicans, the de Witt brothers.48 But the source of  external influence need not be 
as sinister as this to be misleading, and may not involve any conscious contrivance at 
all, as in the more general case of  the whimsical associations formed in the memory, 
or in being led by these associations to vacillate in regarding one or another thing as 
certain, and so ending up conceiving things as inherently contingent. 
 
 
Activity of  mind and resulting ‘noetic union’ 
 
If  passivity is the hallmark of  the more precarious forms of  cognition grouped into 
the first category, then activity must be the hallmark of  those more reliable and 
truthful forms that belong to the second and third categories. This is indeed borne 
out in the text. The cognition that one has when ‘the essence of  a thing is inferred 
from another thing’ is faithful to the essential connections within nature itself, but, 
consisting in one or more inferences, it is essentially an act of  the mind. Again, I 
follow James’ reading: 
Spinoza holds that when we make inferences from one adequate idea to 
another, we act. In acting, the mind exercises a capacity to generate ideas out 
of  itself… When we think independently by initiating our own thoughts, 
“something in us or outside us follows from our own nature and can be clearly 
understood through it alone”.49 
In taking an active role in linking these ideas together, the intellect appeals to the 
interconnected essences of  things themselves. Freely joining ideas together in this 
way, the true order of  nature can be preserved, according to which the knowledge of  
an effect is to be grasped through knowledge of  its cause, and not the other way 
around, as is liable to happen in the case of  a wandering imagination.50 For the 
                                                          
48 Herbert H. Rowen, John de Witt, Grand Pensionary of  Holland, 1625-1672 (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1978), pp. 861-84. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Spinoza, Ethics, 1a4. 
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arbitrary associations of  the imagination are not guaranteed to reflect the true order 
of  nature, and in fact are prone to reflect more the point of  view from which it has 
been conditioned, as illustrated by the example of  the soldier and the farmer quoted 
above. 
But certain ideas are given a more grounding or foundational status. In the Ethics, 
these ideas are called the ‘common notions [notiones communis]’, and are said to 
provide ‘the foundations of  our reasoning’.51 An idea of  this kind, which is of  
‘something which is common to all bodies, and which is equally in the part of  each 
body and in the whole... can only be conceived adequately’, because it ‘will 
necessarily be adequate in God, both insofar as he has the idea of  the human Body’, 
i.e., the mind, ‘and insofar as he has ideas of  its affections’, i.e., the mind’s 
perceptions of  external bodies.52 
From this it follows that there are certain ideas, or notions, common to all men. 
For (by l2) all bodies agree in certain things, which (by p38) must be perceived 
adequately, or clearly and distinctly, by all.53 
From this foundation, the intellect is in a position to make inferences to other ideas, 
which, preserving the adequacy of  the common notions from which they are 
inferred, are themselves adequate: 
For when we say that an idea in the human Mind follows from ideas that are 
adequate in it, we are saying nothing but that (by p11c) in the Divine intellect 
there is an idea of  which God is the cause, not insofar as he is infinite… but 
insofar as he constitutes only the essence of  the human Mind.54 
Adequate cognition of  the common notions, and of  the ideas inferred from them, is 
therefore in both cases credited to the self-determination of  the mind in question, or 
to its acting as an ‘adequate cause’. Common notions, being ‘adequate in God insofar 
as he constitutes the human Mind, or insofar as he has ideas that are in the human 
Mind’, are actively and adequately conceived by that mind, whether it is considered 
qua ‘part of  the infinite intellect of  God’ or qua finite human mind, and ideas 
inferred in turn from common notions are even more clearly an achievement of  the 
mind the question. These two ingredients of  adequate cognition are grouped 
together into the ‘second kind of  cognition’, called ‘reason [ratio]’. 
                                                          
51 Ibid. 2p40s1. 
52 Ibid. 2p38dem. 
53 Ibid. 2p38c. 
54 Ibid. 2p40dem. 
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From this perspective on the nature of  ratio, two important points are worth 
noting. Firstly, it can be appreciated why an idea’s adequacy is intimately bound up 
with its activity, and, conversely, why an idea’s inadequacy involves a degree of  
passivity, relative to the finite human mind in question. With respect to God’s mind, 
which is made up of  the totality of  ideas, all ideas are adequate and true. But when 
the reference point becomes an individual human mind, which is only a certain 
(complex) mode of  that universal mind, the question arises for each idea perceived 
by that mind whether it is grasped in its entirety, or whether it is grasped only 
partially. Whereas adequate ideas are grasped exclusively through an activity of  the 
mind that perceives them, inadequate ideas depend only partially on the mind that 
perceives them, and owe their existence partly to a mode of  thought outside that 
constituting the individual mind. Secondly, when ideas are adequate in an individual 
human mind, for Spinoza, they are identical to the ideas in God’s mind. Inadequate 
ideas, on the other hand, consist in no more than a partial or jumbled (‘mutilated or 
confused’) grasp of  the ideas in God’s mind. For it follows from the fact that a 
human mind is the idea of  a human body that ‘the human Mind is a part of  the 
infinite intellect of  God’.55 
Therefore, when we say that the human Mind perceives this or that, we are 
saying nothing but that God, not insofar [quatenus] as he is infinite, but insofar 
[quatenus] as he is explained through the nature of  the human Mind, or insofar 
[quatenus] as he constitutes the essence of  the human Mind, has this or that 
idea; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not only insofar [quatenus] 
as he constitutes the nature of  the human Mind, but insofar as he also has the 
idea of  another thing together with the human Mind, then we say that the 
human Mind perceives the thing only partially, or inadequately.56 
Crucial to Spinoza’s account here is the work being done by the adverb ‘quatenus’. 
This adverb invites a change of  perspective, either to that of  God, that of  a human 
mind, or even that of  a human mind together with another mode of  thought outside 
it. From ‘God’s perspective’ all ideas are adequate and true, but from the perspective 
of  a human mind, only some ideas are adequate (in which case, they are identical to 
God’s ideas as well as the ideas of  anyone else who perceives them adequately). 
However, there are many ideas that, from the perspective of  a particular human 
mind, are known only partially. In this case, the unknown part of  these ideas is ‘cut 
off  [mutilate]’ from the human mind in question, and consists partly in the existence 
                                                          
55 Ibid. 2p11c. 
56 Ibid. 
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of  modes of  thought outside that mind. Therefore, owing to the parallelism of  the 
attributes, there is for Spinoza a literal sense of  a ‘noetic union’ between knower and 
known when ideas are adequate in a knower’s mind. 
It is this identity between our ideas and the ideas in God’s mind that Spinoza 
refers to in the Short Treatise: 
All the effects of  the intellect which are united with him are the most 
excellent, and must be valued above all others. For because they are internal 
effects, they are the most excellent of  all; moreover, they must also be eternal, 
for their cause is eternal.57 
These ‘internal effects’ are the fruits of  the mind’s own activity, expressed from 
‘within’. In becoming conscious of  this noetic union with that which is known, one 
understands oneself  under the same species of  eternity under which one knows the 
thing in question. For this reason, the ‘power of  conceiving things under a species of  
eternity pertains to the Mind only insofar as it conceives the Body’s essence under a 
species of  eternity’, that is, insofar as it conceives itself under this species of  eternity.58 
There is thus a reciprocal relationship between conceiving things under a species of  
eternity and conceiving oneself  under that same species. 
 
 
Scientia intuitiva, intellectual love and the eternity of  the mind 
 
But if  the second kind of  cognition is, through an activity of  mind, ‘necessarily true’, 
and therefore framed under a species of  eternity in a way that involves the eternity 
of  the mind, then on what basis does Spinoza differentiate the third kind of  
cognition? In virtue of  what is the third kind of  cognition, scientia intuitiva, more 
intimately involved in the ‘intellectual love of  God [amor intellectualis dei]’ and the 
eternity of  the mind? Spinoza explains that, from the ‘third kind of  knowledge… 
there arises the greatest satisfaction of  Mind there can be (by p27), i.e. (by def. aff. 
xxv), Joy… accompanied by the idea of  God, as its cause’, which is ‘what I call 
intellectual love of  God’:59 
                                                          
57 Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, p. 148.  
58 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p29. 
59 Ibid. 5p32dem, 5p32c. 
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Next, because (by p27) the highest satisfaction there can be arises from the 
third kind of  knowledge [ex tertio cognitionis], it follows from this that the 
human Mind can be of  such a nature that the part of  the Mind which we have 
shown perishes with the body (see p21) is of  no moment in relation to what 
remains.60 
Although the second kind of  cognition is capable of  engendering a ‘Striving, or 
Desire, to know things by the third kind of  knowledge’, it is only the third kind of  
knowledge that involves this intellectual love of  God, the joy of  which has the effect 
of  reducing the gravitas of  one’s bodily demise to ‘no moment’.61 In order to explain 
why these special implications should follow from the third, but not the second, kind 
of  cognition, it is necessary to appreciate the epistemological and ontological 
differences between them.  
Although the second kind of  cognition furnishes the mind with adequate ideas, 
which are ‘necessarily true’, it does so by following a sequence of  ratiocinative steps 
that depends for its overall epistemic success on the truth of  each constituent step in 
the sequence. There is thus a priority in grasping each of  these individual steps, 
without which there could be no ratio that strings them together. In the case of  ratio, 
one is capable of  providing grounds or reasons for each constituent step of  
reasoning by pointing to that which immediately precedes it in the deductive chain. 
But in response to why each step should follow from that before, there can be no 
more justification than that it simply does. It must simply be ‘seen’ to do so. This 
bedrock of  intelligibility therefore has to be grasped in a primitive way that is not 
amenable to further explication (at least by anything other than itself), because it is 
that which ultimately explains everything else. This is, for example, the kind of  
cognition that we have of  the proportionality ‘in the simplest numbers’: Given ‘the 
numbers 1, 2, and 3, no one fails to see that the fourth proportional number is 6’, a 
relation ‘which, in one glance, we see the first number to have to the second’.62 It is 
perhaps this that Spinoza meant by scientia intuitiva, the third kind of  cognition, which 
should therefore not be thought of  as a stage to which one proceeds after having 
acquired cognition of  the second kind, but rather as a kind of  cognition that is 
already implicated, and indeed on which there is a dependence, in the ‘lower’ kinds 
of  cognition. This offers an explanation for something that has bothered many 
commentators, namely the apparent absence of  any indication of  how the third kind 
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62 Ibid. 2p40s2. 
  127 
of  knowledge might be acquired. For they have no doubt thought this to be 
problematic because they have thought of  this kind of  cognition as something 
achieved at some later stage than that of  the second kind. 
At this point, it is helpful to remember that Spinoza’s central idea is that God or 
Nature is the single active principle unifying the totality of  things into an individual 
substance. For this is really the metaphysical - and ‘theological’ - aspect of  the 
epistemological point that has just been made. Like Aquinas, Spinoza understands 
the highest form of  cognition - a kind of  ‘intuition’ - to be the closest one can come 
to God. He takes the kind of  transitive explicability constitutive of  ratio to be 
dependent on intelligibility itself. But he also differs radically from Aquinas’ more 
orthodox position in taking this principle of  intelligibility to be the very activity of  
God, not as a transcendent, unexplained explainer, but as the immanent and 
unfolding rationality in Nature itself. Thus, for Spinoza, God or Nature, under its 
cognitive aspect, i.e. the attribute of  thought, is intelligibility itself. Considered qua 
natura naturata, this invites an explanation of  the existence of  things in terms of  their 
essence, which links them together in virtue of  a shared participation in the same 
‘logical space’. Considered qua natura naturans, it invites an understanding of  things as 
active and expressive, in virtue of  that very same essence. The backward, 
explanatory, perspective, on the one hand, and the forward, emanative, perspective, 
on the other, are simply alternative ways of  considering the same principle of  
intelligibility, insofar (quatenus) as one considers it from one point of  view or the 
other. So when an individual human mind successfully grasps something in the clear 
and immediate way of  scientia intuitiva, the resulting noetic union is with something 
far deeper than just some piece of  the divine whole, some fragment of  God or 
Nature qua natura naturata. It is a union with the all-unifying principle of  intelligibility 
and activity itself. Combined with a conscious awareness of  this union and the 
resulting sense of  one’s own eternity, this fills the knower with a sense of  reverence 
for the whole with which, however briefly, one identifies.63 That sense of  delight is 
the intellectual love engendered by the third kind of  knowledge, and it represents for 
Spinoza the highest fulfilment of  human nature.64 
                                                          
63 See, also, De Dijn, ‘Spinoza on Knowledge and Religion’. 
64 Albert Einstein, whom I quoted at the head of  this chapter, was once asked if  he believed in 
God. He replied, ‘I believe in Spinoza’s God, who reveals himself  in the harmony of  all that exists’. 
(Reported in the The New York Times, 25 April 1929). On another occasion, he described the sense of  
delight in grasping the more sublime workings of  the universe as a ‘cosmic religious feeling’, and ‘the 
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To know something under a species of  eternity is to grasp its existence as 
determined from within, as an immanent (as opposed to a transitive) expression of  
the inherent power of  God or Nature. Cognition sub specie æternitatis is literally, for 
Spinoza, to see the divinity in a thing’s existence, with cognition of  the third kind 
being a more fundamental grasp of  this divine quality than cognition of  the second 
kind, which, in fact, depends on that more fundamental cognition. Seeing a thing 
under this divine aspect insofar as it expresses its own true nature is thus what 
Spinoza means in his somewhat more recondite definition of  scientia intuitiva: ‘this 
kind of  cognition proceeds from an adequate idea of  the formal essence of  certain 
attributes of  God to the adequate knowledge of  the [NS: formal] essence of  
things’.65 Being ‘tuned in’ to God’s attributes, as we are in the case of  extension and 
thought, we are capable of  those flashes of  intellectual intuition in which we see that 
nature expressed through the self-determining nature of  something expressed 
through the attributes. But in grasping the expression of  a thing’s nature in this way, 
we too are exercising our innermost nature as rational creatures, in such a way that 
our nature in a sense aligns with the nature of  that which is known, jointly 
amounting to ‘God’s eternal and infinite intellect’.66 In doing so, we ourselves express 
the necessity of  God’s eternal nature, and can be said to exist under that same aspect 
of  necessity, which Spinoza calls ‘a certain species of  eternity’. 
This explains why, for Spinoza, the more we know things through the third kind 
of  cognition, the more our mind partakes of  eternity, since eternity is necessary 
existence understood, not as determined by a transitive cause, but as self-determined 
from within, as the immanent expression of  the nature of  the thing in question, 
which is also an expression of  God’s nature. Eternity, for Spinoza, is thus really a 
kind of  freedom, that is, a kind of  self-determination. It can also now be appreciated 
why Spinoza elaborated a specifically mind-based eternity in Ethics V, since it is 
ultimately the mind, and in particular the intellect, through which human nature is 
most fully expressed and so also that through which we are at our most free. As 
noted above, the quality of  existence Spinoza calls the ‘eternity of  the mind’ is also 
deeply experiential, informed by an ‘intellectual love’ for the unifying activity and 
intelligibility of  Nature, and appreciated reflectively through an intellectual insight of  
                                                                                                                                                              
strongest and noblest incitement to scientific research’. Albert Einstein, Ideas and Opinions, ed. Carl 
Seelig (New York: Crown Publishers, 1954), p. 38 and passim. 
65 Ibid. 2p40s2. 
66 Ibid. 5p40s. 
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the mind which is itself  a form of  ‘perception’: ‘we feel and know by experience that we 
are eternal [sentimus experimurque nos æternos esse]. For the Mind feels those things that it 
conceives in understanding no less than those it has in the memory. For the eyes of  





                                                          
67 Ibid. 5p23s, emphasis added. A similar passage appears in the Theological-Political Treatise: ‘In the 
case of  things invisible which are objects only of  the mind, proofs are the only eyes by which they can 
be seen.’ Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 13, p. 155. 









The survey of  literature in Chapter 1 highlighted the great diversity of  approaches, 
and the ingenuity, with which Spinoza’s notion of  the ‘eternity of  the mind’ has been 
variously tackled. However, apart from one or two exceptions, there did not seem to 
be any approaches that have looked to his views on freedom in aid of  this goal. I 
mentioned the observation made by Caird in 1888, that ‘Spinoza’s doctrine of  
immortality is, in one point of  view, only another form of  his doctrine of  freedom’, 
as well as Kisner’s more recent suggestion that ‘Spinoza’s notion of  salvation is 
arguably directed at our freedom, for it arises from union with the eternal, divine 
nature and, thus, offers a kind of  liberation from the power of  external forces.’1 
However, both writers were pursuing their own orthogonal direction of  inquiry, 
Caird seemingly interested in casting this aspect of  Spinoza’s thought in a Hegelian, 
dialectical, mould, and Kisner concerned with Spinoza’s views on freedom in all their 
rich complexity. It seems these intriguing hints were set aside to await further 
exploration. The path followed in this dissertation has now furnished an invitation to 
do just this. In Chapter 5, it was seen in what way the higher forms of  cognition, in 
Spinoza’s system, both engender and presuppose the special significance of  the 
eternity of  the mind, and it was found that the defining feature of  these higher 
forms of  cognition lies essentially in a quality of  self-determination, or freedom. In 
the present chapter, this fundamental quality lying at the heart of  both rational self-
mastery and eternal life will be investigated more closely. After responding to an old 
                                                          
1 Caird, Spinoza, p. 287; Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom, p. 1. 
There is a bondage which is worse to bear 
Than his who breathes, by roof, and floor, and wall, 
Pent in, a Tyrant’s solitary Thrall: 
‘Tis his who walks about in the open air, 
One of  a Nation who, henceforth, must wear 
Their fetters in their Souls. 
 
William Wordsworth 
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yet persistent perception that Spinoza was in fact out to deny human freedom, this 
concept will be shown to be, not only one to which he was entitled, but one that in 
fact underlies and unifies the various different aspects that make up a desirable 




Spinoza: enemy or champion of  human freedom? 
 
A familiar way of  characterising Spinoza’s philosophy is to point out that he begins 
with the notion of  substance (which is shown to be equivalent, by his lights, to both 
God and Nature, ‘Deus sive Natura’) and deduces the rest of  his system from this 
starting point.2 This order of  priority is as much a programme for the Ethics to 
follow, as it is a metaphysical claim about the structure of  reality, which after all is the 
‘original’ to be ‘reproduced’: 
[I]t is again evident that for our mind to reproduce completely the likeness of  
Nature, it must bring all of  its ideas forth from that idea which represents the 
source and origin of  the whole of  Nature, so that that idea is also the source 
of  the other ideas.3 
Unfolding in turn, and in ordine geometrico, from this starting point, are his 
metaphysics, psychology, ethics, politics, and his own unique brand of  philosophical 
theology. But it is worth bearing in mind that these links in the chain are successive 
phases of  a single unified work with the title ‘Ethics’. For it speaks of  the rich 
inclusivity in Spinoza’s conception of  ‘the ethical’, as well as of  the overall tenor of  
his philosophical ambitions. So, if  his point of  departure was indeed the 
metaphysical one of  the nature of  substance, then his final destination was the 
inherently ethical one of  human freedom, as confirmed at the culmination of  the 
work in its fifth and final part, ‘which concerns the means, or way, leading to freedom 
[quæ est de modo sive via, quæ ad libertatem ducit]’.4 The particular trajectory followed in 
the work is consciously directed towards this end, as he explains in the preface to 
Ethics II: 
                                                          
2 The general shape of  Spinoza’s metaphysical picture was presented in Chapter 3, though with a 
special focus on the role played by ‘attributes’ and ‘species’. 
3 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §42. 
4 Spinoza, Ethics, 5pref. 
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I pass now to explaining those things which must necessarily follow from the 
essence of  God, or the infinite and eternal Being - not, indeed, all of  them, for 
we have demonstrated (1p16) that infinitely many things must follow from it in 
infinitely many modes, but only those that can lead us, by the hand, as it were, 
to the knowledge of  the human Mind and its highest blessedness [ad Mentis 
humanæ ejusque summæ beatitudinis cognitionem]’.5 
This final destination - ‘Freedom of  Mind, or blessedness [mentis libertas seu beatitudo]’ - 
is the same goal that Spinoza vowed to pursue in the opening passage of  the Treatise 
on the Emendation of  the Intellect, emerging from that existential crisis with a firm 
resolution: 
I came to the conclusion that, if  only I could resolve, wholeheartedly, [to 
change my plan of  life], I would be giving up certain evils for a certain good. 
For I saw that I was in the greatest danger, and that I was forced to seek a 
remedy with all my strength… like a man suffering from a fatal illness, who, 
foreseeing certain death unless he employs a remedy, is forced to seek it, 
however uncertain, with all his strength.6 
But there is a serious justificatory challenge to be met. For the various kinds of  
freedom that Spinoza elaborates appear at first glance to be at odds with each other, 
with little more in common than the name. Even more pressingly, and historically the 
reason why Spinoza has, since his own time, been portrayed as the most 
uncompromising enemy and denier of  human freedom, is the seeming preclusion of  
any such thing by his strict metaphysical determinism. This preclusion is already 
apparently enforced with the definition of  freedom stipulated at the outset of  the 
Ethics, in which the extension of  the concept is strictly circumscribed: ‘That thing is 
called free which exists from the necessity of  its nature alone, and is determined to 
act by itself  alone’.7 From this definition, it seems clear that human beings could not 
possibly meet the strict conditions necessary to qualify as truly free, since we are 
clearly not the cause of  our own existence (causa sui), any more than we are the sole 
cause of  our actions, being only finite inhabitants of  a vast natural order, adrift in a 




                                                          
5 Ibid. 2pref. 
6 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §7. 
7 Spinoza, Ethics, 1def7. 
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Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate 
existence, can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is 
determined to exist and produce an effect by another cause, which is also finite 
and has a determinate existence; and again, this cause also can neither exist nor 
be determined to produce an effect unless it is determined to exist and 
produce an effect by another, which is also finite and has a determinate 
existence, and so on, to infinity.8 
To imagine that we are free is a delusion resulting from the feeling that we are 
somehow exempt from this infinite natural series. It is one of  the great myths that 
we are somehow exempt from this status, a kind of  ‘dominion within a dominion 
[imperium in imperio]’:9 
[M]en think themselves free, because they are conscious of  their volitions and 
their appetite, and do not think, even in their dreams, of  the causes by which 
they are disposed to wanting and willing, because they are ignorant [of  those 
causes].10 
The only being that truly is causa sui, and determined to act by its nature alone, is 
God or Nature. So it follows that ‘God alone is a free cause’.11 The freedom we 
imagine ourselves to have is unfortunately only a mirage in a desert of  fortune-swept 
dunes. 
Having spurned the notion of  ‘free will’, so integral to the prevailing Judaeo-
Christian conception of  agency and culpability, it is no wonder that Spinoza should 
have earned a lasting reputation as a dangerous and heretical denier of  human 
freedom.12 But if  he was as unforgiving as this reputation suggests, then what is to 
be made of  the positive pronouncements on human freedom scattered throughout 
his writings? Are we to temper his rhapsodic musings on ‘the free man’, his almost 
spiritual reverence for a certain ‘Freedom of  Mind, or blessedness’, and his 
courageous defence of  a libertas philosophandi with the proviso that, in the last analysis, 
each of  these is only an illusion?13 In addition to this apparent conflict between 
Spinoza’s metaphysical determinism and his positive account of  these forms of  
                                                          
8 Ibid. 1p28. 
9 Ibid. 3pref. 
10 Ibid. 1app. 
11 Ibid. 1p17c. 
12 One of  Spinoza’s earliest biographers, Johannes Colerus, denounced his determinism and its 
apparently detrimental implications for freedom. As David Bell remarks, ‘Colerus immediately brands 
Spinoza’s determinism as pernicious’, because a ‘denial of  absolute freedom was taken to be 
equivalent to a doctrine of  “blind necessity” or fatalism which rendered vice and virtue, as well as 
human effort, meaningless’. Bell, Spinoza in Germany, p. 4. 
13 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p66s and passim; Ibid. 5pref.; Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, title page and 
passim. 
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human freedom, is the question of  the relations among these various forms 
themselves. This latter question points to a tension potentially even more fractious 
than the other. After all, Spinoza was adamant that the freedom enjoyed by the 
ethically accomplished ‘free man’ will be the prize of  only a rare few, since ‘all things 
excellent are as difficult as they are rare’, whereas the libertas philosophandi advocated 
in his political writings is clearly meant as a right to be enjoyed equally by all, by the 
‘multitude’ no less than the lucky few who have mastered their passions, for ‘in a free 
commonwealth every man may think as he pleases, and say what he thinks’.14 These 
twin demands of  theoretical consistency present any account of  Spinoza’s 
philosophy of  freedom with an important justificatory task, but one that is all the 
more urgent for a dissertation in which this concept is to play so crucial a role in the 
interpretation of  the ‘eternity of  the mind’ beginning to come into view. 
 
 
The unity in Spinoza’s freedom(s) 
 
Far from contradicting any genuine sense of  human freedom, as many have 
complained, the definition of  freedom at (1def7) is in fact the expression, in 
metaphysical terms, of  what ultimately underlies and unifies all of  Spinoza’s various 
forms of  freedom.15 James has noted ‘the republican antecedents of  his analysis of  
freedom’, and that ‘the conception of  liberty we have found rooted in his 
metaphysics is also central to his political philosophy’.16 Appreciating the former is 
the key to explaining the latter. For Spinoza’s own development, both personally and 
intellectually, was informed by a deep aversion to any form of  oppressive or 
tyrannical regime, preferring instead the principles of  rational statecraft and 
meritocratic government that had coalesced in the republican tradition. This 
becomes especially salient in the light of  two key historical factors. The first 
concerns the nature of  the historical circumstances in which Spinoza wrote, and 
                                                          
14 Spinoza, Ethics, p42s; Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 20, p. 222. 
15 In the following attempt to uncover a shared affinity among Spinoza’s various remarks on human 
freedom, I am indebted to James’ illuminating work on the topic. See, for example, James, ‘Power and 
Difference’. I should mention that the value of  this article extends beyond the specifically 
interpretative point that I am trying to make, speaking as it does to, among other things, the important 
debate around the possibility of  a ‘politics of  difference’. See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics 
of  Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
16 Ibid. p. 209, note 4; p. 226. 
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particularly the political and religious conflict that had plagued Europe for centuries. 
The second concerns the nature of  Spinoza’s own education and intellectual 
development, and particularly the influence on his thought of  certain writers of  
classical antiquity. I will address these two factors in turn. 
Before the Asturian campaign to reclaim territory in the Iberian Peninsula, at a 
time when the Islamic state of  Al-Andalus had reached its peak in the eighth century 
(extending as far north as Provence), people in the region enjoyed a period of  
relative tolerance and stability, in which a ‘golden age’ of  Jewish culture could begin 
to flourish.17 But it is clear from two surviving chronicles of  the period that the 
wider geopolitical struggle had been invested with a decidedly religious and 
ideological significance.18 The ‘Reconquista’ that ensued over the following centuries 
was spurred on by this antagonism of  religious affiliation, with strict and 
fundamentalist tendencies flaring up on both sides of  the conflict. Spinoza’s 
Sephardi ancestors, who until the thirteenth century had prospered under relatively 
tolerant conditions, began to suffer increasingly harsh treatment during this polarised 
clash between Christianity and Islam, each seeking to assert its own strict authority 
over those in its domain. This fundamentalism and intolerance mounted, until 
Islamic mobs massacred the Jewish population of  Granada in 1066 and their 
Christian counterparts carried out their own massacres of  Iberian Jews in almost 
every major city in the region in 1391, with half  of  the survivors being compelled to 
convert to Christianity over the following century. This persecution reached its tragic 
peak when Isabella I of  Castile and Ferdinand II of  Aragon issued the ‘Alhambra 
Decree’ in 1492, ordering the expulsion of  all remaining Jews on pain of  death 
without trial, giving the already established Tribunal del Santo Oficio de la Inquisición the 
dreadful appointment for which it would become so feared. The following century 
would of  course usher in the fateful events of  the Reformation, splitting Europe 
into inimical denominational factions and sparking the ‘wars of  religion’ that would 
continue to ravage the continent well into Spinoza’s time. 
Having grown up learning of  the suffering inflicted on his Jewish ancestors under 
the Spanish Inquisition, Spinoza was deeply attuned to the darker tendencies of  an 
oppressive society. He was thankful for the freedom that his people could now enjoy 
in their adopted Amsterdam: 
                                                          
17 See Jonathan Ray, The Sephardic Frontier: The Reconquista and the Jewish Community in Medieval Iberia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). 
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  136 
Take the city of  Amsterdam, which enjoys the fruits of  this freedom, to its 
own considerable prosperity and the admiration of  the world. In this 
flourishing state, a city of  the highest renown, men of  every race and sect live 
in complete harmony.19 
But even in this liberal haven, Spinoza himself  was to experience the vitriol of  
intolerance - and from his own people - when for ‘horrible heresies’ and ‘monstrous 
actions’ he was issued with a famously scathing and irrevocable cherem, effectively 
‘excommunicating’ him from the community in which he had grown up: 
[N]obody should communicate with him orally or in writing, or show him any 
favour, or stay with him under the same roof, or come within four ells of  him, 
or read anything composed or written by him.20 
As it happens, Spinoza claimed to welcome this turn of  events: 
All the better; they do not force me to do anything I would not have done of  
my own accord if  I did not dread scandal; but, since they want it that way, I 
enter gladly on the path that is opened to me, with the consolation that my 
departure will be more innocent than was the exodus of  the early Hebrews 
from Egypt.21 
But even if  he welcomed the prospect of  pursuing a life free of  the constraints 
imposed on him by the rabbis in Amsterdam, he undoubtedly would have felt a deep 
sense of  trepidation, if  not shame, at the severity of  the terms with which he had 
been cast out from among his own brethren. In any case, he need not have 
succumbed to this natural emotion for him to take away from this experience a 
profound appreciation for the value of  religious and political tolerance that the 
fundamental liberty to ‘think as one pleases, and say what one thinks’ stood to 
enshrine. 
Aside from his own personal experience of  exile, he was also keenly aware of  the 
fragility of  the freedom generally enjoyed in ‘this flourishing state’, in light of  the 
extremely delicate theological-political situation. He understood that the celebrated 
tolerance and liberty of  the Dutch Republic were delicate and hard-won privileges, 
not to be taken for granted, but to be protected at all costs from the looming spectre 
of  oppression and tyranny. Recent history made this all too clear. For, as recently as 
the 1610s, there had been a violent illustration of  just how precarious the peace and 
stability of  the young republic really was. The upheaval in question unfolded when 
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the republican statesman Johan van Oldenbarneveldt and the Estates of  Holland 
deemed it necessary to intervene in a religious dispute between the conservative 
Calvinist theologian Franciscus Gomarus and his reforming adversary Jacobus 
Arminius, after the latter and his followers had begun to suffer persecution from the 
Gomarists, who were in the majority. Maurice, Prince of  Orange, seeing the political 
advantage to be gained from the theological rift, sided with the Gomarists and used 
their power in numbers to overthrow Oldenbarneveldt, having him executed and 
reasserting the House of  Orange’s dynastic control over the country.22 From then 
onwards the political situation in the United Provinces would be inextricably bound 
up with questions of  theological affiliation, with an alliance between a strict form of  
Calvinism and the dynastic stadhouders, on the one hand, and a loose affinity between 
religious pluralism and the kind of  republicanism favoured by the more liberal regent 
and mercantile classes, on the other. 
Spinoza and his circle of  freethinkers were well aware of  this recent political 
history, and especially of  the latent and volatile mixture of  religious and political 
opposition. Indeed these concerns, further intensified by the growing hostility 
between ‘Orangists’ and the States party during the war with England in the 1660’s, 
were a principal motivation for writing the Theological-Political Treatise. Animating this 
powerful text is a deep-seated concern with freedom, informed by a close reading of  
the ancients. He and his circle had been introduced to the texts of  authors such as 
Seneca and Cicero under the Latin tutelage of  Franciscus van den Enden, himself  a 
revolutionary activist who would later be executed at the Bastille for plotting to 
overthrow Louis XIV and install a republic in Normandy. Aside from their teacher’s 
radical politics, this course of  study made available to them a rich store of  ancient 
ideas (not least those of  the Stoic tradition), and an appreciation of  the wider 
cultural institutions of  antiquity, such as the civic origins behind the ancient Greek 
notion of  ‘freedom [eleutheria]’. For in ancient Greece the word ‘eleutheria’ was 
originally used in a civic capacity, conferring on an individual the status of  
citizenship. Slaves did not have this kind of  stake in society, so the opposite of  
‘freedom’ simply meant slavery and servitude. Underlying the pair of  terms, ‘slavery’ 
and ‘freedom’ was ultimately the difference between heteronomy, or being under the 
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authority of  another, and autonomy, or being under the authority of  oneself  (such 
that ‘libertas’ could later be defined as ‘sui iuris’ in Justinian’s influential Roman Digest).23 
With this idea of  self-determination behind the originally political distinction 
between ‘slaves’ and ‘citizens’, the Stoics were able to introduce the meaning of  the 
term ‘freedom’ to new contexts. It was observed that, just as being conquered by an 
enemy state could turn a nation of  subjects into a nation of  slaves, so too the 
subjects of  a nation ruled tyrannically could be understood as no better off  than 
slaves, living as they do under the arbitrary power of  another. This idea, in particular, 
would have brought to mind, for Spinoza and his circle, the ominous threat of  
arbitrary subjugation to the House of  Orange.24 But, in addition to these external 
senses of  freedom, there was also a clear application to the life of  the mind. So this 
originally external sense of  freedom from physical tyranny and slavery segued to the 
internal sense of  psychological or spiritual freedom from one’s own passions, or 
from one’s own desires for external, material things. Underlying this - originally 
metaphorical - use of  the term ‘freedom’ is an implicit distinction between one’s 
‘true nature’ and those aspects of  one’s psychology whose effects are like an 
oppressive assault from something outside oneself. While for the Stoics this inner 
form of  freedom was one feature among many enjoyed by the ethically 
accomplished Sage, for Spinoza it was of  such importance that he made it into the 
sobriquet for his counterpart to the Stoic Sage, ‘the free man [homo liber]’.25 But, as 
will emerge in what follows, Spinoza’s ‘free man’ is free, not only in these political 
and psychological senses, but in all the different senses that together make up his 
rich conception of  ‘the ethical’. 
Both the original civic notion of  freedom and the Stoic application of  it to the 
life of  the mind can be clearly discerned as central themes in Spinoza’s thought. 
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Given the historical and political landscape in which he found himself, it becomes 
clear why this essential quality of  self-determination, and especially in its original and 
raw form of  political or civic autonomy, should resonate so deeply with him. This 
was the notion that unified, for the Stoics, both the external, political sense of  
freedom, and the extension of  the term to an inner mastery of  one’s own emotions 
or psychology generally. Spinoza can be read as having endorsed this fundamental 
and unifying conception in his own development and formulation of  what is 
essentially a philosophy of  freedom. This core notion of  self-determination is what 
lies at the heart of  the ethical fulfilment Spinoza advocates, whether this is attained 
through the ‘rebirth’ described in the Short Treatise or through the ongoing conative 
process described in the Ethics. And it is really this notion of  autonomy or self-
determination that one finds expressed in the metaphysical definition that has 
seemed to so many to preclude or problematise human freedom. For that which 
‘exists from the necessity of  its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself  
alone’, is that which, or someone who, can be said to have attained (some measure 
of) autonomy, self-determination, or, in other words, freedom.26 To illustrate the way 
in which this core notion informs each of  Spinoza’s various kinds of  freedom, and 
unifies them into a single condition of  ethical fulfilment, I will now consider some 





Freedom in its epistemic guise was explored in Chapter 5. An epistemically unfree 
person is someone who is not the author, or at least reflective judge, of  his or her 
thoughts. It is the situation of  a person whose cognitive life is ruled by the 
imagination, without the active collaboration of  ratio and scientia intuitiva. This leads 
to an uncritical exposure to the accidental relations among things, which are 
replicated in one’s associative faculties, or to the influence of  ‘hearsay’, or perhaps a 
more sinister source of  (mis-)information. In his own day and since, Spinoza’s brave 
and rebellious stance has always consisted in his defiance of  those who have shored 
up their positions of  power through the promulgation of  narratives justifying their 
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own authority and the subservience of  others. Whether through an entrenched 
mechanism of  religious intolerance, through an absolutist grip on political power, or 
through the more fleet-footed and opportunistic manipulation of  an angry crowd of  
people, Spinoza saw the risk of  epistemic coercion to be a profound danger standing 
in the way of  his ethical quest. 
But, as discussed in Chapter 5, there need be no contrivance at all behind the 
deleterious situation of  epistemic captivity. This is after all the natural tendency of  
the associative faculties in lieu of  being enfolded by the higher, rational ones. Where 
this form of  captivity is at its most insidious is in the spread of  ‘superstition 
[superstitio]’, doubly dangerous when propaganda dealt out by politicians and clerics is 
met with welcome enthusiasm by a gullible public, and especially when it plays on the 
most seductive of  passions, hope and fear: 
We may add to this that these affects show a defect of  knowledge and a lack 
of  power in the Mind… Therefore, the more we strive to live according to the 
guidance of  reason, the more we strive to depend less on Hope, to free 
ourselves from Fear, to conquer fortune as much as we can and to direct our 
actions by the certain counsel of  reason.27 
The passions of  hope and fear tend to be exploited by those in power in order to 
control, and potentially manipulate, an unruly ‘multitude’. For ‘[t]he mob is terrifying, 
if  unafraid’.28 Through the promise of  reward, and, especially, the threat of  
punishment, an unpredictable and impassioned mass of  people will, in their own 
interests, remain with certain boundaries of  self-control. This tool for social 
conditioning is then finally applied on a sublime and cosmic scale, holding out the 
promise of  bliss in the hereafter, or the threat of  fiery torment. Spinoza, in his more 
Machiavellian moments, seemed to acknowledge the utility in this ploy, both in its 
mundane and more cosmic application, but he of  course regarded it as a form of  
captivity to be overcome by those who have it in themselves to do so. 
He or she attains epistemic freedom through the exercise of  an inner capacity for 
active perception, thought and reflection. Spinoza groups these forms of  rational 
activity under the rubric, ‘following the guidance of  reason’, though this metaphor 
may not be the most apt, suggesting as it does an adherence to some outside 
influence (i.e., the ‘guidance’). But, of  course, the ‘guidance of  reason’ issues from 
within, as an immanent expression of  the natural human capacity for adequate 
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knowledge. In expressing this nature, one becomes a ‘free man’, rid of  the shackles 
of  superstition and false dogma. 
[T]he Mind has, not an adequate, but only a confused [NS: and mutilated] 
knowledge, of  itself, of  its own Body, and of  external bodies, so long as it 
perceives things from the common order of  nature [ordo naturæ communis], i.e., 
so long as it is determined externally, from fortuitous encounters with things, to 
regard this or that, and not so long as it is determined internally… For so often as 





Psychological captivity is really the same condition as epistemic captivity, only 
considered under its psychological aspect. Spinoza contrasts the condition of  ‘one 
who is led by reason’, with that of  one ‘who is led only by an affect, or [sive] by 
opinion’.30 This latter person is led by ‘an affect’ to the same extent that he or she is 
led by ‘opinion’. After all, ‘a Passion of  the mind is a confused idea’, because ‘we 
have shown (3p3) that the Mind is acted on only insofar as it has inadequate, or [sive] 
confused ideas’.31 In locating the source of  psychological discord in the effects of  
our own emotions, whose diverse interaction and combination elude any immediate 
or straightforward awareness, Spinoza was endorsing a generally Stoic line of  
thought. But in recommending a process of  bringing the hidden roots of  these 
emotions to light as a possible remedy, he was also anticipating the developments of  
psychoanalysis to follow three centuries later: 
An affect which is a passion is a confused idea (by gen. def. aff.). Therefore, if  
we should form a clear and distinct idea of  the affect itself, this idea will only 
be distinguished by reason from the affect itself… Therefore (by 3p3), the 
affect will cease to be a passion… 
Cor.: The more an affect is known to us, then, the more it is in our power, and 
the less the Mind is acted on by it.32 
It is perhaps unsurprising that this aspect of  Spinoza’s project has received more 
attention than any other, with the very structure of  the Ethics apparently shaped by 
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it. It seems fairly straightforward that the sequence of  the work progresses from a 
necessary grounding in the metaphysics of  substance and the philosophy of  mind in 
Parts I and II, to a general anatomy (or physiology) of  the ‘affects’ in Part III, then 
to an account of  the tendency that they have to hold us in a state of  ‘bondage’ in 
Part IV, culminating in a therapeutic strategy for overcoming this state of  
psychological discord in Part V. In this way, many have interpreted Spinoza’s 
understanding of  ‘the ethical’ along broadly Stoical lines, as concerned with the 
attainment of  a general state of  tranquility (ataraxia) and a kind of  harmony with the 
natural world around one, but some, in doing so, have marginalised, perhaps, the 
more ‘spiritual’ aspects of  his thought, subsuming them under a purely psychological 
or therapeutic project. But although such approaches risk reducing these other 
important aspects of  Spinoza’s ‘ethics’ to the psychological, it is undoubtedly true 
that the attainment of  a calm and harmonious relationship with the world was of  
great importance to him. 
Spinoza articulates this process of  psychological remediation with the language of  
‘bondage [servitute]’ and ‘freedom [libertas]’. But aside from having an intuitively 
plausible ring to it, what are the philosophical grounds for regarding this kind of  
disruption as a form of  ‘bondage’, and its converse, equanimity, as a form of  
‘freedom’? Affects, for Spinoza, are ‘affections of  the Body by which the Body’s 
power of  acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, 
the ideas of  these affections’.33 It is a general category, which includes both ‘actions’ 
and ‘passions’: ‘if  we can be the adequate cause of  any of  these affections, I 
understand by the Affect an action; otherwise, a passion’.34 An ‘adequate’ cause is 
one ‘whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it’, by which 
Spinoza means that the effect issues exclusively from that cause, while a ‘partial, or 
inadequate’ cause is one whose ‘effect cannot be understood through it alone’, 
which, conversely, is to say that the effect depends on more than the partial cause to 
come about.35 
Considered under the attribute of  thought, a passion ‘increases or diminishes, aids 
or restrains, our Mind’s power of  thinking’.36 If  the former, the passion is 
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understood as a ‘joy [lætitia]’, if  the latter, a ‘sadness [tristitia]’.37 Together with ‘desire 
[cupiditas]’, understood as ‘appetite together with consciousness of  the appetite’, i.e. 
that ‘striving [conatus]’ to persevere in one’s being which every individual thing has, 
these are the basic ingredients of  our emotional life.38 From their complex 
permutation, combination, and recursion, arise the many different emotions and 
states of  mind, from jealousy to shame, from avarice to ambition. From a 
metaphysical perspective, it is clear why a passionate life is one of  subjugation. For 
the metaphysics of  a passionate life, by definition, describes a situation in which one 
is at the mercy of  a causal arrangement that goes beyond one’s own causal agency, 
without any control over the coming and going of  successive emotions. Indeed, by 
Spinoza’s definition at (3def3), such effects cannot even qualify as actions, let alone 
actions that can be attributed to a free agent, which, to be free, must be ‘determined 
to act by itself  alone’.39 
And with this I think I have explained and shown through their first causes the 
main affects and vacillations of  the mind which arise from the composition of  
the three primitive affects, viz. Desire, Joy, and Sadness. From what has been 
said it is clear that we are driven about in many ways by external causes, and 
that, like waves on the sea, driven by contrary winds, we toss about, not 




Throughout Spinoza’s overtly political writings, freedom is consistently upheld as the 
principal value and purpose of  the state. This is explicitly maintained in the 
Theological-Political Treatise, in which he declares that ‘the purpose of  the state is, in 
reality, freedom’.41 And it is true even of  the Political Treatise, in which he appears, on 
the contrary, to say that ‘the purpose of  civil order... is nothing other than peace and 
security of  life [pax vitæque securitas]’.42 For following this remark, and opposing 
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Hobbes, for whom peace is the ‘absence of  war’, he explains that true peace, in turn, 
must allow for the rational expression of  the polity: 
For peace is not just the absence of  war, but a virtue which comes from 
strength of  mind… Anyway, a commonwealth whose peace depends on the 
sluggish spirit of  its subjects who are led like sheep to learn simply to be slaves 
can more properly be called a desert than a commonwealth.43 
Thus, as Isaiah Berlin recognised, Spinoza’s conception of  freedom is inherently 
more than ‘negative liberty’, or a libertarian conception defined principally in terms 
of  the absence of  coercion or restraint.44 For Spinoza’s freedom is indeed about 
human potential and its fulfillment, about a ‘true nature’ with which we struggle to 
align ourselves. However, this need not render him guilty of  the dangerous 
tendencies that Berlin saw in such a conception. Indeed, Spinoza’s political 
philosophy could be said to offer a compelling middle path between the excesses of  
both left and right wings of  Berlin’s spectrum. A society whose rationality is 
obstructed by forms of  epistemic coercion, whether through state-sponsored 
propaganda or an educational policy subservient to a particular economic interest-
group, is kept, to some extent, from expressing its full potential, even if  its citizens 
are ‘free’ to indulge whichever desires the prevailing narrative occasions in them. But 
the alternative is not to entrust a potentially tyrannical ruling elite, a coterie of  
‘philosopher kings’, with the task of  redirecting these models of  living in a more 
‘humane’, or ‘rational’, way.45 Indeed, it would be an absurdity, on Spinoza’s view, to 
‘force someone to be free’, in Rousseau’s famous phrase, since rationality and 
freedom can issue only from within.46 
But the minimal conditions for this possibility of  self-determination must be 
vouchsafed, for the good of  the sovereign no less than that of  the polis. For an 
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attempt to stifle the natural tendency people have to form their own thoughts and 
share them with others, ‘even when secrecy is needed’, will only be met with 
resistance, and will in some cases ‘turn the devotion of  the masses into a rage, 
inciting them against whomsoever they will’.47 But these conditions can guarantee at 
most the ‘virtual’ enjoyment of  freedom, its realisation depending ultimately on each 
individual conatus. To the extent that an individual achieves this kind of  liberty, the 
aims and interests encompassed in his or her conatus will align with those of  others 
who, similarly, have achieved some degree of  freedom. James describes the 
‘virtuality’ of  this freedom as a kind of  ‘simulacrum’, or ‘the next best thing’ to 
freedom itself: 
So although the State cannot make people free by imposing the relevant kinds of  
similarity [i.e. some degree of  rationality], it aims to create the next best thing - 
a simulacrum of  a free community in which difference, though present, is 
manifested in the similarities that promote the common good.48 
The ‘similarities that promote the common good’ would include institutions and 
resources that enable citizens to realise their rational potential, such as state 
education, suitable forums for debate, as well as the apparatus of  civic engagement 
itself, including a constitution, judiciary and political representation. ‘[T]heir 
transition to freedom - when it occurs - is a passage to an ideal kind of  citizenship.’49 
So, while Spinoza did not propose anything like Hegel’s teleological account of  the 
state - to be realised through an inner tendency towards communal rationality - he 
did acknowledge the potential for differing approximations to this shared political 
goal, while never losing sight of  the natural - and volatile - dynamics of  power.  
The peace and stability, which Hobbes took to be the raison d’être of  the state, 
could in theory be secured through the negative conditions of  fear and superstition, 
without providing the conditions for the expression of  that which is specifically 
human about human nature. It is against this minimal and potentially unfree state of  
‘peace’ and security, that Spinoza issued his warning about the true purpose of  the 
state: 
It is not, I repeat, the purpose of  the state to transform men from rational 
beings into beasts or puppets, but rather to enable them to develop their 
mental and physical faculties in safety, to use their reason without restraint and 
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to refrain from the strife and the vicious mutual abuse that are prompted by 
hatred, anger or deceit. Thus the purpose of  the state is, in reality, freedom.50 
In the Political Treatise, Spinoza calls this ‘a human life, which is characterised not just 
by the circulation of  the blood and other features common to all animals, but 
especially by reason, the true virtue and life of  the mind’.51  
The relationship between the right of  the sovereign and the freedom of  the 
individual works both ways. For not only did Spinoza aim to show that the true 
purpose of  the state is freedom, and that ‘this freedom can be granted without 
detriment to public peace or to the right of  civil authorities’, but also, crucially, that it 
‘cannot be withheld without great danger to peace and grave harm to the entire 
commonwealth’.52 Spinoza’s argument for this converse dependence of  the survival 
of  the state on its recognition of  the freedom of  the individual is grounded in his 
theory of  natural right: 
For example, fish are determined by nature to swim, and the big ones to eat 
the smaller ones. For it is certain that Nature, taken in the absolute sense, has 
the sovereign right to do all that she can do; that is, Nature’s right is co-
extensive with her power.53 
In the Theological-Political Treatise, this account of  natural right lays the foundations for 
a kind of  social contract theory in the Hobbesian mould:54 
[T]here is nobody who does not desire to live in safety free from fear, as far as 
is possible. But this cannot come about as long as every individual is permitted 
to do just as he pleases… For there is no one whose life is free from anxiety in 
the midst of  feuds, hatred, anger and deceit, and who will not therefore try to 
avoid these as far as in him lies… [Thus] in order to achieve a secure and good 
life, men had necessarily to unite in one body… and the unrestricted right 
naturally possessed by each individual should be put into common 
ownership.55 
But the power of  the sovereign, in which the collected natural right is 
concentrated and embodied, must, for its own preservation, be administered 
reasonably. For the more oppressive or stifling it becomes, the less it will be fulfilling 
                                                          
50 Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 20, p. 223. 
51 Spinoza, Political Treatise, p. 62. 
52 Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, preface, p. 7. 
53 Ibid. ch. 16, p. 173. 
54 Although it is uncertain whether or not Spinoza had read a Dutch translation of  Hobbes’ 
Leviathon that had been published in Amsterdam in 1651, it seems clear that he had at least read De 
Cive, a copy of  which was found in his library. 
55 Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 16, p. 175. 
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its purpose, and the less disposed will its subjects be towards upholding it as an 
institution. 
As we have shown, sovereign powers possess the right of  commanding 
whatever they will only for as long as they do in fact hold supreme power... 
Therefore it is exceedingly rare for governments to issue quite unreasonable 
commands; in their own interest and to retain their rule, it especially behoves 
them to look to the public good and to conduct all affairs under the guidance 
of  reason. For, as Seneca says, “violenta imperia nemo continuit diu” - tyrannical 
governments never last long.56 
Thus freedom in its fullest human sense must be upheld by the state for the sake of  
its own longevity. 
But what is meant by freedom in this full sense? As mentioned above, Spinoza 
understands freedom to be more than the mere absence of  coercion or restraint. Just 
as the social contract theory of  the Theological-Political Treatise begins from the theory 
of  natural right, so too does the next step of  the argument begin from a careful 
fidelity to the nature of  things. Because human nature aspires to express itself  
through ‘the life of  the mind’, which includes entertaining and assenting to thoughts, 
sharing these thoughts with others, and organising these thoughts with the faculty of  
reason, this nature must be given the space it needs to express itself  and flourish 
within a state. Disregarding this fact of  nature is like a foolish resistance to the 
inexorable course of  nature, like trying to swim against the current, and leaves any 
sovereign power in a dangerously precarious position. Unduly restricting these 
tendencies of  human nature is to attempt to constrain the power of  nature itself, a 
power that will as much as possible strive to break out of  any restrictive conditions 
imposed on it. This fidelity to the concrete reality of  power and its constitutive 
conditions marks a Machiavellian realism in Spinoza’s political thought, which was 
consciously directed away from speculative abstractions and directed instead towards 
the practical exigency of  things. For he was concerned that, for all the noble 
intentions of  speculative political theory, it had not generally endeavoured enough to 
engage with the practical realities of  human nature, tending to produce a scheme 
‘that borders on fantasy or could be put into effect in Utopia or in that golden age 
of  the poets where there would naturally be no need of  such.’57 
It is simply a fact of  nature that opinions vary, and that people cannot help 
expressing them. ‘It is the common failing of  men to confide what they think to 
                                                          
56 Ibid. ch. 16, pp. 177-8. 
57 Spinoza, Political Treatise, ch. 1, p. 33. 
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others, even when secrecy is needed’, and not even ‘men well versed in affairs can 
keep silent’.58 It would thus be to try and stifle the expression of  nature itself, to 
oppose an un-opposable force, were a state to try and control people’s thoughts or 
even their expression of  them. Any statesman, whether their motives are noble or 
not, must accept this fact of  nature as given and reckon with it accordingly. Failure to 
recognise and to provide for it will only result in a precarious and unstable state, a 
situation not in the interests of  anyone, least of  all the sovereign: 
On the contrary, the greater the effort to deprive them of  freedom of  speech, 
the more obstinately do they resist: not indeed the greedy, the flatterers and 
other poor-spirited souls who find their greatest happiness in gloating over 
their money-bags and cramming their bellies, but those to whom a good 
upbringing, integrity and a virtuous disposition have given a more liberal 
outlook… In consequence, they are emboldened to denounce the laws and go 
to all lengths to oppose the magistrate.59 
So determined will the resistance of  nature be, that opponents and dissidents will be 
willing to die in the struggle for freedom: 
Those who are conscious of  their own probity do not fear death as criminals 
do, nor do they beg for mercy, for they are not tormented with remorse for 
shameful deeds. On the contrary, they think it an honour, not a punishment, to 
die in a good cause, and a glorious thing to die for freedom.60 
 
Freedom from death 
 
In Ethics IV, Spinoza demonstrates that a ‘free man thinks of  nothing less than of  
death’, and that ‘his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death’.61 This proposition 
comes in the midst of  the excursus on ‘the free man’, that ideal citizen who ‘lives 
according to the dictate of  reason alone’.62 As was found in the previous chapter on 
cognition, the exercise of  reason is an activity of  mind and an expression of  human 
nature, and so a free, self-determined act. In ordering one’s mental life according to 
this rational principle, one is affected less by the ‘random’ influence of  outside 
sources of  belief, and less also by the ‘passions’ (those same effects considered 
                                                          
58 Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise, ch. 20, p. 223. 
59 Ibid. ch. 20, p. 226. 
60 Ibid. ch. 20, p. 227. 
61 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p67. 
62 Ibid. 4p67dem. 
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psychologically). One of  these effects from which one frees oneself  is the emotion 
of  fear, and inter alia the irrational fear of  something for which there is no positive 
reality, namely death. Spinoza combines this Epicurean critique of  the fear of  death 
with the point that, as a rational person, ‘the free man’ is concerned only with ‘the 
good directly... and preserves his being from the foundation of  seeking his own 
advantage’, and is thus concerned only with what is positive and real, that is, ‘his 
wisdom is a meditation on life’.63 
But freedom from death cannot simply be subsumed under the general heading 
of  ‘psychological freedom’, as elaborated above. It is rather, for Spinoza, a 
substantive existential condition to which ‘the free man’ aspires. Just as the First 
Letter of  John speaks of  a choice between ‘abiding in death’ or having ‘eternal life’ 
inside oneself, depending on whether one has love in one’s heart, Spinoza makes 
‘choosing life over death’ a matter of  the way in which one lives. In particular, this 
way of  life is that of  someone who has come - to some extent - to determine his or 
her own existence in accordance with the insights won through an active use of  
reason. For if  one applies oneself  in this manner, then, Spinoza thinks, one will 
eventually arrive at the same demonstrations that have been compiled in the Ethics. 
At this point of  one’s philosophical awakening, one will realise that ‘death’ is a 
misleading noun, suggesting reality where there is none, since it can in fact amount 
to no more than a ‘privation’ or an ‘absence’, neither of  which has anything positive 
in it. Understanding that reality is perfection itself, and that ascriptions of  
‘deficiency’, ‘imperfection’, or ‘privation’, reflect only a partial and limited viewpoint, 
one will focus one’s attention instead on that which is in fact real, that is, on life - 
God or Nature - itself. Sylvain Zac has put this succinctly, explaining that, for 
Spinoza, ‘God is life itself ’, and that ‘eternity is an “eternity of  life” and not an 
“eternity of  death”’.64 
So, far from not being entitled to a genuine notion of  human freedom, this 
notion in fact underlies the many diverse dimensions of  the ethical condition that 
Spinoza identifies as the goal of  human existence. Freedom, eternity, and ‘choosing 
life’ all coalesce in this ethically rich state of  human flourishing. However, even if  we 
grant all of  this, there still remains a glaring aporia in the account. For in what sense 
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can Spinoza still claim that ‘something’ of  our eternal selves ‘remains’ after the death 
of  the body? 






‘Superficial’ vs. ‘Authentic’ 
 
 
In the previous chapter, it was found that ethical fulfilment, for Spinoza, amounts to 
a rich and manifold condition of  human freedom. In the Short Treatise, this condition 
is presented as coming about through a ‘road to Damascus’ episode, or ‘rebirth’, 
while in the Ethics, it seems to be more a matter of  degree, admitting of  shades and 
approximations, either closer towards, or further away from, an unobtainable ideal. 
Nevertheless, the qualities included in this condition are in both works more or less 
the same. They include knowledge, love for others, love for God or Nature, as well 
as a certain existential orientation towards human mortality. In the Ethics, the further 
one strays from this ideal condition, the less one acts in accordance with one’s true 
nature, the less one is disposed to act out of  love for others, and the less one has 
reconciled oneself  to death. Only when life has been freely ‘chosen’ over death, on 
this conception, can one live a life free of  the angst occasioned by its looming 
inevitability. Freeing oneself  from death in this way is a matter both of  how one 
grasps things intellectually and how this knowledge is expressed in a way of  life. For 
Spinoza, there is no ‘gap’ between the ontological and the epistemological; both are 
complimentary aspects of  the same reality. Therefore, in addition to the question as 
to whether one grasps things only ‘superficially [superficialiter]’ or as they are ‘really 
[realiter]’, there is also a complimentary question as to whether one lives ‘superficially’ 
or in a more ‘authentic’ manner. In this chapter, I will explore this opposition, which 
Spinoza implicitly offers in place of  the traditional philosophical opposition between 
‘appearance’ and ‘reality’. Unlike transcendental philosophical frameworks, under 
which an epistemological ‘world of  appearance’ is thought to be somehow detached 
¿Cuánto vive el hombre, por fin? 
¿Vive mil días o uno solo? 
¿Una semana o varios siglos? 
¿Por cuánto tiempo muere el hombre? 
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from an ontological ‘world of  reality’, Spinoza’s immanentist alternative allows the 
‘same world’ to be lived in and grasped in different ways, some more ‘authentic’, 
some more ‘superficial’, depending on the degree of  one’s activity or passivity. Those 
aspects of  our lives that are, in this sense, ‘authentic’, can also be said to ‘remain’ (in 




Where ought the line be drawn? 
 
It has seemed self-evident to many over the ages that there must be, somewhere in 
Spinoza’s philosophical system, a line to be drawn between that which is real and that 
which only appears to be real but does not have an ontological standing of  its own. 
In fact, one such partitioning has already been encountered in this dissertation. 
During the discussion of  ‘attributes’ in Chapter 3, the old debate concerning their 
ontological status was briefly rehearsed. The so-called ‘subjectivist’ side of  the debate 
insists that the attributes are a set of  subjective prisms through which the singular 
and undifferentiated reality of  substance is spectrally differentiated and structured in 
the way that we human beings then perceive it to be. Drawing the line where they do, 
the subjectivists would understand everything other than substance itself  to consist 
of  mere appearances - or shadows, in Plato’s famous metaphor - since the 
modifications of  substance, which are only ever perceivable under some attribute or 
other, would themselves have to be understood as subjectively structured by the 
attributes and so as belonging to the same realm of  appearance. Perhaps the most 
famous spokesperson for this interpretation is Hegel who, in his Lectures on the History 
of  Philosophy argues that, for Spinoza, ‘only this absolute unity is reality’, and hence 
that the attributes can be no more than what ‘[t]he understanding grasps... as the 
reality of  substance’, that is, ‘only reality in the view of  the understanding, which 
falls outside substance’.1 This earns Spinoza the dubious distinction of  having 
formulated a philosophy of  ‘Acosmism’: 
 
                                                          
1 Hegel, History of  Philosophy, vol. III, pp. 256, 260. 
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[I]f  Spinoza is called an atheist for the sole reason that he does not distinguish 
God from the world, it is a misuse of  the term. Spinozism might really just as 
well or even better have been termed Acosmism, since according to its 
teaching it is not to the world, finite existence, the universe, that reality and 
permanence are to be ascribed, but rather to God alone as the substantial. 
Spinoza maintains that there is no such thing as what is known as the world, it 
is merely a form of  God, and in and for itself  it is nothing. The world has no 
true reality, and all this that we know as the world has been cast into the abyss 
of  the one identity.’2 
Others have located the separation between reality and appearance in Spinoza’s 
system in the distinction between substance and its modifications. For if  substance is 
indeed unique, unchanging, infinite and eternal, then what confronts us in everyday 
experience as an expansive world of  variety and change must in some way be an 
illusion of  our own making, since we are not experiencing the world as it really is. 
Clearly with this kind of  interpretation in mind, Leibniz ventures a thinly veiled 
reference to Spinoza: 
[I]t would follow that no created substance, no identical soul, would be 
permanent… but everything would reduce to certain evanescent and flowing 
modifications or phantasms, so to speak, of  the one permanent divine 
substance. And, what reduces to the same thing, God would be the nature and 
substance of  all things - a doctrine of  most evil repute, which a writer who 
was subtle indeed but irreligious, in recent years imposed upon the world.3 
While Leibniz may have only exaggerated this caricature to bring his own alternative 
into sharper relief, his likening of  modifications to ‘phantasms’ with an ‘evanescent’ 
airiness nonetheless expresses well this particular way of  drawing the line between 
the real and the merely apparent in Spinoza’s philosophy. Another way of  denying 
the modifications a status of  genuine reality, is to find something arbitrary, or at least 
conventional, in the way they are individuated by a finite intellect. Bennett, for 
example, has suggested that we think of  Spinoza’s substance/mode relationship as a 
‘field metaphysic’, such that individual modes are adjectival upon regions of  
substance (as expressed under some attribute).4 If  this is the case, then there may be 
something metaphysically arbitrary in the way that different regions are cordoned off  
                                                          
2 Ibid. p. 281. 
3 Leibniz, ‘On Nature Itself, or on the Inherent Force and Actions of  Created Things’, in Loemker 
ed., Philosophical Papers and Letters, p. 502. For a discussion of  the influence that this reaction had on 
the formation of  Leibniz’s own views on the activity inherent in all ‘supposita’, see Maria Rosa 
Antognazza, Leibniz: An Intellectual Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 422 
and passim. 
4 Bennett, Study of  Spinoza’s Ethics, p. 95 and passim. 
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and identified as modes, a kind of  Quinean indeterminacy avant la lettre.5 For if  the 
individuation of  modes depends on a subject’s (or at least a group of  subjects’) way 
of  carving up what is in itself  a single and continuous reality, then modes would to 
that extent seem to enjoy only a somewhat qualified and subjective status. 
Another way of  drawing the line that seems natural looks, not to the distinction 
between substance and attributes, or to that between substance and modes, but to an 
apparent discrepancy among the attributes. For there seems to be, in certain important 
respects, a dominance of  the attribute of  thought over the other attributes. The 
impression that there is a dependence of  this kind on the attribute of  thought was 
especially vivid amidst the wave of  Spinoza scholarship that appeared in England 
towards the close of  the eighteenth century. Pollock, Martineau and Caird seem to 
converge on this fundamental verdict.6 Coincidental though this burst of  interest in 
Spinoza may have seemed, these scholars were apparently united in their debt to 
their idealist forerunners in Germany, and especially Hegel. But unlike their famous 
predecessor, who regarded Spinoza’s attributes as ‘only reality in the view of  the 
understanding, which falls outside substance’, these English scholars took the 
attribute of  thought to be a genuine reality, but the only reality in Spinoza’s system, 
under which the other attributes can have no more than a derivative status. Despite 
granting Spinoza’s intentions to the contrary, Pollock concluded that ‘all Attributes 
but thought are really superfluous, and Spinoza’s doctrine, when thus reduced to its 
simplest terms, is that nothing exists but thought and its modifications’.7 Similarly, 
Martineau inferred that, because only ‘“through” Thought alone can anything be 
“conceived”... there remains only the Thinking principle’.8 Caird, in turn, echoed 
these assessments, finding in Spinoza’s system ‘an unconscious preponderance 
ascribed to the ideal side’.9 These ‘idealist readings’ have therefore taken Spinoza to 
equate the real with the attribute of  thought, with other attributes having no more 
than an ‘appearance’ of  independent reality themselves. In the case of  us human 
                                                          
5 W. V. Quine, Word & Object (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1960) ch. 2, p. 23 and passim. 
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Newlands, ‘More Recent Idealist Readings of  Spinoza’, Philosophy Compass, 6, no. 2 (2011), pp. 109-19. 
See, also, his companion piece, ‘Hegel’s Idealist Reading of  Spinoza’, Philosophy Compass, 6, no. 2 
(2011), pp. 100-8. 
7 Pollock, Spinoza, p. 184. 
8 Martineau, Study of  Spinoza, p. 188. 
9 Caird, Spinoza, p. 202. 
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beings, this means that the attribute of  extension belongs, in some sense, to the 
realm of  appearance. 
But the fault line between the real and the apparent in Spinoza’s system might be 
charted wherever there seems to be a fundamental dichotomy of  some kind. So far, 
interpretations have been considered that locate the decisive break between 
substance and attributes, between substance (as expressed through its attributes) and 
modes, and between the attribute of  thought and other attributes. But it might just as 
well be ascribed to the distinction between the infinite and the finite, between 
eternity and duration, between the immutable and the changeable, or even, within 
the modal realm, between the infinite and the finite modes. But, rather than 
competing with each other, these various ways of  drawing the distinction can be seen 
to seep into, or at least dovetail with, one another. Thus Hegel’s flamboyant 
characterisation of  Spinoza’s ‘Acosmism’ overlaps to some extent with Leibniz’s 
more polemical description of  an ‘evanescent’ or ‘phantasmic’ framework, while 
both of  these share some affinity with the ‘British Idealist’ readings. Again, if  the 
distinction between, say, eternity and duration is thought to mark the separation, 
then it might seem to do so in tandem with the distinction between the infinite and 
finite modes, since the former are said to be eternal, whereas the latter appear to 
belong to the realm of  temporality and change. 
However, in addition to these alternative ways of  demarcating the real in 
Spinoza’s thought, there remains the epistemological question of  how this 
ontological realm relates to cognition. Indeed, any distinction between reality and 
appearance must be, in at least one respect, an epistemological distinction, since it 
concerns either the apprehension of  what is really the case, on the one hand, or the 
rather more subjective condition of  merely having things appear to one to be a 
certain way. Thus a somewhat different angle from which to approach the distinction 
between the real and the apparent in Spinoza’s thought from those canvassed so far, 
would be to consider the matter epistemologically. For many it has seemed self-
evident that Spinoza identified the realm of  appearance with the delivery of  the 
inferior modes of  cognition, such as sensory perception, and reserved the status of  
‘the real’ for what can be known in a purely intellectual way, purged of  any sensual 
impurities. This relegation of  the sensory might seem to be a straightforward feature 
of  Spinoza’s ‘rationalism’, epitomised in the claim that ‘we perceive... singular 
things... through the senses in a way that is mutilated, confused, and without order 
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for the intellect [mutilate, confuse et sine ordine ad intellectum]’.10 However, rather than 
being an alternative place to draw the line between appearance and reality within 
Spinoza’s system, this epistemological characterisation simply offers an additional 
specification in terms of  the way in which these two contrasting categories relate to 
cognition. So for each of  the above ways of  drawing a line between appearance and 
reality metaphysically, there will be a further question as to how the distinction 
relates to cognition, which then becomes an epistemological matter. But it is true 
that many have sought to emphasise the opposition between the sensory and the 
intellectual in Spinoza’s thought, and have taken this to be at the root of  the 
distinction between appearance and reality. 
 
 
An ontology of  immanence 
 
However, none of  the alternatives canvassed so far seem to fit the true shape of  
Spinoza’s philosophy. In fact, the illusion of  choice among them stems from a shared 
misunderstanding, of  which they are equally culpable. They all stem from an 
oversight regarding what was perhaps the most revolutionary feature of  Spinoza’s 
thought. For what he always sought to overturn was precisely the kind of  
transcendentalism involved in any sharp opposition between the ontological and the 
epistemological. This is indeed a genuine distinction in his system, but it is not to be 
conceived of  in the way that these interpretations suggest. There cannot be any 
detachment, or ‘gap’, between the two. As discussed in Chapter 4, Peter’s ‘essence’ 
consists both in what he is ‘formally’, i.e. what he is ‘really’, and what he is 
‘objectively’, i.e. what he is ‘really known to be’. It is a basic feature of  Spinoza’s 
position that existence and intelligibility are two sides of  one coin, without any ‘gap’ 
between the ontological and the epistemological. In Chapter 4, this was seen to 
depend on Spinoza’s innovative appropriation of  the scholastic notion of  the 
‘objective [obiective]’ with respect to ideas, which he allows a public and open 
presence, as opposed to the more private and ‘representational’ conception 
developed by Descartes. For Spinoza, the operative axis is instead one that extends 
from a more or less partial to a more or less complete grasp of  that which is 
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immediately present, which in turn responds to the extent to which one is active or 
passive in one’s thoughts. 
Similarly, the category of  ‘substance’ cannot refer to a realm ‘beyond’ its 
‘attributes’ or its ‘modifications’, but must be understood as expressed in and through 
these other categories. In place of  any sharp separation between creator and 
creation, itself  a theologised appropriation of  a generally Platonic tendency towards 
ontological hierarchy, Spinoza effectively ‘democratised’ being by demonstrating the 
parity among existent things. In drawing the consequence that ‘God is the immanent, 
not the transitive, cause of  all things’, from the pantheistic result that ‘Whatever is, is 
in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God’, Spinoza valorised all 
existence by situating it on the same plane.11 In doing so, he traded, to continue the 
spatial metaphor, the ‘vertical’ metaphysics of  the old theology for his own 
‘horizontal’ alternative. It therefore cannot be correct that, on Spinoza’s scheme, 
modes are no more than faint or shadowy reflections of  a true reality lying ‘beyond’ 
in the realm of  substance, because modes simply are the expression or manifestation of  
that reality. Indeed this is the principal reason for his apt articulation of  the 
relationship between substance and its manifestations as one of  ‘expression’, the far-
ranging developments of  which have been explored, for example, by Deleuze.12 
Of  course, it is true that Spinoza, in line with the philosophical tradition before 
him, conceived of  modes as dependent on substance, that is, on that of  which they 
are the affections, or that through which they are conceived. This much is explicit in 
the definitions of  these terms, and a principle which enjoys the distinction of  being 
the first to be demonstrated in the Ethics:13 ‘A substance is prior in nature to its 
affections.’14 But the kind of  priority involved is not that of  the dependence of  a 
created thing on its creator, nor even, say, that of  an image or reflection on its 
source. It is rather a kind of  logical dependence of  things, in the most general sense 
of  the word ‘thing’, on the notion of  existence itself, a fundamental dependence of  
the variety and multiplicity of  ‘things’ on a shared basic participation in ‘being a 
thing’: 
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For we are accustomed to refer all individuals in Nature to one genus, which is 
called the most general, i.e., to the notion of  being, which pertains absolutely 
to all individuals in Nature.15 
This kind of  ‘dependence’ is so radically different from that which obtains in a more 
transcendental metaphysics that in comparison it does not seem to be ‘dependence’ 
at all. Indeed, to say that things ‘depend’ on a shared substance, simply in order to 
say that they exist, is to deny that they rely on any more ultimate metaphysical order. 
What enables Spinoza to perform this great inversion of  traditional metaphysics is 
his replacement of  a transcendent originating power with the ever-unfolding power 
immanently contained in nature itself. This ontological inversion requires a certain 
re-construal of  the relationship between ‘substance’ and ‘modes’. While it remains 
true that the former is more fundamental than the latter, it is also true that the 
former is what it is in virtue of  its expression in the latter. The expression of  
substance in a manifold of  singular things is the manifestation of  substance itself. 
What for dualistically inclined thinkers in the early modern period was a problematic 
gulf  between the observed world of  finite things and the unobservable ontology 
underlying it disappears, leaving complete identity between individual things and 
their shared participation in existence itself. 
Alexandre Matheron has ranked the reality of  distinct individual things as one of  
Spinoza’s two most fundamental principles (the other affirming a universal 
intelligibility): 
[There are] two fundamental principles. The first remains implicit: there are 
things, individual things; individuality, far from being an illusion due to our 
ignorance of  the Whole, possesses an irreducible reality. The second, under 
one form or another, is the leit-motiv of  the Ethics: everything is intelligible, 
through-and-through and without any residue.16 
This is indeed the only sense to be made of  the attention that Spinoza lavishes on 
the theory of  individual essences and our grasp of  them in the form of  definitions: 
Therefore, so long as we are dealing with the Investigation of  things, we must 
never infer anything from abstractions [ex abstractis], and we shall take very 
great care not to mix up the things that are only in the intellect with those that 
are real. But the best conclusion will have to be drawn from some particular 
affirmative essence, or, from a true and legitimate definition. For from 
universal axioms alone the intellect cannot descend to singulars, since axioms 
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extend to infinity, and do not determine the intellect to the contemplation of  
one singular thing rather than another.17 
I will return to Spinoza’s use of  the term ‘abstraction [abstractus]’ as a contrastive for 
that which is real. For now, the important thing to note is that individual things, 
understood metaphysically as ‘modifications’ of  substance, are genuinely real, and 
that their nature qua distinct individual entities is encapsulated in each of  their 
respective essences. 
That there is no ‘gap’ between substance and its expression is even more salient in 
the case of  attributes than it is in the case of  modes, a fact that is again already 
evident from the opening set of  definitions in the Ethics, in which God is defined as 
having ‘an infinity of  attributes, of  which each one expresses [exprimit] an eternal and 
infinite essence’.18 As discussed in Chapter 3, both the ‘subjectivist’ and ‘objectivist’ 
sides of  the debate concerning the attributes have made the mistake of  postulating a 
‘gap’ of  some kind between substance and its attributes. The fallacy involved in this 
way of  thinking about the attributes was discussed in Chapter 3, and passages were 
cited to support a more charitable reading according to which attributes are akin to 
alternative fields of  meaning through which reality is, not only apprehended, but 
indeed objectively constituted, and immediately present to any suitably inculcated 
intellect. Just as the absence of  any threat to objectivity was highlighted by 
emphasising the role of  attributes in ‘constituting the essence’ of  substance, so too it 
is important to emphasise in this case the great significance in characterising the 
relationship between substance and its attributes as one of  ‘expression [exprimere]’, a 
relationship which consists in an immediate and ‘immanent [immanens]’ presence.19 So 
neither the distinction between substance and its modifications, nor that between 
substance and its attributes, can be read as generating a division between the real and 
the merely apparent. Neither Hegel’s subjectivist gloss on the attributes, nor Leibniz’s 
deflationary characterisation of  the modes, can be defensible, because both disregard 
the important metaphysical work being done by this fundamental principle of  
immanence. 
Nor is the kind of  idealist interpretation, which, naturally enough, seemed 
necessary to the ‘British Idealists’, able to accommodate the shape of  Spinoza’s 
ontology. Although these scholars were at least careful to acknowledge that the 
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formulation of  an idealist philosophy is something at odds with Spinoza’s own 
official intentions, they all concluded that this was nonetheless the inescapable 
tendency of  his philosophy, regardless of  what he intended. But if  a reading can be 
found that reconciles the meaning of  the philosophical content with the intentions 
of  its author, then that is surely to be preferred. With this exegetical aim in mind, it 
might reasonably be argued that, not only was this philosophical orientation 
accidental to Spinoza’s own aspirations, but it cannot hope to capture the sense of  
his writings either. For, as discussed in Chapter 4, the impression that there is a kind 
of  asymmetry among the attributes can arise only when they are compared with, or 
measured against, one another. Not only does this violate the fundamental 
heterogeneity and incommensurability of  the attributes, established early on in the 
Ethics at (1p10), but it ignores the essential metaphysical direction implied by the 
relationship of  ‘expression’ that holds between substance and its attributes. For each 
of  the attributes is, in perfect parity with all the others, and each in its own 
distinctive and conceptually self-contained way, an expression of  one and the same 
reality. From this - more fundamental - perspective of  the ‘direction of  expression’ it 
becomes clear that attributes are all on an equal ontological footing. In addition to 
this, and owing to the role of  the attributes in expressing the same reality, there is also 
a structural isomorphism that obtains across all of  them, i.e., the ‘parallelism’ 
discussed in Chapter 4.20 This structural isomorphism, however, does not permit a 
translation-manual from the ‘language’ of  one attribute to another. It involves no 
more than the rather minimal claim that, for each mode a under Attribute A, there is 
a mode b under Attribute B, and in a sense independent of  any attribute in particular, 
a is identical to b. 
This insistence on the symmetry among the attributes may seem mistaken, in light 
of  a further feature of  the attribute of  thought, already noted in Chapter 4. What 
Bennett has called the ‘lopsidedness’ of  the attribute of  thought was in fact brought 
to Spinoza’s attention by Walter von Tschirnhaus. At first indirectly, through the 
mediation of  their mutual acquaintance, Georg Schuller, and then directly in his own 
hand, he challenged Spinoza’s view that we as human beings are ‘tuned in’ to the 
attributes of  thought and extension alone. If  attributes are, as Spinoza maintains, all 
jointly the expression of  God’s essence, then why is it that we do not know, say, the 
affections of  our own body insofar as they are expressed as modes under attributes 
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other than thought and extension? And, if  our own particular way of  life is entirely 
contained within these two attributes, then does it not follow that there are as many 
other ways of  life, and, indeed, as many other worlds, as there are other attributes 
and modes expressed under them? 
[D]oes it not follow from this that creatures constituted by other attributes 
cannot on their side have any idea of  extension? If  so, it would seem that there 
must be constituted as many worlds as there are attributes of  God. For 
example, our world of  extension, to call it so, it of  a certain size; there would 
exist worlds of  that same size constituted by different attributes. And just as 
we perceive, apart from thought, only extension, so the creatures of  those 
worlds must perceive nothing but their own world’s attribute, and thought.21 
Spinoza’s response was more or less a rehearsal of  the train of  thought followed 
in the Ethics: 
[T]he essence of  mind consists (Prop.13, II) solely in its being the idea of  an 
actually existing body…. Now this idea of  the body involves and expresses no 
other attributes of  God than extension and thought. It is thus clear that the 
human mind - i.e., the idea of  the human body - involves and expresses no 
other attributes of  God except these two… So I conclude that the human 
mind can attain knowledge of  no other attribute of  God than these two, which 
was the point at issue.22 
But this did not satisfy Tschirnhaus, who continued to press him on the matter: 
Will you please let me have a proof  of  your assertion that the soul cannot 
perceive any more attributes of  God than extension and thought… 
Although I do indeed gather from your text that the world is one, it is also no 
less clear… that therefore each single thing is expressed in infinite modes. 
Hence it seems to follow that, although the particular modification which 
constitutes my mind and the particular modification which expresses my body 
are one and the same modification, this is expressed in infinite modes… 
Hence there now arises the question… [Why] does the mind perceive only the 
particular modification expressed through extension, that is, the human body, 
and not any other expression through other attributes?23 
Spinoza’s response seems only to embrace the problematic result that modes of  
thought vastly outnumber those under any other attribute: 
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[I]n reply to your objection, I say that although each thing is expressed in 
infinite modes in the infinite intellect of  God, the infinite ideas in which it is 
expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of  a particular thing, but 
an infinity of  minds. For each of  these infinite ideas has no connection with 
the others, as I have explained in that same Scholium to Proposition 7, Part II 
of  the Ethics, and as is evident from Prop. 10, Part I. If  you will give a little 
attention to these, you will see that no difficulty remains, etc.24 
Indeed the situation may not be as problematic as it seems. One way of  diffusing 
the difficulty is to introduce a notion of  cardinality with respect to the attributes. It 
seems that all Spinoza requires in order to preserve an isomorphism across the 
attributes is that they share the same cardinality, which seems undermined by 
Tschirnhaus’ challenge. However, following more recent developments in set theory, 
and, in particular, Georg Cantor’s work on transfinite sets, which in a sense are all 
‘infinite’, though to varying degrees of  cardinality, some sense can be made of  
Spinoza’s insistence on an ‘infinity of  minds’ for each mode under another attribute: 
Tschirnhaus’ claim that, in allowing both ideas of  things (bodies) and ideas of  
ideas, Spinoza had violated the parallelism by making thought more extensive 
than extension, has been echoed by many commentators to the present day. 
Seen in the light of  modern set theory, the postulated violation does not exist. 
Two infinite sets may have the same cardinality (which is what 2p7 asserts for 
thought and extension) while one of  them has also a one-to-one mapping 
between two of  its proper subsets.25 
Of  course, Spinoza did not have recourse to such notions, but perhaps he 
understood in an intuitive way that his position was consistent, and that perhaps 
some theoretical account was possible, if  not yet conceivable.  
Finally, the kind of  interpretation that attributes to Spinoza a sharp opposition 
between the sensory and the intellectual must be treated with caution, since it too 
can distort the actual distinction that Spinoza sets up. Far from opposing these two 
categories in any rigid way, Spinoza regarded the ideas furnished by the imagination 
(imaginatio), which includes sensory perception, not as erroneous per se, but as prone 
to ‘wandering [vaga]’ until enfolded by the higher forms of  cognition in a holistic 
collaboration between ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ forms.26 This is why, even when we come 
to learn the true distance of  the sun from the earth, we do not cease to perceive it as 
though it were 200 feet away, in doing which there is no error: 
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[W]hen we look at the sun, we imagine it to be about 200 feet away from us. In 
this we are deceived so long as we are ignorant of  its true distance; but when 
its distance is known, the error is removed, not the imagination, i.e. the idea of  
the sun, which explains its nature only so far as the Body is affected by it… 
And so it is with the other imaginations by which the Mind is deceived…: they 
are not contrary to the true, and do not disappear on its presence.27  
 
‘Superficial’ vs. ‘authentic’ 
 
If, as the results of  this brief  survey suggest, Spinoza did not conceive of  the 
distinction between reality and appearance in any of  these ways, that need not be 
taken to imply that he rejected the distinction tout court. Like other traditional notions 
and distinctions that he inherited, this particular distinction is reconfigured in a novel 
way. To appreciate the way in which Spinoza reinterpreted this classic distinction, and 
to bring the discussion back into line with the main thread, it will be instructive to 
consult his alignment of  the distinction with that between eternity and duration. In 
the Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, Spinoza distinguishes between the intellect, 
which ‘perceives things not so much under duration as under a certain species of  
eternity, and in an infinite number’, and the imagination, which, ‘when it imagines 
things, perceives them under a certain number, determinate duration and quantity’.28 
It is interesting to compare this with a similar distinction made in the ‘letter on the 
infinite’: 
[W]e conceive quantity in two ways: either abstractly, or [sive] superficially 
[superficialiter], as we have it in the imagination with the help of  the senses; or as 
Substance, apprehended solely by means of  the intellect.29 
In Latin, the word ‘sive’ is a disjunctive of  inclusion, often connoting equivalence 
between two disjuncts, in this case, between ‘abstract’ and ‘superficial’ ways of  
conceiving things. It seems that Spinoza regards an ‘abstraction’, or subsumption of  
a number of  individuals under a general axiom or rule, to be ‘superficial’ because, in 
collecting individuals together in this way, one must gloss over the various aspects 
that differentiate them, which is to ignore a certain level of  reality, i.e. the 
determinate essence or nature of  those individuals. But the resulting conception is 
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not false of  any of  these individuals. It is simply partial or truncated, indeed, a grasp 
of  the ‘surface [superficies]’ of  the things in question. This is how things are conceived 
when one abstracts from their particular nature, and views them as conditioned by 
their surrounding circumstances in space and time. In other words, it is a kind of  
cognition sub specie durationis. In order to penetrate beyond this surface and grasp a 
thing’s nature more fully, attention must be given to each thing in turn, so that its 
‘inmost essence’ can be understood. This ‘inmost essence’, timelessly contained in 
the attributes of  God or Nature, is conceived sub specie æternitatis: 
The essences of  singular, changeable things are not to be drawn from their 
series, or order of  existing, since it offers us nothing but extrinsic 
denominations, relations, or at most, circumstances, all of  which are far from 
the inmost essence of  things. That essence is to be sought only from the fixed 
and eternal things, and at the same time from the laws inscribed in these 
things, as in their true codes, according to which all singular things come to be, 
and are ordered.30 
So the categories that frame a superficial conception of  things under a species of  
duration include ‘extrinsic denominations’, ‘relations’, and ‘circumstances’. It seems 
that singular things cannot be known any more than superficially when they are 
conceived only in terms of  ‘relations’, whether those relations furnish incidental or 
adventitious ‘circumstances’ for the things or whether they involve a causal influence 
of  some kind. 
This suggests that there is more to the modal realm than simply an infinite series 
of  transitive causal determination. It is, of  course, part of  the story: 
Every singular thing, or any thing which is finite and has a determinate 
existence, can neither exist nor be determined to produce an effect unless it is 
determined to exist and produce and effect by another cause… and again, this 
cause… and so on, to infinity.31 
But, although being embedded in the ‘common order of  nature [ordo naturæ 
communis]’ and thus subject to the ‘slings and arrows of  outrageous fortune’ is a 
necessary condition for the existence of  finite things, it is not the most fundamental 
source of  their activity.32 This source of  activity must, in the first place, issue from 
the nature of  the things themselves, that is, from their ‘inmost essence’. This is a 
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commitment to which Spinoza remains faithful throughout his career, and one that 
looms as large as ever in the Ethics, in which God is proven to be the cause ‘not only 
of  the existence of  things, but also of  their essence’, and in which an individual 
thing’s essence, as defined at (2def2), and equated with the thing’s conatus at (3p7), 
comes to play a pivotal role in the overall structure of  the philosophical system.33 
It is this distinction between things conceived superficially and things conceived 
according to their inmost essence, together with a corresponding manner of  
existence, that informs Spinoza’s reconfiguration of  the classic opposition between 
appearance and reality. Leaving one’s cognition at the level of  imaginatio, without an 
active use of  ratio and scientia, confines one to a superficial perspective, responsive 
only to the surface of  things. At the same time, one’s whole manner of  existence is 
correspondingly superficial, swayed by the effects on one’s mind from outside 
oneself, that is, by the passions (which Spinoza calls a kind of  ‘negation’), framed in 
terms of  one’s surrounding circumstances, and troubled by the most fearful negation 
of  all, death. Conversely, when imaginatio is enfolded within an active use of  ratio, and 
complemented by the insight of  scientia intuitiva, then one’s perspective is deepened to 
include more than just the surface of  things. One grasps the inner essence of  things, 
which is an expression of  Nature’s unfolding power, and one understands this as a 
manifestation of  the immanent source of  change and variety. In this case, too, one’s 
cognitive enhancement is expressed in a whole manner of  existence, no longer 
superficial, but authentic, determined from within, and oriented towards life, not 
death, as the true animating principle in nature. These alternatives do not refer to 
distinct ontological realms, or to a distinction between a ‘world of  reality’ and a 
‘world of  appearance’. They relate to the same world, but involve qualitatively 
distinct ways of  grasping and living in it. This is Spinoza’s immanentist version of  
the classic distinction. 
The sense in which a passion is a kind of  ‘negation’ can be appreciated in the light 
of  the distinction made between an action and a passion in Ethics III, itself  a double-
edged conception that Spinoza seems to have inherited from Descartes. The latter, 
following a customary gibe at the ‘ancients’, whose faults ‘are nowhere more 
apparent than in their writings on the passions’, begins his study of  the Passions of  the 
Soul with the foundational principle ‘that whatever takes place or occurs is generally 
called by philosophers a “passion” with regard to the subject to which it happens 
                                                          
33 Ibid. 1p25. 
  166 
and an “action” with regard to that which makes it happen’.34 This foundation is 
echoed in Spinoza’s definitions in Ethics III: 
D2: I say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of  which 
we are the adequate cause, i.e. (by d1), when something in us or outside us 
follows from our nature... On the other hand, I say that we are acted on when 
something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of  which we 
are only a partial cause. 
D3: …Therefore, if  we can be the adequate cause of  any of  these affections, I understand 
by the affect an action; otherwise, a passion.35 
When an interaction is conceived from the point of  view of  the thing affected, it 
can be said to involve a ‘negation’, as Spinoza says when focussing specifically on the 
case of  the mind: 
We see, then, that the passions are not related to the Mind except insofar as it 
has something which involves a negation, or insofar as it is considered as a part 
of  nature which cannot be perceived clearly and distinctly through itself.36 
Although, from the point of  view of  the affected mind, a passion is superficially 
conceived as a positive reality, it is in fact a ‘negation’. Understood as it is in itself, it 
is not a passion at all, but a fraction of  a complete, adequate cause. Conversely, an 
action issues from the inmost essence of  an agent, who is its adequate cause, so an 
action is, understood as it is in itself, a positive reality. Spinoza’s appropriation of  the 
distinction between appearance and reality therefore hinges on this distinction 
between the passive and the active. However, instead of  referring to two distinct 
ontological realms, these terms refer to two different perspectives on, and ways of  
living among, the same set of  things and events. This is perhaps unsurprising, given 
what has been said about the alternative species of  duration and eternity. That is, 
these species are alternative ways in which existence is either expressed or conceived. 
The former perspective conceives things according to a random series of  encounters 
with neighbouring objects, whereas the latter perspective conceives things as 
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We conceive things as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them to 
exist in relation to a certain time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to 
be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of  the divine nature. But 
the things we conceive in this second way as true, or real, we conceive under a 
species of  eternity, and to the extent they involve the eternal and infinite 
essence of  God.37 
Since human beings are, like all finite things, necessarily embedded in the ‘common 
order of  nature [ordo naturæ communis]’, and are in constant interaction with other 
things, the question of  how much, or in what way, one is responsible for one’s 
actions and for the expression of  one’s nature is necessarily one of  degree. So while 
all finite modes are in continuous interaction with fellow finite modes (as described 
at (1p28)), there will nevertheless be various different respects in which, and extents to 
which, given their surrounding circumstances and influences, finite modes determine 
their own existential condition. 
It is for this reason that Spinoza, like Descartes before him, alludes to a sliding 
scale of  reality. The more a particular thing acts or exists in accordance with its own 
nature, the more reality it has. As Spinoza puts it in the somewhat different context 
of  a proof  for the existence of  God, ‘since being able to exist is power, it follows 
that the more reality belongs to the nature of  a thing, the more powers it has, of  itself, 
to exist’.38 Unavoidably subject to surrounding influences, we are vulnerable to the 
passions that these outside encounters occasion in us and at the same time we 
undergo a corresponding change in our overall existential condition: 
An Affect that is called a Passion of  the mind is a confused idea, by which the 
Mind affirms of  its Body, or of  some part of  it, a greater or lesser force of  
existing than before... 
[W]hen I say a greater or lesser force of  existing than before, I do not understand that 
the Mind compares the Body’s present constitution with a past constitution, 
but that the idea which constitutes the form of  the affect affirms of  the body 
something which really involves more or less of  reality than before.39 
But what can it mean to say that something has more or less reality than 
something else, or that something increases or decreases its share of  reality? Just as a 
passion has no positive reality in itself, or is what Spinoza calls a ‘negation’, so too 
there can be no genuine absence of  reality, or any lack of  perfection, except insofar as 
this is conceptualised from a superficial perspective, perhaps through making a 
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comparison between a thing and another thing which is thought to be a more real - 
or more perfect - instance of  a general type. ‘Perfection and imperfection, therefore, 
are only modes of  thinking, i.e., notions we are accustomed to feign because we 
compare individuals of  the same species or genus to one another.’40 Although this 
anthropocentric and superficial approach to valuation is identified as being only a 
mode of  thinking, Spinoza does grant a genuine metaphysical meaning to the term 
‘perfection’, albeit by collapsing it into that of  ‘reality’: ‘By reality and perfection I 
understand the same thing.’41 Spinoza grants that, in a sense, all individuals belong to 
‘one genus’, that is, ‘to the notion of  being’.42 However, compared to one another, 
some can be seen to more actively express their nature than others. Again, one is 
reminded of  the ‘great chain of  being’ that Spinoza describes in the ‘physical 
digression’, the lower levels of  which having less power than the higher.43 However, 
this does not mean that there is a lack or absence of  reality in any of  these things: 
[I]nsofar as we attribute something to them that involves negation, like a limit, 
an end, lack of  power, etc., we call them imperfect, because they do not affect 
our Mind as much as those we call perfect, and not because something is 
lacking in them which is theirs, or because Nature has sinned.44 
It is no accident that this kind of  anthropocentric valuation belongs to what 
Spinoza calls a superficial conception of  things, one that does not attend to their 
inmost essence. Confined to the accidental associations of  the imagination, which 
reflect only the extrinsic relations among things, Spinoza’s analogue for the classic 
philosophical category of  appearance includes a conceptualisation of  things as 
passive, or as lacking power, since these are ‘negations’ which do not pertain to the 
essences of  the affected things themselves.45 But this conceptualisation is not false. It 
is simply partial, reflecting more the viewpoint from which it is formed than that 
which it represents. Spinoza does not for a moment suggest that we purge our 
thought of  these ‘modes of  thinking’ nor cleanse our language of  the terms with 
which we express them, for they are essential to the practical aims of  the Ethics. That 
is, one needs the appropriate conceptual resources for addressing one’s passions 
before one can master them, and one needs to aspire to what Spinoza calls a ‘model 
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of  human nature’ in order to achieve the kind of  ethical and spiritual emancipation 
sought through the philosophy of  the Ethics.46 
Spinoza’s treatment of  the superficial is therefore not eliminative. He was not 
suggesting, per impossibile, that this mode of  conception and manner of  living be 
phased out of  human life altogether. His point seems rather to be that, although this 
is a necessary aspect of  the human condition, it can be rendered healthier when 
complimented by an intellectual grasp of  the inner essence of  things. Although 
superficial at a metaphysical level, thinking in terms of  the imperfection of  things or 
in terms of  a comparison with an ‘ideal model’ can nonetheless serve an important 
heuristic purpose, and to this extent the ‘lower’ form of  conception can be brought 
into harmony with the ‘higher’ forms. Just as the imagination is not necessarily 
erroneous per se, but depends on a collaborative relationship with the intellect, so, 
too, a superficial conception of  things is not pernicious per se, but stands to be 
complimented by a deeper insight into the inmost essence of  things.47 As discussed 
above, the former conception is framed under a species of  duration, whereas the 
latter is framed under a species of  eternity. So, given the necessary interplay between 
the two conceptions, it can be concluded that eternity is not a kind of  existence apart 
from, or ‘outside’, duration, as it might be portrayed under a transcendental 
framework; rather, eternity is an existential comportment with respect to things 
understood sub specie durationis. It is at a certain time and place, or for a certain length 
of  time, and from one place to another, that the manner of  existence which Spinoza 
calls ‘eternal’ is expressed. That manner of  existence, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 
6, consists in an expression of  the essence of  the thing in question, that is, insofar as 
the thing is free. 
Thus the ‘real’, or rather, the ‘authentic’, for Spinoza, consists in the positive 
expression of  a thing’s essence. The only thing whose existence is exclusively 
conditioned by its own essence is God or Nature considered as a whole, and 
therefore God or Nature is the only being that is absolutely real or authentic. 
Modifications of  God or Nature can only partially condition their own existence in 
accordance with their essence, and so their authenticity can be only a matter of  
degree. From the point of  view of  God or Nature, however, this ‘degree of  reality’ is 
not conceived as limited or negated, but is understood as contributing its positive 
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expression to the whole of  which it is an integrated modification. It is only from a 
limited and superficial point of  view that this may appear to be less than real. In fact, 
there is no lack of  reality in nature whatsoever. All those aspects of  life that involve 
an imperfection or a negation, such as those episodes of  human life given over to 
intemperate passion, are the aspects that Spinoza regards as superficial. Taken 
together, these superficial aspects are like our own shadow from which we struggle 
to free ourselves. In those moments when things are grasped according to their 
inmost essence, these superficial aspects are understood according to their true 
causes and origins, which ex hypothesi do not involve (except ‘partially’) the essence or 
nature of  the individual in question. Forming a conception of  things sub specie 
æternitatis, these aspects in a sense evaporate as unreal appearances, at least with 
respect to the individual in question, and from that eternal perspective, all that 
‘remains’ are those aspects in which an individual has expressed his or her essence, 
determined him-or-herself, and has been truly free. It therefore transpires that 
authenticity, for Spinoza, coincides with freedom. In the following chapter, this result 
will provide the basis for one possible way of  reconciling the ‘this-life’ character of  
the eternity of  the mind, with the rather more ‘next-life’ sounding remarks 
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Because I could not stop for Death – 
He kindly stopped for me – 





Freedom from Death 
 
 
This dissertation began with an invitation to uncover the meaning of  Spinoza’s 
notion of  the ‘eternity of  the mind’, as expounded in the last pages of  the Ethics. 
This ambition prompted an investigation into certain key concepts in his philosophy, 
such as ‘eternity [æternitas]’, ‘mind [mens]’, and ‘cognition [cognitio]’. This in turn 
gradually brought to light the immanent, ‘this-life’, shape of  his mature eschatology. 
Following these twists and turns, the quest has now led to this, the concluding 
chapter, where the final pieces of  the puzzle can be put into place. In Chapter 2, I 
suggested that, although Spinoza may have set aside the language of  ‘immortality’ 
when he came to write the Ethics, his attempt in that later work to substantiate a 
genuine form of  life without death might nonetheless be said to consummate a 
lifelong project of  trying to rethink this religious concept in a way that fits with his 
radically immanent view of  the world. The activation of  an eternal, ‘deathless’, way 
of  life, was seen, in Chapter 5, to come about essentially through an exercise of  that 
most human of  qualities, the ‘life of  the mind’, though it was pointed out that this 
by no means consists in a world-shy flight from the hustle and bustle of  life, but 
rather in the cognitive dimension of  a whole manner of  existence that encompasses 
all the aspects that together constitute ethical fulfilment. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, what unifies these various aspects into a single ethical 
conception, for Spinoza, is the diversity of  ways in which they jointly form a unified 
condition of  active self-determination, or freedom. It is one particular expression of  
this overall freedom that has been the subject matter of  this dissertation. For it is a 
certain ‘freedom from death’ that lies at the heart of  Spinoza’s mature eschatology in 
the guise of  the ‘eternity of  the mind’. At the close of  Chapter 6, I indicated that 
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this ‘freedom from death’ could not simply be reduced to the more general condition 
of  ‘psychological freedom’, as it might seem to do for a generally Epicurean strategy, 
aimed at alleviating the fear of  death. While this is indeed one facet of  Spinoza’s 
philosophical eschatology, it could not be the whole story. In this concluding 
chapter, I hope to elaborate the sense in which there is, crucially, in addition to this 
‘psychological point’, also a ‘metaphysical point’ to the doctrine. It is in virtue of  the 
‘metaphysical point’ of  his doctrine that substantive sense has to be made of  his 
attempt to corroborate the claim that ‘something’ of  the mind ‘remains’ after the 
death of  the body, even if  a final evaluation of  his success here must remain 
somewhat nuanced, and even uncertain. Following this elaboration, I will conclude 
the dissertation as a whole with a general appraisal of  Spinoza’s treatment of  this 
theological question, finding the importance of  his contribution to consist in a 
genuine and defensible philosophy of  life-affirmation. 
 
 
The importance of  freedom in Spinoza’s philosophical eschatology 
 
The most immediate significance that the notion of  freedom has for Spinoza’s 
eschatology lies in the role that it plays in substantiating the quality of  life that he 
presents as being without death. This is as true of  his early account in the Short 
Treatise as it is of  his mature position in the Ethics. While the early work concludes 
with a chapter titled ‘Of  True Freedom’, in which Spinoza maintains, ‘[t]he true 
intellect can never come to perish’, the final remark of  the later work records its 
author’s confidence that he has ‘completed all [he] wished to set forth touching the 
mind’s power over the emotions and the mind’s freedom’, such that it should be clear 
that ‘the wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, is hardly troubled in spirit, but 
being, by a certain eternal necessity, conscious of  himself, and of  God, and of  
things, he never ceases to be, but always possesses true peace of  mind [vera animi 
acquiescentia]’.1 However, although both early and later treatments of  this question are 
framed within a wider ethic of  human freedom, there is also, as has been charted in 
this dissertation, an important sense in which the earlier view evolved into a more 
refined position in the Ethics. Whereas the earlier offering remains somewhat 
                                                          
1 Spinoza, Short Treatise, II, p. 148; Spinoza, Ethics, 5p42s, emphasis added. 
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entangled in a kind of  mind-body dualism, and thus a correspondingly 
transcendental, ‘next-life’ eschatology, the final and polished doctrine presented in 
the Ethics conveys an entirely ‘realised’, ‘this-life’ alternative. Not coincidentally, this 
fits Spinoza’s eventually decisive endorsement of  a ‘qualitative’ conception of  
eternity, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
In light of  this, the eternity of  the mind put forward in the Ethics has to be taken 
to be about a quality of  existence, rather than a quantity or ‘amount’ of  existence. The 
quality of  existence referred to as ‘eternal’ has been gradually characterised over the 
preceding chapters along parallel yet equally important dimensions. These include 
the epistemic, the moral, the agapic, the political, and the spiritual. All of  these 
aspects were, from Spinoza’s earliest writings, taken to coalesce in a single ‘ethics’. 
Once it is appreciated that lying at the heart of  this holistic way of  life is 
fundamentally a kind of  self-determination, ‘divine’ in its immanent source of  
activity, all of  these otherwise diverse aspects come to be seen as indeed parallel 
expressions of  that same underlying freedom or autonomy. In the Short Treatise, 
Spinoza had put this in terms of  an almost ‘either-or’ pair of  alternative states, a 
divide to be crossed with a single ‘road to Damascus’ transformative episode. But in 
the Ethics this gives way to a more ‘conative’ and ongoing process of  continually 
striving to express oneself  autonomously and in doing so partake in a quality of  life 
which is to some degree free, enlightened, virtuous, and even... eternal. This by itself  
is sufficient to corroborate the central claim of  this dissertation, i.e., that freedom 
plays an indispensable role in the workings of  Spinoza’s mature eschatology. But 
there are further reasons still for resituating this notion at the centre of  our attempts 
to understand Spinoza’s notion of  the eternity of  the mind. 
Foremost among these is the specific relevance of  the notion of  freedom in 
elucidating the eternity of  the mind as, specifically, a ‘freedom from death’. In 
Chapter 6, it was found that, just as the diverse aspects which together make up 
Spinoza’s rich conception of  the ethical each in their own way involve a kind of  
liberation, so too does this specifically eschatological aspect. So, in addition to 
providing an explanation for the unity underlying all these aspects, and providing the 
essential resonance in the quality of  life called ‘eternal’, freedom also characterises 
that specific aspect relating to human mortality, supplying the meaning of  the 
expression ‘eternal life’. It is this specific freedom from death that will be further 
explored in this chapter. That the notion of  freedom provides an invaluable 
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interpretative key for unlocking the puzzle of  the eternity of  the mind is evident 
from the definitions of  the two operative concepts, ‘freedom’ and ‘eternity’. In the 
Ethics, both notions are defined in terms of  a kind of  existence that flows from the 
nature of  the entity in question, with perhaps the only difference being one of  
emphasis. Whereas the definition of  freedom stresses the origins of  this quality of  
existence (i.e. the nature of  the thing in question), that of  eternity stresses the 
necessity with which this quality of  existence is expressed, a necessity that could also 
be glossed as a kind of  immanent causality.2 Thus, ‘that thing is called free which 
exists from the necessity of  its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself  alone’, 
whereas by ‘eternity I understand existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow 
necessarily from the definition alone of  the eternal thing’.3 
The shared content of  the two notions is therefore supplied by the notion of  
‘necessity’, suggesting an intimate triumvirate made up of  freedom, eternity, and 
necessity, each of  which is to be understood in terms of  the other two. Thus, 
freedom and eternity can be seen to occupy the same ‘conceptual space’ in Spinoza’s 
thought, in light of  their shared relation to necessity. Contrary to ‘incompatibilist’ 
conceptions of  freedom, according to which freedom consists in the absence of  
necessity, Spinoza opted for a ‘compatibilist’ concept, such that freedom is necessity 
itself, so long as the necessity with which one exists can be traced back to one’s own 
nature. At the same time, ‘[e]ternity is the very essence [or nature] of  God insofar as 
this involves necessary existence’.4 Therefore, to the extent that one exists necessarily 
from one’s own nature, and is thus free, one is to some extent divine in one’s 
participation in an eternal kind of  existence (i.e. ‘the very essence [or nature] of  
God’). 
Beyond the conceptual workings of  the notion of  freedom, in both Spinoza’s 
broader ethical picture and in his doctrine of  the eternity of  the mind, is the more 
biographical significance that this concept clearly held for Spinoza. For in addition to 
casting light on the internal logic of  that doctrine - both in itself  and how it hangs 
together with the rest of  his philosophy - it becomes clear in a meta-conceptual way, 
how these ideas occurred to, and impressed themselves on, an intellectual who was 
                                                          
2 ‘Everything that is, is in God, and must be conceived through God… And then outside God there 
can be no substance… God, therefore, is the immanent [immanens], not the transitive cause of  all 
things.’ Spinoza, Ethics, 1p18. 
3 Ibid. 1def7, emphasis added; 1def8, emphasis added. 
4 Ibid. 5p30dem. 
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deeply moved by the exigencies of  human freedom. As explored in Chapter 6, 
freedom was important to Spinoza the philosopher because it was important to 
Spinoza the man. Born into a community displaced only one or two generations 
earlier from its native Iberia, by way of  violent persecution and intolerance, Spinoza 
was from his youngest days inculcated with an awareness of  the value of  freedom. 
From this default position of  awareness, he could only have grown further 
convinced of  this ultimate human value during his own personal experience of  
rejection and exile, itself  a result of  intolerance. All the while, beyond his own 
personal struggles and those of  his native Sephardic community, the unfolding 
antagonism between political-religious factions in the Dutch Republic would have 
struck his increasingly attuned sensibility for the menacing threat of  tyranny that it 
was, itself  dwarfed by a wider culture of  intolerance and persecution blighting much 
of  seventeenth-century Europe. With this historical context and biographical 
portrait in view, one can readily appreciate why the notion of  freedom and, in 
particular, human freedom, came to figure so prominently in Spinoza’s philosophy. 
The doctrine of  the eternity of  the mind is no different in this respect. Nevertheless, 
to make this point is not at all to engage in the dubious pursuit of  psychologising the 
objective philosophical workings of  these ideas themselves. There is nothing 
inconsistent in recognising the dual-significance that the notion of  freedom held for 
Spinoza, both as it figures in his thought conceptually and why, biographically, it 
would have struck him all the more forcefully as being of  profound importance. 
 
 
An ‘immanent’, though not ‘merely’ Epicurean, eschatology 
 
There is, then, in addition to the various kinds of  freedom canvassed in Chapter 6 
(epistemic, psychological, agapic, political, etc.), also a kind of  freedom from the 
existential predicament posed by human mortality. Eternity is a timeless quality of  
existence. Therefore, to the extent that it is enjoyed, it renders a liberation of  sorts, 
however briefly, from the inescapable conclusion awaiting finite things in time. 
Centuries later, Ludwig Wittgenstein (whose first major work, the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus, seems to be named in allusion to the famous author of  the Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus), would articulate this notion as follows: 
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If  we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration, but timelessness, 
then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present. Our life has no end 
in just the way in which our visual field has no limits.5 
As noted in Chapter 6, it is not so much that these various kinds of  freedom open 
up distinct possibilities, capable of  being independently realised, but rather that there 
is a single condition of  freedom simultaneously expressed in all these different ways. 
In fulfilling one’s essence as a human being, one actively forms adequate ideas, and 
ideas being not simply ‘mute pictures on a panel [picturas in tabula mutas]’, but being 
embodied in one’s practical engagements with the world and with others, the 
rationality characteristic of  ‘the free man’ manifests itself  as much through a political 
engagement, as through a mastery of  one’s passions and a love for others.6 
Indeed, all these complementary aspects would remain equally important and 
valuable even were the added spiritual benefits described in Ethics V not to follow: 
Even if  we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of  
the first importance morality, religion, and absolutely all the things we have 
shown (in Part IV) to be related to tenacity and nobility.7 
But in fact this is a hypothetical abstraction from intrinsically connected aspects, a 
state of  affairs which could not really come about, because with the former 
liberation in the form of  ‘tenacity [animositas]’ and ‘nobility [generositas]’ comes the 
latter liberation in the form of  the mind’s eternity. Indeed, the whole force of  
Spinoza’s ‘philosophical’ and ‘immanent’ reconfiguration of  spirituality is to 
somehow identify it with (but without reducing it to) these other more earthly forms 
of  freedom. Spinoza’s suggestion seems to be that these complementary aspects 
hang together holistically, unified in a single quality of  existence, or way of  life, 
called ‘freedom [libertas]’, so that once the other ‘things we have shown’ are achieved, 
the freedom from death described in Ethics V is achieved as well. But it is 
undoubtedly this spiritual dimension, in particular, that Spinoza chose for the 
capstone of  his philosophical edifice, giving it pride of  place in the final climactic 
conclusion of  the Ethics. 
Thus the overall shape of  Spinoza’s mature eschatology, clear already from the 
examination of  his concept of  eternity in Chapter 2, is towards something which 
                                                          
5 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922), 6.4311. 
6 Spinoza, Ethics, 2p49s. 
7 Ibid. 5p41. 
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theologians have called ‘realised eschatology’, a term coined by Charles Dodd for his 
reading of  the New Testament, according to which eschatological themes, such as 
the ‘kingdom of  heaven’, the ‘return of  Christ’, and ‘eternal life’, do not refer to 
events or states in the future, but rather to a kind of  spiritual condition or 
relationship with the divine achievable in this life: 
[The parables in the New Testament] use all the resources of  dramatic 
illustration to help men see that in the events before their eyes... God is 
confronting them in His kingdom, power and glory. This world has become 
the scene of  a divine drama, in which the eternal issues are laid bare. It is the 
hour of  decision. It is realised eschatology.8 
Certain books in particular, such as those attributed to John, are thought to 
exemplify this reading of  the New Testament. Carlisle has drawn attention to the 
affinity between such biblical passages and the eschatology of  Ethics V. It is also 
worth remembering that, in addition to many references within the text itself, 
Spinoza chose to preface the Theological-Political Treatise with a quotation from the 
First Epistle of  John: ‘Through this means we recognise that we remain in God, and 
God remains in us - that He gave to us from His own Spirit.’9 Eternal life, for 
Spinoza, is not at all a matter of  living forever through endless time, but about 
partaking in a certain timelessness (in the here and now, or for a stretch of  time, or 
from place to place), in which the usual boundaries of  time somehow cease to be 
relevant to one’s manner of  existence or otherwise lose their force. In these states, 
one is no longer bound by the finitude of  temporal existence and death loses its grip, 
rendering one ‘without death’, ‘deathless’, or - what comes to the same - ‘immortal’. 
There is a psychological aspect to this kind of  deathlessness, but this is by no 
means exhaustive of  Spinoza’s eschatology. This psychological strand concerns the 
attitude of  a person who exists freely from his or her nature. It is an existential 
attitude framed in terms of  affirmation and directed towards life, rather than 
morbidly worrying about a negation of  existence, or suffering from a fear of  death. 
Since the conduct of  a person living freely expresses a true knowledge of  things, 
framed under a species of  eternity, he or she attends to the real, ‘inner’ nature of  
things, and not merely to a ‘superficial’ grasp of  them in terms of  ‘negation’, 
‘imperfection’, or ‘death’. In Chapter 7, I explored the sense in which these latter 
                                                          
8 Dodd, Parables of  the Kingdom, p. 147. 
9 Carlisle, ‘Spinoza on Eternal Life’, forthcoming. The epigraph of  the TTP is taken from 1 John 
4:13. 
  178 
categories, for Spinoza, frame a superficial conception of  things. Enfolding and 
consolidating this merely superficial conception into a fuller, richer conception is the 
achievement of  the ‘free man’. Spinoza explains at (4p67dem) that a ‘free man, i.e., 
one who lives according to the dictate of  reason alone... desires the good directly (by 
p63c), i.e. (by p24), acts, lives, and preserves his being from the foundation of  
seeking his own advantage.’10 This kind of  motivation is premised on affirmation and 
on life, the truly animating principle in nature. On the other hand, a free person 
cannot be said to be motivated by a ‘negative affect’ such as fear, nor, inter alia, by a 
fear of  death: ‘A free man... is not led by Fear... he thinks of  nothing less than of  
death. Instead his wisdom is a meditation on life’.11 For this reason, Spinoza’s 
philosophy is indeed a ‘philosophy of  life’, and his understanding of  eternity is that 
of  an ‘eternity of  life’, not an ‘eternity of  death’, as Sylvain Zac has put it.12 
This psychological aspect of  Spinoza’s eschatology may well seem to situate him 
within a broader philosophical tradition of  responding to the question of  human 
mortality. In his famous garden in Athens, Epicurus too tried to assuage the fear of  
death felt by his interlocutors by means of  rational argument. 
So death, the most terrifying of  ills, is nothing to us, since so long as we exist, 
death is not with us; but when death comes, then we do not exist. It does not 
concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the 
latter are no more.13 
So the only explanation for suffering from such a fear would be a person’s own 
irrationality, perhaps curable through exposure to arguments like that provided by 
Epicurus. This sentiment is indeed echoed in Spinoza’s remarks about the free man, 
i.e. ‘one who lives according to the dictate of  reason alone’.14 But, although there 
may seem to be a convergence between these two thinkers, there is in fact a great 
distance separating them. After all, Epicurus has usually been remembered for his 
early and influential formulation of  what would now be called a ‘materialist’ 
conception of  the world, whereas Spinoza, it has emerged over the course of  this 
dissertation, worked out a far more inclusive vision, a striking feature of  which is the 
equal status afforded to all attributes of  substance (as opposed to only the ‘material’ 
                                                          
10 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p67dem. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Zac, L’idée de vie, p. 15. 
13 Epicurus to Menoeceus, in The Extant Remains, ed. Cyril Bailey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 
p. 85. 
14 Spinoza, Ethics, 4p67dem. 
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or ‘extended’). In fact, in Spinoza’s treatment of  the question, there occurs an 
interesting synthesis between this ancient, more ‘purely’ philosophical response, and 
subsequent ‘theological’ offerings. 
It is therefore unsurprising that, although dispelling the fear of  death features as 
an undeniable aspect of  Spinoza’s doctrine, it is by no means the whole story. It is 
true that, for Spinoza, the ‘more the mind understands things by the second and 
third kind of  knowledge, the less it is acted on by affects which are evil, and the less 
it fears death’.15 But this is accompanied also by what might be referred to as the 
‘metaphysical point’ of  the doctrine: 
[B]ecause (by p27) the highest satisfaction there can be arises from the third 
kind of  knowledge, it follows from this that the human mind can be of  such a 
nature that the part of  the mind which we have shown perishes with the body 
(see p21) is of  no moment in relation to what remains.16 
In order to make sense of  this additional ‘metaphysical point’ of  Spinoza’s 
eschatology it is necessary to address two questions. Firstly, who - or what - exactly, 
is eternal? Secondly, what can it mean to say that this - the answer to the first 
question - ‘remains’? 
 
 
Who - or what - is eternal? 
 
One of  the difficulties standing in the way of  a straightforward reading of  the 
eternity of  the mind passage in Ethics V is that it seems unclear just what the referent 
of  this quality of  existence - eternity - is supposed to be. On the face of  it, the 
passage seems to be concerned with a quality of  ‘the mind’ simpliciter.17 But Spinoza 
also seems to slide from elaborating this quality in connection with ‘the mind’ (and, 
at times, even more generically, to ‘us’) to reserving this special status for ‘something 
of  [the mind]’, ‘the Mind only insofar as it conceives the Body’s essence under a 
species of  eternity’, or for only a ‘part of  it’.18 Are these latter specifications more 
precise refinements of  what are elsewhere more general or casual references to ‘the 
mind’ as a whole (or to ‘us’), or is there some rationale behind this variety in 
                                                          
15 Ibid. 5p38. 
16 Ibid. 5p38dem. 
17 Ibid. 5p20s and passim. 
18 Ibid. 5p23s; 5p23; 5p29dem, emphasis added; 5p38. 
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Spinoza’s presentation of  the doctrine? If  it turns out that there is an ambiguity in 
Spinoza’s account here, what would this mean for his apparently univocal conception 
of  eternity? Is there just one single quality of  eternity being ascribed, or are there 
rather distinct kinds of  eternity (each applicable to its own respective referent)? Thus 
Nadler, for example, has claimed that it is ‘absolutely crucial to see that there are two 
distinct kinds of  eternity’ at work here, warning that a ‘failure to distinguish them 
can lead one into various kinds of  misreadings of  Spinoza’s views on the eternity of  
the mind’.19 Nadler is not, in this context, distinguishing between the ‘qualitative’ and 
‘quantitative’ conceptions of  eternity examined in Chapter 2. The kinds of  eternity 
Nadler is referring to here correspond instead to a difference in what is said to be 
eternal, a difference in the ‘extension’ of  the term which, it turns out, engenders a 
difference in its ‘intension’ also. 
The ‘two distinct kinds of  eternity’ are, on the one hand, something which Nadler 
calls a ‘very minimal kind of  eternity’ enjoyed by ‘all things, human and otherwise’, 
simply in virtue of  there being a timeless essence for each and every individual 
contained in the attributes, and, on the other hand, ‘another variety of  eternity’ 
which is special in being ‘available only to human minds’.20 It would presumably be 
due to a ‘failure to distinguish’ between these two kinds of  eternity were one to read 
Spinoza as ‘saying aloud: “the human mind is in a certain sense eternal”’, but then 
‘adding in a whisper, for the few who could penetrate his secret: - “and everything 
else too”’, as Pollock once put the temptation.21 With the distinction in view, 
Spinoza’s ‘secret’ whereby ‘everything else’ is as eternal as the human mind, so that 
there is perhaps no special eschatological significance attached to the human mind in 
particular, can be attributed to the more ‘minimal’ variety of  eternity described by 
Nadler. That is, it follows as a rather straightforward consequence of  Spinoza’s 
general metaphysical picture that for every individual there is an essence somehow 
eternally contained in the attributes of  God. This is perhaps also the kind of  eternity 
that the mind ‘as a whole’ can be said to enjoy within the attribute of  thought qua 
idea-correlate of  the essence of  the body, which is also, in its own way, contained 
timelessly in the attribute of  extension. 
                                                          
19 Nadler, ‘Eternity and Immortality’, p. 229, note 23. Moreau is generally credited with having 
highlighted the importance of  this distinction. Moreau, Spinoza, p. 540. 
20 Nadler, ‘Eternity and Immortality’, pp. 231-2. 
21 Pollock, Spinoza, p. 295. 
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This seems to be the import of  (5p22) and (5p23), according to which, ‘in God 
there is necessarily an idea that expresses the essence of  this or that human Body, 
under a species of  eternity’, and so also ‘something that pertains to the essence of  
the human Mind’.22 But it turns out that the ‘essence of  the human Mind’ is of  such 
a peculiar nature that it enables participation in what Nadler describes as a kind of  
eternity ‘available only to human minds’. Nadler is correct to highlight the special 
relationship that holds between a human mind and its own eternity. As Spinoza puts 
it at (5p23s), ‘we feel and know by experience that we are eternal [sentimus 
experimurque nos æternos esse]’. That is, our distinctively conscious and rational mental 
life renders our own eternity a matter for reflective awareness. But more than this, 
the extent to which we share in this quality of  existence is a function of  that very 
same rational activity and lived ‘life of  the mind’: for the ‘Mind’s essence consists in 
knowledge (by 2p11); therefore, the more the Mind knows things by the second and 
third kind of  knowledge, the greater the part of  it that remains’.23 In the case of  the 
self-necessitating existence with which human beings are capable of  actively 
identifying (which is available for them to do as and when they freely take up an 
‘authentic’ way of  life), this sense of  one’s own eternity, for Spinoza, seems to stand 
in a reciprocal cycle of  generation with that eternity itself. There is thus a kind of  
circle here, though not one that is obviously problematic or ‘vicious’. 
This points towards a rationale in Spinoza’s varied ascription of  eternity to ‘us 
[nos]’, to ‘the mind [mens]’, and sometimes to ‘a part of  the mind [pars mentis]’. For 
these distinct bearers of  the quality are in fact related to each other in a 
straightforward sequence. To begin with, Spinoza is clearly concerned, above all, with 
human beings. He maintains that ‘we feel and know... that we are eternal [nos æternos 
esse]’.24 But, in virtue of  what are we eternal? At this point, it is important to 
remember that the essence of  (a truly) human existence, for Spinoza, consists in a 
‘life of  the mind’. In the Political Treatise, he stresses ‘a human life, which is 
characterised not just by the circulation of  the blood and other features common to 
all animals, but especially by reason, the true virtue and life of  the mind’.25 So if  
one’s share of  eternity turns on the extent to which one lives ‘authentically’ and in 
synch with one’s nature or essence, then one’s eternity will clearly turn on the extent 
                                                          
22 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p22, 5p23. 
23 Ibid. 5p38dem. 
24 Ibid. 5p23s, emphasis added. 
25 Spinoza, Political Treatise, ch. 5, p. 62. 
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to which one lives this ‘life of  the mind’. But the life of  the mind is, specifically, a 
rational life of  the mind, in which one has actively formed adequate ideas about the 
world and one’s place in it, which, far from being ‘mute pictures on a panel’ to be 
enjoyed in a detached sphere of  ethereal contemplation, are instead concretely 
manifest in one’s practical engagements with the world and with others. Because 
there is no gap between some supposedly inert content of  an idea and a subsequent 
‘mental attitude’ towards it, but instead ideas are inherently active, and so consist in 
their practical manifestations, the ‘part of  the mind’ that Spinoza calls ‘rational’ really 
refers to a whole set of  patterns of  human behaviour and interactions. This ‘part of  
the mind’, is therefore only a ‘part’ in a somewhat metaphorical sense, but it is this 
‘part’ that, to the extent that it is consciously felt to be eternal, Spinoza regards as 
eternal. It is crucial to add this extra experiential requirement in light of  the 
reciprocal dependence, mentioned above, between one’s eternity and one’s awareness 
of  one’s eternity. 
However, this ‘part’ of  the human mind, to the extent that it consists in a truly 
authentic engagement with the world, is in fact also ‘part’ of  God’s eternal intellect, 
as proven at (2p11c): ‘the human Mind is a part of  the infinite intellect of  God’. In 
this realisation of  one’s nature, an exercise of  the specifically rational ‘part’ of  the 
mind at the same time invites an acknowledgement of  one’s identity with God or 
Nature, and this in turn triggers a conscious illumination of  one’s own existence as 
something shared with the rest of  a divine, yet natural, world. 
[T]he wise man, insofar as he is considered as such, is hardly troubled in spirit, 
but being, by a certain eternal necessity, conscious of  himself, and of  God, 
and of  things, he never ceases to be, but always possesses true peace of  mind 
[vera animi acquiescentia].26 
Again, when Spinoza describes the human mind as ‘part’ of  God’s intellect, this can 
only be a metaphorical use of  the term ‘part’, since the human mind, in a sense, 
transcends its own particularity and identifies with the whole of  God or Nature. In an 
earlier work, Spinoza describes this conscious convergence between the human and 
divine as ‘knowledge of  the union that the mind has with the whole of  Nature’.27 
Similarly, he speaks of  the capacity ‘for our mind to reproduce [referat] completely 
the likeness of  Nature’.28 Given his gradual eschewal of  the more dualistic account 
                                                          
26 Spinoza, Ethics, 5p42s. 
27 Spinoza, Treatise on the Emendation of  the Intellect, §13. 
28 Ibid. §42. 
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of  the mind in his earlier works and the eventual statement of  parallelism in the 
Ethics, even the notion of  ‘reproducing’ here - if  that is the most apposite rendering 
of  the Latin - would seem insufficient to capture the much stronger sense in which 
Spinoza envisages this union between the finite and infinite to take place. Perhaps 
better suited to this intention is the notion of  ‘constitution’, which need not boil 
down to mere aggregation. Elsewhere, for example, Spinoza refers to a community 
of  minds that jointly ‘constitute God’s eternal and infinite intellect [Dei æternum et 
infinitum intellectum constituant]’.29 
The special relationship that obtains between a human mind and its own quality 
of  eternity is, then, a function of  several traits peculiar to its nature or essence. 
Firstly, there is, as Harris puts it, a kind of  ‘transcendental self-overcoming’ in the 
enjoyment of  true knowledge, a movement towards grasping a world around oneself, 
or beyond the limits of  one’s body.30 This apparently paradoxical synthesis between 
the perspective of  the individual and an identification with a wider context in which 
one is embedded is, Harris suggests, precisely the point in Spinoza’s philosophy 
where the two incongruent categories of  the finite and the infinite are finally 
reconciled. Secondly, this quality of  eternity can be directly felt or experienced, that 
is, it can feature as the object of  one’s reflective awareness: ‘we feel and know by 
experience that we are eternal’.31 As discussed in Chapter 4, this capacity for self-
awareness, or consciousness, is a result of  the inherent complexity in both the 
human organism and its social context. Systems within systems, within yet more 
systems, are, under the attribute of  thought, sufficient to trigger a reflexive act 
through which one becomes the object of  one’s own awareness. Thirdly, in striving 
to consummate this intrinsic human capacity for simultaneous knowledge of  both 
self  and other, it becomes a conscious endeavour to achieve this as far as possible. In 
actively seeking true knowledge, expressed in an ‘authentic’ manner of  existence with 
consequences for one’s interactions with others as much as for personal salvation, a 
human being lives in accordance with his or her nature, or ‘exists from the necessity 
of  [his or her] nature alone, and is determined to act by [his-or-herself] alone’, that is, 
he or she is free.32 But a quality of  existence by which something lives or acts from 
the necessity of  its own nature (as encapsulated in that thing’s true definition) is also 
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precisely that which Spinoza calls eternity, i.e., ‘existence itself, insofar as it is 
conceived to follow necessarily from the definition alone of  the eternal thing’.33 
Thus it is this quality of  existence called ‘eternity’ that is peculiarly felt and pursued 
by a human mind, as embodied in the fullness of  human life. 
 
 
One ‘remaining’ question 
 
If  some sense can be made of  what exactly it is that is eternal, there remains at least 
one unresolved aporia. Giving rise to this remaining bump in the carpet is that which 
I have called the ‘metaphysical point’ of  the doctrine. For Spinoza’s eschatology is 
about more than the psychological benefits accrued from an Epicurean treatment of  
the question, precisely because of  the ontology underlying the claim that ‘the human 
mind can be of  such a nature that the part of  the mind which we have shown perishes 
with the body (see p21) is of  no moment in relation to what remains’.34 How can the 
eternity of  the mind be essentially about a quality of  existence attainable in ‘this life’, 
if  there is, as Spinoza says, ‘something’ of  the mind which ‘cannot be absolutely 
destroyed with the Body... [but] remains’?35 How can his doctrine be both more than 
just therapy aimed at alleviating the anxiety occasioned by human mortality, and 
nonetheless still fundamentally something I have been calling a ‘philosophical’ 
reinterpretation of  the more supernatural doctrines found in mainstream Abrahamic 
theology? Contrary to the kind of  interpretation that has emerged in this dissertation 
as a result of  taking the eternity of  the mind to be a form of  realised eschatology, 
Spinoza in these remarks seems almost to countenance a kind of  ‘afterlife’. 
One possibility for reconciling the general interpretative approach with such 
remarks is, like Harris, to translate the language in which they are expressed into a 
‘timeless idiom’. It is, for example, in such a timeless idiom that one can speak of  
two ‘remaining’ when five is divided by three.36 This strategy does indeed have 
something going for it, given the adoption of  a ‘qualitative’ reading of  Spinoza’s 
concept of  eternity, since this has to be understood as a timeless form of  existence, 
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and thus anything which, in virtue of  being eternal, is said to ‘remain’ after the death 
of  the body, must presumably do so in a timeless way. But, all things considered, it 
must be admitted that this strategy might ultimately seem insufficient to 
accommodate the implied temporality in these remarks, indeed, the implied 
continuation of  ‘something’ beyond the death of  the body. 
Another possibility is to acknowledge a certain temporality in Spinoza’s claim that 
‘something remains’, but maintain that this is nonetheless consistent with the 
interpretation developed so far. This might be done in various ways. The first of  
these would be to credit Spinoza with having substantiated, in the terms of  his 
metaphysical system, something which might be called an ‘afterlife of  legacy’. In 
order to gain true knowledge, framed under a species of  eternity, a person must in 
doing so appreciate his or her own existence under that same aspect: 
[B]ecause it is of  the nature of  reason to conceive things under a species of  
eternity (by 2p44c2), and it also pertains to the nature of  the Mind to conceive 
the Body’s essence under a species of  eternity (by p23), and beyond these two, 
nothing else pertains to the Mind’s essence (by 2p13), this power of  conceiving 
things under a species of  eternity pertains to the Mind only insofar as it 
conceives the Body’s essence under a species of  eternity.37 
In virtue of  this ‘noetic union’, discussed in Chapter 5, when one grasps the 
existence of  things sub specie æternitatis, one thereby becomes part of  that which can 
be grasped, or, insofar as one’s essence consists in the rational apprehension of  the 
existence of  things (that is, insofar as the ‘mind’, or ‘something of  the mind’, 
characterises one’s fundamental nature), ‘one’ thereby becomes part of  the whole 
which is universally available to any rational mind to grasp. Again, this is the self-
generating ‘circle’ mentioned above. The universally available conception of  the 
totality of  things under their eternal, which is to say, their ‘divine’, aspect, is precisely 
that which, in a very real sense, ‘remains’, because it is ever-present. 
This would not be a deflationary rendering of  the language of  ‘remaining’, but 
nor would Spinoza be helping himself  to anything beyond an essentially ‘realised’ or 
‘this-life’ eschatology. Those episodes of  a person’s life which manifest the 
possession of  adequate ideas are precisely those episodes in which a person lives 
according to his or her ‘inmost essence’, making such episodes part and parcel of  the 
same conception of  things sub specie æternitatis of  which those episodes are 
themselves manifestations. This, again, is the reciprocal circle, which is also why the 
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eternity of  a person’s mind is fundamentally something to be experienced by that 
person. In other words, these aspects of  a person’s life are ‘authentic’, as opposed to 
‘superficial’. As discussed in Chapter 7, a conception of  things sub specie æternitatis 
attends to things insofar as they exist according to their ‘inmost essence’, and not in 
terms of  ‘extrinsic denominations, relations, or... circumstances’, which can amount 
to only a ‘superficial’ grasp of  them.38 
One can therefore experience one’s own participation in this eternal conception 
of  things, but, moreover, that participation itself  becomes available as part of  that 
same conception, whoever might conceive it. There is thus, on this reading, a 
distinction between the subjectivity of  one’s eternity and the objectivity of  those 
same occurrences of  subjectivity, no longer being experienced by the subject, but 
nonetheless part of  the objective conception of  things sub specie aeternitatis. In this 
way, Spinoza’s ‘naturalised’ or ‘philosophical’ alternative to a supernatural 
eschatology involves a certain ‘afterlife of  legacy’. This is the widely held belief, 
particularly in more secular societies, that loved ones live on in our memory, if  not in 
some supernatural dwelling. What Spinoza has done, however, is to have woven this 
common sentiment into a formidable and unified metaphysical doctrine, lending 
substance to a widespread but perhaps insecurely held belief, so that even if  one day 
there were no one around to conceive these aspects of  things sub specie æternitatis, that 
overall conception would still, in Spinoza’s metaphysical sense, ‘remain’. 
Once again, however, this interpretative option may seem insufficient to capture 
Spinoza’s intentions. For one thing, although this version of  an ‘afterlife of  legacy’ is, 
in his hands, given a more substantive, metaphysical twist, nonetheless there may 
seem to be something overly deflationary in such a reading. For Spinoza does seem 
to be trying to articulate a kind of  eternity of  one’s mind (or part thereof), which, 
experienced as such, ‘remains’ after the death of  the body. Abstracting from this 
personal experience to the thoughts of  others might be thought to fall short of  
Spinoza’s ambitions in this passage. Possibly less deflationary would be to defer to 
the ‘thoughts’ of  God, or to God’s infinite intellect. Whether or not one’s lived 
moments of  eternity are acknowledged as such by others, they could be said to 
remain in God’s - timeless - conception of  things, to be in some sense contained as 
eternal essences in God’s attributes. One is tempted to reach for the term 
‘archetypes’ here, though to do so would seem to conflict with the immanence with 
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which such essences inform the individual things of  which they are essences. 
Nonetheless, such a reading might work by drawing a connection between the two 
kinds of  eternity discussed above. That is, because for each thing there is an essence 
somehow contained in God’s attributes, we human beings, in common with 
everything else, could be said to enjoy the first, ‘very minimal kind of  eternity’, as 
Nadler refers to it. It is this ‘minimal kind of  eternity’ that in a timeless sense 
‘remains’ in the fabric of  God’s nature, as expressed through the attributes and, in 
turn, the infinite and eternal modes. We human beings, however, also enjoy the 
second kind of  eternity described above, in virtue of  our own experience of  it. This 
second kind of  eternity, clearly understood in terms of  the ‘here and now’, is 
perhaps equally ‘encoded’ in the timeless essence which expresses our entire 
existence. So in these moments we can be said to experience an essence that 
‘remains’ beyond the death of  the body, an essence that includes these very moments 
themselves, but only ‘objectively’ when they are no longer being experienced as such. 
The diffident and speculative nature of  these various possibilities suggest a final 
evaluation that must remain somewhat qualified and nuanced. The moral to be 
gleaned from this discussion would seem to be that there might never be any fully 
confident resolution of  these tensions in Spinoza’s mature eschatology. However, far 
from leaving a dissatisfying question mark over the issue, this very result can be 
taken to point towards a positive conclusion, albeit one that, for these same reasons, 
must remain tentative. That is, it may be the very nature of  the question at hand that 
renders it unresolvable in the language and ratiocination of  philosophical discourse. 
If  the third kind of  cognition, scientia intuitiva, consists in an immediate flash of  
understanding, then it is perhaps simply incapable of  being captured in the step-by-
step reasoning of  the second kind of  cognition, ratio. I suggested in Chapter 5 that it 
is these moments of  immediate intellectual perception, in particular, that engender 
the intensity involved in experiencing one’s eternity, as described in Ethics V. Keeping 
this in view, it is perhaps less surprising that the essentially ratiocinative structure of  
the Ethics, including Part V, must ultimately fall short of  capturing what can only be 
experienced for oneself. What can be conjectured with more confidence is that 
Spinoza himself  appears to have experienced these intense feelings of  his own 
eternity and union with ‘the whole of  Nature’, and evidently felt compelled to try his 
utmost to convey this to his readers, even if  the only way to do so was through the 
ultimately inadequate medium of  ratio. Indeed, he seems aware of  this when he 
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acknowledges the somewhat attenuated status of  his discussion: ‘although we are 
already certain that the mind is eternal... we will consider the mind itself, as though it 





It remains only to assess the merits - or failings - of  this idiosyncratic response to the 
perennial question of  human mortality. Firstly, is the doctrine of  the eternity of  the 
mind presented in Ethics V warranted by, or even consistent with, the rest of  the 
philosophical system developed in the text? Some commentators have not hesitated 
to reject this final flourish as, not only an unfortunate flight from the meticulous 
logic of  the first four parts of  the work, but as a kind of  intellectual faux pas forever 
tarnishing Spinoza’s reputation. Bennett, for example, famously lamented what he 
took to be a complete lapse of  sanity in these pages, but suggested that this 
particular piece of  dead fruit could nevertheless be pruned away to salvage what was 
still on the whole a healthy philosophical tree. This is the preferred treatment of  
those who look to the Ethics for a kind of  early modern manifesto for what would 
eventually blossom in the twentieth century as a philosophy of  ‘physicalism’, 
according to which all phenomena are ultimately reducible to physical particles and 
processes. But in light of  all that has emerged in the course of  this dissertation, it 
should be clear that this particular appropriation of  Spinoza’s philosophy betrays the 
richness of  a system that he both envisaged and, more or less, succeeded in 
constructing. 
Far from recommending a reduction of  all phenomena to the ‘physical’ or, in his 
language, the ‘extended’, Spinoza made it clear that this is only one among many, 
indeed infinitely many, aspects (or ‘attributes’) of  the world. Even more critically, 
however, the suggestion that the final passages of  the Ethics could constitute an 
optional appendage to Spinoza’s larger philosophical system, that one is free to either 
‘take it or leave it’, would in fact deprive the system as a whole of  the final 
denouement that these passages supply. As Harris has put it, it is precisely at this 
point in Spinoza’s philosophy where the otherwise glaring tension between the 
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infinite and the finite is finally resolved. Although at one point Spinoza seems to 
characterise the eschatology of  Ethics V as an optional extra, suggesting that even ‘if  
we did not know that our mind is eternal, we would still regard as of  the first 
importance morality, religion, and absolutely all the things we have shown’, this can 
only be from the point of  view of  what people know.40 That is, it is not necessary for 
the ‘multitude’ to understand this recondite philosophical reconciliation between the 
infinite and the finite for them to understand and appreciate the benefits of  morality 
and true religion. But for those who do follow Spinoza’s reasoning up to this point, 
the doctrine of  the eternity of  the mind provides the piece of  the puzzle required 
for the final coherence of  the system as a whole. 
Secondly, and over and above the question of  how the doctrine hangs together 
with the rest of  Spinoza’s philosophy, can it be said to provide a satisfying response 
to the question of  human mortality? In response to this, it might be ventured that an 
assessment of  the doctrine’s success must turn on the extent to which one accepts 
the characterisation Spinoza gives of  the quality of  life he calls ‘eternal’, and, as 
discussed above, it becomes at this point perhaps a matter of  personal experience as 
to whether one recognises the kind of  existential condition involved. As has been 
elaborated in this chapter, the condition in question is one of  affirmation and 
conscious identification with the principle of  life animating and unifying the world in 
which one finds oneself. As Zac has articulated it, Spinoza’s philosophy is in a sense 
a philosophy of  life. God or Nature, considered as the fundamental and all-
encompassing principle of  existence, is really life itself, and to the extent that one 
consciously identifies with this eternal and divine principle, one attends to the 
positive expression of  existence, and not to its negation, death. To live in union with 
this principle is therefore to live a life free of  death. 
While the intricacies of  Spinoza’s metaphysical supplement to a purely 
psychological freedom from death must remain somewhat obscure, and perhaps 
even defy any merely ratiocinative treatment, the principal thesis of  this dissertation - 
that Spinoza’s conception of  freedom plays an indispensable role in his mature 
eschatology - has, I hope, been vindicated. With freedom and eternity occupying the 
same conceptual space, for Spinoza, it becomes clear in what way the quality of  
existence involved in the eternity of  the mind consists in a condition of  human 
freedom. Eternity is ‘existence itself, insofar as it is conceived to follow necessarily 
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from the definition alone of  the eternal thing’, a thing that is therefore free, precisely 
because it ‘exists from the necessity of  its nature alone, and is determined to act by 
itself  alone’.41 As human beings, we strive to live freely in accordance with our 
‘inmost essence’, and to the extent that we succeed in doing so, we join together in a 
shared pursuit of  knowledge, love and spiritual fulfilment. In the autonomous 
expression of  one’s true essence, which is to rationally apprehend an all-embracing 
Nature within which one lives (and in doing so acknowledge a union with it), one 
breaks free from the external constraints of  time and place peculiar to one’s 
parochial and ‘superficial’ vantage point, and exists freely (i.e., from one’s own 
nature) and eternally (i.e., timelessly). The vicissitudes of  ‘fortune’, in the form of  
unpredictable encounters with other finite things around us (including each other), 
have the potential to confuse this shared pursuit by casting a ‘superficial’ shadow of  
our true selves. We are thus our own greatest danger. Spinoza does not think that 
these conflicting human tendencies are destined to align once and for all in the 
utopian completion of  an unfolding logic, leaving the unpredictability and practical 
tensions of  society behind. Rather we remain responsible at all times for our own 
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